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1 Introduction
Central banks are important public institutions. Since the start of the Global Fin-
ancial Crisis, they have again been subject to close scrutiny. This is in large parts
due to the fact that some of the most influential central banks have become strongly
involved in the public sector’s efforts to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis.
For instance, the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and
the European Central Bank (ECB), among others, have pursued policies of highly
increased levels of market liquidity and low interest rates in order to stimulate eco-
nomic growth. Meanwhile, important changes have also occurred in numerous other
aspects of central banking.
This dissertation sheds light on selected issues and tendencies in central banking
that receive less attention due to the often ubiquitous focus on monetary policy
issues in scholarly articles and the media. The underlying idea for this work was
that a lot of data on different central bank issues is available but either not in
the right format or not extensively used. Capturing this information in a coherent
manner would, therefore, help to assess some issues of interest empirically, thereby
yielding new insights. This dissertation seeks to close gaps in the current literature
by creating a new central bank database. To this end, four chapters discuss issues
in the organisation of central banks. The structure of this work is as follows.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of different areas in the organisation of central
banks where changes have occurred in recent years. It points out that central banks
are, contrary to their reputation, actually flexible institutions that adapt their struc-
tures and objectives when necessary. Introducing a new dataset, I show that import-
ant changes have taken place in the last two and a half decades. Concerning central
bank structures, staff levels as well as regional and foreign branch networks have
been reduced, while central banks apparently have become slightly less centralised
despite a larger number of organisational elements. Concerning central bank object-
ives and their pursuit, important changes in the involvement of financial supervision,
the increased use of explicit inflation targets, and a more active and expansive man-
agement of international reserves are to be mentioned amongst others.
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Chapter 3 explores how hierarchies and relations within central banks have
evolved over time and seeks to identify possible drivers of change. As data availab-
ility is a hurdle in the field of organisational empirics, especially when it comes to
public institutions, this chapter shows a way of generating additional data by the
use of organisational charts. Analysing more than 1,200 historical organisational
charts, the oldest going back to the 19th century, I retrace organisational structures
across time and across countries. For a balanced sample for the period 2004-2015,
I find that central banks around the world have actively modified organisational
structures. On average, they have increased the number of organisational elements,
have become slightly less centralised, and employ fewer people. I show this by con-
structing different measures of organisational structures. Relating these measures
to selected country-specific variables cannot confirm anecdotal evidence pointing
to inter alia technological progress and budgetary pressure as important drivers of
change.
Chapter 4 is concerned with international reserves held by central banks. These
reserves are characterised by an eightfold increase during the last two decades. In
this chapter, we introduce new country-specific reserve data and examine determin-
ants of the currency composition of international reserves. The chapter is based on
panel data for the period 1996-2015 and 37 central banks. In particular, we identify
currency pegs and trade patterns as primary driving forces. Further, we examine
a possible break in euro-denominated asset holdings caused by the euro crisis. The
euro crisis appears to have been a throwback for the euro (EUR), which tempor-
arily seemed to challenge the US dollar (USD), but had an only partial impact on
determinants of international reserve compositions. In a final exercise, we estimate
currency compositions of international reserves of the three major non-disclosing
countries, id est (i.e.) China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.
In Chapter 5 there is an analysis of financial supervisory structures around the
world and the role these structures assign to central banks. Historically, one response
to the continuing integration of banking, securities, and insurance markets has been
a higher degree of integration in financial supervision. In the early days of financial
supervision, distinct supervisory authorities bearing responsibility for one sector
were the norm; later on more integrated approaches emerged. In the wake of the
Global Financial Crisis, which has revealed institutional flaws in supervisory systems
around the world, the question of the appropriate allocation of responsibilities of
prudential supervision has been subject to increased interest. This chapter does
not investigate the outcome of financial supervisory structures but tries to identify
country-specific factors determining these structures. Using a new dataset which
2
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covers the changing supervisory structure of 170 countries from 1990 to 2015, I
find that political factors influence the degree of supervisory consolidation and that
supervisory designs are correlated with the general organisation of public activities in
a country: Federalism, especially, is associated with lesser integration of supervisory
responsibilities, while government effectiveness and democracy is associated with a
higher degree of institutional integration.
Chapter 6 is a summary and discussion of the findings from the previous
chapters. Finally, summaries of the characteristics of central banks around the
world have been compiled into a handbook of central banks, which, among other
things, can be found in the Appendix.
3
2 Organisational Aspects of Central
Banks
4
Organisational Aspects of Central Banks
2.1 Motivation
Organisational structures of central banks as well as their objectives depend on
national needs and circumstances. For instance, a central bank belonging to a mon-
etary union might have a different structure and different tasks than a central bank
totally independent in its monetary policy. However, there are certain trends that
can be observed worldwide and which are the subject of this chapter. A new dataset
covering a variety of central bank characteristics helps to better understand recent
changes in various dimensions and to assess these empirically, as is done in Chapters
3-5. In this chapter, I show that central banks are evolving institutions comparable
to private firms in some aspects. These changes concern inter alia staffing trends,
regional and foreign branch networks, hierarchies and relations within central banks,
central bank responsibilities in financial supervision, or the use of inflation targets.
To give some examples, the Federal Reserve had nearly 24,000 employees in
1990. By 2015, its workforce was reduced to 18,600 people. During the same period
of time, Germany’s Bundesbank (BuBa) reduced its staff number from close to
18,000 to 11,000 employees, while thinning out its branch network from 210 to only
35. Apart from this, the overall number of foreign branches of central banks has not
changed much, but the geographical composition has evolved. New representative
offices have mainly been established in Asia, a fact which might be due to altered
economic weights in the world. Other diverse examples of the changing nature of
central banks can be seen in a careful organisational decentralisation or the success
of the monetary union model. While in the early 1990s important currency unions
felt apart (dissolution of Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia), this trend was
reversed with the establishment of the euro area. In 2016, there were four monetary
unions with 37 member states. This corresponds to roughly every fifth state in the
world being part of a monetary union nowadays.
This chapter presents quantitative features of central banks, which can be em-
pirically assessed. To this end, it presents selected issues from the sphere of cent-
ral bank governance and sets the background for the following Chapters 3, 4 and
5, which are basically statistical analyses of the data introduced in this chapter.
Sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.9 present exemplarily nine selected important areas in which
changes have occurred since the 1990s.
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2.2 Literature
Despite a focus on monetary policy issues, the academic literature has slowly devoted
itself more to other issues in the last years. Contributions range from central bank
independence over the decision-making process within central banks to questions
concerning the role of central banks as supervisory authorities, but also a multitude
of other issues. In the following, I present a selection of relevant studies.
The importance of central bank independence is a topic that seems not to have
lost scholars’ interest despite its age, as a multitude of recent publications indic-
ate. Earlier contributions include for example Grilli et al. (1991) who establish a
link between central bank independence and inflation rates. Alesina and Summers
(1993) confirm this finding but cannot find a link between central bank independence
and a country’s economic performance. Cukierman et al. (1993) make use of new
measures of central bank independence finding that independence has no growth ef-
fect in industrial countries but a positive one in less-developed countries. Eijffinger
and de Haan (1996) look at the “Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence”.
They agree that independent central banks in general achieve lower levels of in-
flation but that independent central banks are not automatically associated with
higher growth and employment rates. Further, as for the authors, for whom public
support for monetary stability is crucial, they are sceptical whether more central
bank independence would induce certain euro member states to commit themselves
to more monetary stability.
The decision-making process within central banks is an example of a more
recent research topic. In this field, the size and composition of decision-making
committees are in the spotlight. Contributions come inter alia from Blinder, who
examines questions such as why decision-making has been transferred from one single
governor to monetary policy committees in many cases and how decision-making in
committees works (for instance, Blinder, 2007). Morris and Lybek (2004) conduct
a “Survey of Boards and Management” of central banks and Gerlach-Kristen (2006)
argues that monetary policy should be conducted by a committee if the potential
output is uncertain. Berger et al. (2008) analyse monetary policy committees in over
30 countries from 1960 to 2000 and find a relation between membership size and
inflation with the lowest levels of inflation being achieved by committees comprising
seven to ten members. Further, Badinger and Nitsch (2014) explore the importance
of the nationality of ECB managers. To this end, they compile a dataset comprising
the nationalities of 190 senior managers since 1999. They find that nationalities
matter not only for hiring but indeed also for monetary policy decisions. This
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second finding is based on the observation that a Taylor rule-type model using
national representation weights is better able to explain monetary policy outcomes
than a similar model using economic weights of member countries.
The role of central banks as supervisory authorities in a financial system is the
subject of several contributions. It was pioneered by Schoenmaker and Goodhart
(1992) who explore the impact of supervisory integration and the role for central
banks. Masciandaro is the author of a multitude of important contributions such as
that of the “central bank fragmentation effect” which describes a trade-off between
integration of financial supervision and central bank involvement, i.e. the more
important a central bank is as a supervisory authority, the less likely supervision
is to be integrated (Masciandaro, 2007). Melecky and Podpiera (2013) search for
drivers of supervisory integration and find the level of economic development, the
size of an economy, and the experience of past financial crises to matter and confirm
a negative effect of central bank independence on supervisory integration. Nitsch
(2015) is concerned with interdependencies between the organisation of private and
public institutions and the organisation of financial supervision within countries.
Using a panel of 98 countries for the period 1999-2010, the paper finds, among other
things, that central bank independence and transparency are associated with less
central bank involvement in financial supervision and that measures of firm and
fiscal decentralisation are associated with more integrated financial supervision in
authorities other than the central bank.
The literature on other organisational aspects of central bank governance, which
are addressed in this paper, is rather limited. However, there is a certain number of
theoretical papers and a growing number of empirical papers on firm organisation,
which are helpful when dealing with the organisation of public entities such as central
banks. For instance, Rajan and Wulf (2006) analyse how corporate hierarchies have
flattened. These scholars find an increase in the number of positions reporting to
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and a decrease in the number of levels between
CEO and division heads. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), in a related paper, identify
(product market) competition as a driver of flattening of hierarchies.
Unlike other papers, this chapter will not deal with one single central banking
issue but aims at compactly assembling different aspects in order to present a greater
picture and to illustrate trends. To this end, it relies on quantitative data from
diverse sources.
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2.3 Areas of Change
As indicated above, there has been a variety of changes in different aspects of central
banking. The underlying data of this dissertation is compiled from different sources
such as the central banks’ homepages and annual reports, Bloomberg, past volumes
of the annual “Central Bank Directory” and “How countries supervise their banking,
insurers and securities markets” (since 2014: Directory of Financial Regulators), the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) (see IMF, 2016a) and other pieces of inform-
ation provided by the central banks themselves.1 Table 2.1 provides an overview of
data sources used in this dissertation and their content.
Table 2.1: Main data sources used in this dissertation
Name Content
Central bank annual reports Information on recent internal and external
developments, staff numbers, balance sheets,
international reserves, organisational
structures.
Central Bank Directory Basic information on central banks such as
year of establishment, contacts, staff
numbers, domestic and foreign branches.
How countries supervise their banking,
insurers and securities markets / Directory of
Financial Regulators
Individual supervisory structures worldwide,
division of responsibilities of financial market
supervision.
Bloomberg Basic information on central banks and stock
prices of publicly traded central banks.
IMF Annual Reports on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER)
Classifications of exchange rate arrangements
and monetary policy frameworks.
As the different data sources also differ in their time and country coverage, my
dataset can be best understood as being composed of several subdatasets. While in
Chapter 2 and in the “Central Bank Handbook” of the Appendix data from different
1The regular bibliography of this dissertation is followed by three separate sections comprising,
firstly, all central bank annual reports, secondly, all volumes of the “Central Bank Directory”,
and, thirdly, all volumes of “How countries supervise their banking, insurers and securities
markets” (since 2014 of the “Directory of Financial Regulators”) which were used during the
work on this dissertation. In the following chapters, distinct volumes of these three sources are
only quoted when I refer to a particular figure or table originating from a particular volume of
one of these sources.
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sources is assembled for illustrative purposes, Chapters 3-5 are more homogeneous in
this matter (see Table 2.2): Chapter 3, which is concerned with organisational struc-
tures of central banks, is based on organisational charts that are mostly extracted
from central bank annual reports. Chapter 4, which analyses currency compositions
of international reserves, is also based on information gathered from central bank
annual reports (mostly from balance sheets). Chapter 5, which examines financial
supervisory systems around the world, is based on several editions of “How coun-
tries supervise their banking, insurers and securities markets” and of the “Directory
of Financial Regulators”. The homepages of the respective supervisory authorities
complete the data of that chapter. Table 2.2 provides information on which chapter
is based on which source and suggests a certain exclusiveness in the use of the men-
tioned data sources.
Table 2.2: Data used in Chapters 3-5
Chapter Exact origin of data
(dependent variables)
Other studies relying on
same or similar data





central banks, vast majority of
charts taken from central bank
annual reports.
No. To the best of my
knowledge first making use





(Mostly) balance sheets from
central bank annual reports.
Same data source used by
Wong (2007) and Beck and






How countries supervise their
banking, insurers and
securities markets / Directory
of Financial Regulators and
homepages of supervisory
authorities.
Different data source but
similar data used by Melecky
and Podpiera (2013) for
similar purpose.
The following nine subsections present some purely descriptive findings and are
based on different, mostly unbalanced, subsets of the dataset for different spans of
time and for different groups of central banks.2
2Table 6.1 in the Appendix lists all countries within the dataset. Also see Table 6.2 in the
Appendix for a list of central bank establishments in chronological order since the dissolution
of the former Eastern bloc. Worldwide, over 30 central banks were established or re-established
between 1989 and 2015. The youngest central banks worldwide and in this sample are those of
South Sudan and Timor-Leste, both established in 2011.
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2.3.1 Staffing
In general, central bank staffing levels between countries are largely unequal. Some
small countries’ central banks might function with fewer than 100 employees. The
other extreme are very large central banks. For example, the People’s Bank of
China has more than 128,000 employees, which makes it the largest central bank
in the world in terms of staffing. In the last decades, there has been a downward
trend in staffing levels for many countries, which might in part be explained by
new technologies that have enabled central banks to execute their tasks with less
personnel. Figure 2.1 illustrates how the average central bank staffing level in our
sample has decreased over time. While the average central bank had over 4,000
employees in 1990, this number was cut to under 2,500 by 2015. Strong reductions
were the case for, inter alia, the Bank of England (from 5,400 to under 4,000), the
Banque de France (from 17,000 to 12,000), the Bundesbank (from 18,000 to 11,000)
and - particularly drastic - the Bank of Finland (from 960 to 390 employees). Not
surprisingly, the reductions were particularly pronounced in the central banks of
the euro area, which have lost their main responsibility. Overall, there is a trend
of staffing levels to decline, but it is not true for all central banks. Some central
banks have kept the number of employees unchanged such as the Bank of Greece
and Denmark’s Nationalbank, and others like the central bank of Malaysia have
even increased their personnel from 1990 to 2015. Nevertheless, the large central
banks with massive reductions in their workforce were the driving forces behind this
evolution.
The number of central bank employees per 100,000 inhabitants is a useful meas-
ure to get an idea of whether a central bank is large compared to a country’s popu-
lation. This number varies substantially across countries, as shown by the following
example for 2015: At this point in time, four Bank of Japan employees per 100,000
inhabitants stand in contrast to 44 Bank of Russia employees per 100,000 inhab-
itants. By this measure, the Bank of Russia appears overstaffed, while the Bank
of Japan is seemingly able to fulfil its duties with a significantly smaller staff (see
Figure 2.2). The graphical illustration also reveals that this ratio is typically higher
for smaller countries.3
3Obviously, central bank size is not exclusively determined by the size of an economy. Also, central
bank tasks play a role. For example, Mr. Heikenstein, former Governor of Sveriges Riksbank
(2003-2005), advocated a concentration on core activities (see Heikensten, 2003). The Sveriges
Riksbank indeed managed to reduce its workforce from 755 employees in 1995 to 341 in 2015
(-55%).
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Source: Central bank annual reports.
Figure 2.2: Central bank employees per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015




























Source: Central bank annual reports.
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2.3.2 Regional and Foreign Representations
Not only staff levels have been reduced, but branch networks have also been downs-
ized over time. If the average central bank in our sample had nearly 30 regional
branches in 1990, this number has been reduced by half over the last 25 years,
which means an important scaling back of central banks’ regional presence (see
Figure 2.3).









Source: Central bank annual reports.
Regional branches have historically been important for currency issuance, for
other services and also for representative purposes. Several factors have plausibly
contributed to the reduction in the number of branch offices, of which an important
one should be technological progress,4 similar to the case of the number of employ-
ees. Figure 2.4 shows the change in the number of branches for selected economies
compared to 1995.
4A paper of the Bank for International Settlements devotes a section to regional representations
of central banks. It finds a downscaling of branch networks and considers, inter alia, declined
communication and travel costs as well as gains in efficiency in particular in “industrial-type
and administrative operations” as important factors (see Ortiz, 2009, pp. 168-171).
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Source: Central bank annual reports.
Concerning foreign representations, there is no clear trend. While most central
banks have no foreign offices in other states or in international institutions such as
the IMF, the overall number of foreign branches did not change significantly. At
present, there are about 30 central banks worldwide maintaining foreign branches.
The latest to announce the build-up of an overseas office network has been the
National Bank of Hungary, which is planning around 12 new representations (see
Beacon, 2015).
Apart from the low overall number of foreign representations, an important
aspect is where these branches are located. A particularly striking observation is
that new foreign branches have opened their doors mainly in Asia during the last
ten years. In the meantime, some offices in Europe have been shut down. This
observation might stem from the growing economic weight of Asia and an increasing
importance of Asian currencies in trade and in international reserves. Figure 2.5
illustrates how the geographical concentration of foreign branches is moving from
west to east. While out of 54 foreign representations in 1990 only eight were located
in Asia, this number has grown to 20 of a total of 71 overseas offices in 2015. Or
in other words: In 1990, around 15% of all foreign representations were located in
Asia. In 2015, Asia’s share had nearly doubled to more than 28%. The respective
13
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shares for Europe were 50% in 1990 and 39% in 2015 (see Figure 2.5).5
Figure 2.5: Foreign representations 1990 and 2015
Foreign representation: number of branches









PBC (2014): Frankfurt, London, New York, Sydney, Tokyo.
2
Source: Central bank annual reports.
2.3.3 Hierarchies and Organisational Relations
From research on firms, it is commonly accepted that organisational structures are
related to business outcomes. For the public sector, not subject to profit maximisa-
tion, organisational structures should, despite different objectives, also play a role
for central bank outcomes. Observers of private institutions argue that those are
becoming less hierarchical and flatter (see for instance Wulf, 2012). Furthermore,
recent anecdotal evidence suggests that structural changes have taken place in the
public sector in the last years. To the best of my knowledge, no one has yet made the
effort to follow these structural changes for an extended period of time for central
banks. My new database enables me to do so (see chapter 3).
By quantifying organisational charts with a set of five different measures, which
are in part borrowed from the related literature (see for instance Guadalupe and
Wulf, 2010), I can indeed confirm important changes in the internal organisation of
central banks. Especially, I find a trend towards more organisational units and less
centralisation. In Chapter 3, these observations are described in detail and linked to
potential explanatory factors. Figure 2.6 illustrates these developments and reveals
that central banks are also more flexible in terms of management structures than
their reputation would suggest.
5Table 6.3 of the Appendix gives an overview of central bank foreign branches in 2015.
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2.3.4 Involvement in Financial Supervision
An important issue in central banking is the participation in prudential financial
market supervision, which consists of the three main fields of banking, securities
markets, and insurance supervision. This issue is dealt with in Chapter 5. Not
in all, but in most countries, central banks play a major role in the supervision of
the banking sector. There are three possible degrees of integration of a country’s
supervisory architecture: All three market segments being supervised by distinct
authorities (no integration of supervision); at least two market segments being su-
pervised by one authority (partial integration of supervision); or all three segments
being supervised by a single authority (total integration of supervision).
Historically, the classical approach to financial supervision consists of three sep-
arate authorities each of which supervises one separate financial market segment. In
the course of a continuing integration of financial markets and a growing importance
of Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries, the integrated approach to financial super-
vision progressively gained popularity (“all-finance supervision”) in the 1990s (see
Podpiera and Cihak, 2006, pp. 4-5), pioneers being Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
With the establishment of the British Financial Services Authority in 1997, for the
first time a large economy transferred the task of supervising the entire financial
system to a sole authority. This event marked the “breakthrough” of the integrated
design (see Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2011a, p. 10). In the following years, the
British model was adopted by, inter alia, Korea (1999), Japan and Hungary (2000),
Germany and Austria (2002), Poland (2008), and Finland, and Switzerland (both
2009). Despite the fact that certain countries have again dissolved their Financial
Supervisory Authorities (FSAs) in the last years (United Kingdom (UK), Hungary),
the trend in the last decades has nevertheless been one of increasing integration of
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supervision: While there were only three integrated supervisors in 1990, there were
over 40 in 2015 and, simultaneously, the number of countries with partially in-
tegrated authorities increased, whereas the traditional model lost ground. At the
same time, exclusive central bank responsibility for banking supervision has strongly
decreased. Figure 2.7 illustrates the rise in the number of single consolidated super-
visors over time. In Chapter 5, I link variables of political, economical, technological
and financial development to supervisory structures of 170 countries.











Sources: Central bank annual reports, How countries supervise their banking, insurers and secur-
ities markets, Directory of Financial Regulators.
2.3.5 Exchange Rate Regimes
The exchange rate regime choice belongs to the very important central bank char-
acteristics due to its consequences for the economy as a whole and for the central
bank itself. Theoretical debates centre around costs and benefits of monetary in-
tegration and of monetary independence. For instance, Mundell (1961) developed a
fundamental theory concerning under which conditions monetary integration is be-
neficial (“Optimum Currency Areas” (OCA)) and Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) coined
the term of the macroeconomic trilemma or the impossible trinity. Both of these
terms have gained renewed popularity with the euro crisis and the difficult economic
16
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recovery of Greece and the periphery of the euro area.6
De facto classifications of worldwide exchange rate regimes are provided by
the IMF in their AREAER database (IMF (2016a)). This piece of information is
accessible for the period 1999 to 2016 and distinguishes hard pegs, soft pegs, and
floating regimes.7 Other managed arrangements are summarised under the category
“residual”.
The last years were characterised by the catching up of intermediate arrange-
ments in the “soft peg” category: In 2004 for example, the IMF staff categorised
only 51 states out of a total of 187 states as de facto soft peggers. In 2016, 76 out
of 192 states were categorised as de facto soft peggers. During the same period, the
respective numbers for hard peggers were 48 (2004) and 25 (2016) and for floaters 88
and 71 (see Figure 2.8). Hence, there is no evidence for a vanishing of intermediate
arrangements (see IMF, 2007b, p. 8).












Hard pegs Soft pegs Floating regimes
Source: IMF (2016a). Own calculations.
6For a discussion of the exchange rate regime choice from a historical perspective Bordo (2003)
is a recommendable starting point.
7Hard pegs are exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender and currency board
arrangements. Soft pegs are conventional pegged arrangements, pegged exchange rates with
horizontal bands, stabilised arrangements, crawling pegs, and crawl-like arrangements. Floating
regimes (market-determined rates) are floating and free-floating arrangements.
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2.3.6 Monetary Unions
Historically, there have been numerous monetary unions and “since World War II,
economies have exited currency unions at an average rate of one per year” (see
Rose, 2008, p. 1). Nevertheless, during the last years membership size has been
growing at a positive rate and plans for new unions have regularly been announced.
This issue is important because it has several direct implications for member states’
central banks. Most prominently, membership in a monetary union takes away a
central bank’s exclusive responsibly for monetary policy. From a central bank’s
point of view, this could impact the entire organisation (e.g. staffing needs, internal
structures and relations, the country’s exchange rate regime, the involvement in
financial supervision, and the holding of international reserves, to mention only a
few).
The end of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia caused break-
ups of important currency unions. Since then, the trend has been reversed and
several countries have joined monetary unions. In 2016, there were four central
banks conducting monetary policy for a union of several countries each: The ECB
for the European Monetary Union (EMU), the Central Bank of West African States
(BCEAO: Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) for the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA: Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-
Africaine), the Bank of Central African States for the Economic and Monetary
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC: Communauté Économique et Monétaire
de l’Afrique Centrale) and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) for the
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). Together these four monetary unions
include 41 states, or roughly every fifth state in the world. Figure 2.9 shows the
return of the currency union model. The euro area is primarily responsible for this
strong growth, as it has grown from 12 member states since its establishment in
1999 to 19 member states in 2016.8
The UEMOA reached its current membership size of eight countries with the
8The first countries to physically use the EUR were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (2002). Slovenia
(2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania
(2015) introduced the EUR subsequently.
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accession of Guinea-Bissau in 1997.9 Both the CEMAC10 and the ECCU11 have
not seen any enlargement since the 1980s and comprise six and eight member states
respectively. Plans for the establishment of future common currency unions exist
at different stages for instance for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)12 and the
East African Community (EAC)13.











European Monetary Union West African Economic and Monetary Union
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa Eastern Carribean Currency Union
Sources: Central bank annual reports, Central Bank Directory. Own calculations.
2.3.7 Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting is another trend in central banking and is considered a possible
remedy to persistently high inflation rates by the central banks of some countries
suffering from this problem.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was the first central bank worldwide to an-
9The current members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, and Togo.
10The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa is constituted by Cameroon, the
Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo.
11The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union consists of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenad-
ines.
12The GCC comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emir-
ates.
13The East African Community is formed of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania,
and Uganda.
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nounce an explicit price inflation target in 1989. In the next years, Canada (1991),
the UK (1992), and Australia (1993) soon also adopted inflation targeting frame-
works. At present, the IMF names 38 countries as inflation targeters in their de facto
classification of exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy frameworks (see
IMF, 2016a). Figure 2.10 illustrates the growing number of central banks around
the world which have committed themselves to targets in price level increases.14 The
Fed and the ECB do not consider themselves inflation targeters but are sometimes
referred to as implicit inflation targeters due to their more or less openly expressed
inflation objectives (see former Fed Governor Meyer, 2001).15 Overall, the trend to-
wards inflation targeting appears to be an important and far-reaching development
in central banking. Table 2.3 provides additional information on current inflation
targeting central banks (i.e. dates when IT was introduced and recent targets).










Sources: Central bank annual reports, Hammond (2012), IMF (2016a).
14Spain, Finland, and Slovakia abandoned inflation targeting after their EMU accession.
15In particular, the Fed has an employment target apart from its inflation target (dual mandate).
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Table 2.3: Countries with inflation targeting framework
Country Year of adoption Inflation target for 2016
New Zealand 1989 2.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Canada 1991 2.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
United Kingdom 1992 2.0%
Australia 1993 2.0% - 3.0%
Sweden 1995 2.0%
Czech Republic 1997 2.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Israel 1997 1.0% - 3.00%
Korea, South 1998 2.5%-3.5%
Poland 1998 2.5% +/-1.0 percentage point
Brazil 1999 4.5% +/-2.0 percentage points
Chile 1999 3.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Colombia 1999 3.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
South Africa 2000 3.0% - 6.0%
Thailand 2000 2.5% +/-1.5 percentage points
Hungary 2001 3.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Iceland 2001 2.5%
Mexico 2001 3.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Norway 2001 2.5%
Peru 2002 2.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Philippines 2002 3.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Guatemala 2005 4.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Indonesia 2005 4.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Romania 2005 2.5% +/-1.0 percentage point
Armenia 2006 4.0% +/-1.5 percentage points
Turkey 2006 5.0% +/-2.0 percentage points
Ghana 2007 8.0% +/-2.0 percentage points
Uruguay 2007 3.0% - 7.0%
Serbia 2009 4.0% +/-1.5 percentage points
Georgia 2009 5%
Albania 2009 3.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Moldova 2010 5.0% +/-1.5 percentage points
Dominican Republic 2012 4.0% +/-1.0 percentage point
Uganda 2012 5.0% +/-2.0 percentage points
Japan 2013 2.0%




Sources: Hammond (2012), central bank annual reports, central bank homepages.
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2.3.8 International Reserves
International reserves under central bank management are another field in which
important changes have occurred. The IMF defines these reserves as “those ex-
ternal assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities
for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for intervention in exchange mar-
kets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related purposes (such as
maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for
foreign borrowing)” (see IMF, 2007a, paragraph 6.64). As most central banks are
very discrete in the management of their foreign reserve assets, little is known about
recent trends in this issue. The IMF publishes aggregated reserve holdings broken
down by the most important international currencies (Currency Composition of Of-
ficial Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database (IMF, 2017)) but it does not
report country-specific reserves. Only 37 states disclose the height and composition
of their international reserves. This piece of information is part of our dataset and
is used in Chapter 5.
Our data as well as IMF data reveal strong increases in the size of interna-
tional reserves, particularly between 1996 and 2015. For instance, the broader IMF
COFER data shows a mere 1.6tn USD of Foreign Exchange Reserves for the year
1996, but over 11tn USD for the year-end 2016. Concerning the composition, the
USD has, during this period, slightly increased its share among the allocated re-
serves (from 62% to 63%) and the EUR has, over the years, been able to establish
itself as the world’s second international currency with a share of over 20% in 2016.
Simultaneously, the Japanese yen (JPY) and the British pound (GBP) took turns
as the number three reserve currency. Figure 2.11 portrays the respective currency
shares in the international reserves over time. In chapter 5, we ask for determ-
inants of the composition of international reserves using individual country data.
Three developments are particularly remarkable: First, the sheer increase in reserve
volumes; second, the enduring dominance of the USD; third, an increased diversific-
ation of reserves, which manifests itself in the rise of reserve holdings denominated
in currencies such as the Chinese renmimbi (RMB), the Australian dollar (AUD),
the Canadian dollar (CAD), the Singapore dollar (SGD), or the Swiss franc (CHF).
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Source: IMF (2017).
2.3.9 Ownership
Compared to other trends in central banking the question of central bank owner-
ship is a rather unambiguous issue as it has changed only little over the last dec-
ades. While, historically, private ownership of central banks had been considered
the norm, since the end of World War II, central banks have been increasingly na-
tionalised and the model of state ownership has by far become dominant. Following
the nationalisation of the central bank of Austria in 2010, there remain only nine
central banks allowing for private shareholders (see Figure 2.12). For instance, Bar-
tels et al. (2016) discuss the issue of private central bank ownership in the context
of a possibly different financial behaviour of private central banks, which they deny.
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Source: Central bank homepages. Own taxonomy.
The central banks allowing for private ownership are located in Belgium, Greece,
Italy, Japan, San Marino, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.
Of this dwindling number of non 100% publicly-owned central banks the stocks
of five are traded on stock exchanges or over-the-counter (OTC) and reliably pay
dividends: The National Bank of Belgium, the Bank of Greece, the Bank of Japan,
the South African Reserve Bank, and the Swiss National Bank. The National Bank
of Belgium has 50% of its shares traded on Euronext Brussels and the other 50%
held by the Belgian state. The Bank of Greece limits state ownership to 35%,
its share being listed at the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) (see Bank of Greece,
2016). The Bank of Japan is characterised by a ratio of 55% public to 45% private
ownership (see Bank of Japan, 2016), with its shares being traded on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE). The Reserve Bank of South Africa is completely in private
hands and its stock has been listed on an Over-the-counter Share Transfer Facility
(OTCSTF) market since 2005 (until 2002: JSE Securities Exchange) (see South
African Reserve Bank, 2016). Finally, the stock of the Swiss National Bank is listed
on the Swiss Exchange (SIX), of which around 60% are owned by public entities and
40% are owned by private shareholders (see Swiss National Bank, 2016b).
Unlike these five central banks, the national banks of Italy, the US, and Turkey
do not trade on the stock market, but also have private shareholders. The central
bank of the US, consisting of twelve regional branches, is completely owned by
private banks, while the Bank of Italy allows for banks, insurance and reinsurance
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companies as shareholders, in addition to some public entities (see Federal Reserve
System (2017), Bank of Italy (2017a)). 55% of the Central Bank of Turkey are under
public (treasury) and 45% under private ownership (mainly banks) (see Central Bank
of the Republic of Turkey, 2017). According to the taxonomy of Figure 2.12, the
stock of the Bank of Greece is most comparable to the stock of a private company
in terms of its primarily private ownership and liquidity.16
For the central banks traded on the stock market, private investors can acquire
stocks and realise profits and losses from dividend payments and stock price fluctu-
ations. Figure 2.13 exemplarily shows the stock market performance of the National
Bank of Belgium, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan. In addition,
Figure 2.14 shows the stock performance of the Bank of Greece. The Bank of Greece
has experienced a tremendous loss in its market value since 2008. Whereas the price
for one share in the Bank of Greece fluctuated between 70 and 80 EUR in 2007, a
stock price of close to 10 EUR at the end of 2016 implies a significantly lower market
capitalisation of the Greek central bank than before the financial crisis.






















National Bank of Belgium Swiss National Bank Bank of Japan (right axis)
Source: Bloomberg.
16Table 6.4 in the Appendix presents selected characteristics of the respective ownership models
of all nine central banks providing for private shareholders.
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This chapter shows the flexibility of central banks along several dimensions. Cent-
ral banks have not only turned out to be flexible and creative in the conduct of
monetary policies vis-à-vis a financially and economically troubled environment. In
contrast, one can say that they actively adapt their structures and objectives when
needed. Using new central bank data from different sources, I show that since the
1990s changes have appeared in areas as different as human resources, organisational
structures, the involvement in financial supervision, or the management of interna-
tional reserves, to name only a few. Apart from this, the motivation of this chapter
is to give an insight into the dataset and to place the econometric analyses of the
following chapters into the wider context of this dissertation.
26
3 Evolving Hierarchies in Central
Banks
27
Evolving Hierarchies in Central Banks
3.1 Motivation
Most business leaders would agree that the success of a firm does not only depend
on competent managers and employees but also on their interconnection with one
another. The relation between a firm’s internal organisation and its outcome is sup-
ported by a battery of empirical studies. For instance, the size of a company in terms
of employees as well as factors such as horizontal and vertical relations within the
company are regularly considered determinants of the firm’s innovative capability or
its efficiency. Not surprisingly, organisational structures of firms constantly undergo
important changes. One recent and often cited example of a major organisational
change in the private sector consists of the claimed flattening of hierarchies.
For public institutions1, the importance of organisational structures appears
less clear. Firstly, because organisational structures of public institutions have not
been subjected to the same interest by scholars and therefore have scarcely been
examined systematically. Secondly, because the output of public institutions is
more difficult to quantify. Whereas firm success can be measured in terms of profits
or cost-income ratios, functions and objectives of public institutions are different by
nature.2 Nevertheless, the presumption that in the public sector internal structures
are also related to outcomes appears conclusive.
Given the limited empirical research on the internal organisations of public
institutions compared to that on private institutions, this chapter helps narrow this
gap. In particular, I examine administrative structures of central banks as prominent
public institutions - usually considered conservative and stable - both across time
and countries. The contribution of this chapter shall be twofold: Firstly, making use
of historical organisational charts, I compile a new dataset which retraces internal
changes for central banks over an extended period of time. This approach is, to
the best of my knowledge, unique and is used for the first time in an academic
contribution. Secondly, I confront my findings with evidence for the private sector.
I conclude that organisational structures in central banks have changed in several
1The concept of institutions has no sole definition but is very different according to the respective
scientific discipline. A possible general and very broad definition in the field of organisational
economics could explain institutions as groups of individuals working together for a common
purpose. Two prominent forms of the latter are public institutions and private firms. The
best-known difference between those two is whether the realisation of profits is a primary aim.
Closely connected to this question is the nature of the goods public institutions and private
enterprises provide.
2Hasan and Mester (2008, p. 10) put this in a nutshell when writing that “the multiplicity of
objectives makes central banks complicated institutions. Although central banks and govern-
ments care about seigniorage income and operating within their budgets, as public institutions,
central banks are much less driven by the profit motive than are private corporations.”
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dimensions but that a comparison to the private sector remains difficult.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
background of this chapter and some related literature, Section 3 introduces the
data, which is then analysed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the findings.
3.2 Some Background on Organisational Economics
The organisation of firms and to a lesser degree that of public entities have been
popular research topics since the end of the 19th century, with the main part of this
research clearly focusing on firms and stemming from scholars from the broad field
of business administration.3 Several papers identify competition accompanied by
new concepts of management as the main driving force for firms to modify internal
structures (see for instance Bloom et al., 2012, p. 4). While public institutions
normally have not been exposed to this same type of pressure due to their different
nature and objectives, this might have partially changed in the last years. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that increased demands for cost effectiveness and more customer
orientation might have induced important changes for the public sector and might
have brought it closer to the private sector.
In the following, I outline both the “classic” theoretical background and the
still limited but growing literature on empirics of organisational economics. I only
very briefly touch on the arguments of flat and tall hierarchies from the (applied)
perspective of a public institution.4
3.2.1 Theories on Organisational Structures and Change
The list of literature adding to our understanding of the structures of organisations
and their evolution is impressive: Management theories, explanations based on per-
sonal observations, and, of course, coherent theories, which mostly have not yet
3When reviewing the literature, economists seem to have understood the importance of organisa-
tion only much later. Marshall (1920) and Schumpeter (1942) are among those who recognized
the importance of organisation early on and can be considered notable early exceptions. Coase
(1937), for instance, must not be forgotten when discussing the existence of firms. His “Nature
of the Firm” explains why firms are established at all instead of simply entering contracts in
the marketplace, but his work is above all connected to transaction costs and not the organisa-
tional structure of the firm itself. Empirical analyses of organisational structures can be found
hesitantly from the late 1990s on.
4A good and compact overview of prominent organisation theories can, for instance, be found in
“Writers on Organizations” by Pugh and Hickson (2007).
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been empirically tested.5 In the following section, I limit myself to summarising a
selection of influential contributions directly related to this chapter.
To the group of management theories belong the works of Fayol (1916) and
Taylor (1947), who are credited with having written the first general theory of or-
ganisations and the first theory of scientific management respectively. Terms coined
by Fayol such as the “unity of command” and the “scalar chain” are still in use 100
years later, while Taylor already promoted an integral management approach where
workers and managers share a common goal 70 years ago.6
Worthy (1950) delivers an example of an explanation based on personal obser-
vations. Having worked for Sears, Roebuck & Co for many years, Worthy recognised
some important advantages of “broad” or “flat” hierarchies over “vertical” or “tall”
hierarchies and argued against too much specialisation for the sake of employee sat-
isfaction and higher efficiency - an idea promoted by many start-ups and modern
tech companies.
The question of why organisational structures change over time is addressed
among others by Chandler (1973) who states that the structure of an organisation
follows the organisation’s strategy. According to this author, organisational changes
and in particular the advent of the managerial hierarchy and modern enterprise can
be understood as a response to market and technological pressures. DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) observe an increasing convergence in the structures of organisations
from the same field and refer to this phenomenon as “institutional isomorphism”.
Their theory ascribes this development to external pressure, the imitation of an
alleged role model, and the professionalisation of managers with similar educational
backgrounds.
A further theoretical contribution of direct importance when analysing organ-
isational structures comes from Aghion and Tirole (1997), who emphasise the dif-
ference between formal authority and real authority. While the first consists of
5Moreover, the business press, in parts, reveals important paradigm shifts but is not considered
in this place.
6Contemporaneously with Taylor, Weber (1947) in his theory of authority structures distinguishes
organisations according to the source of their legitimation (charismatic, traditional, legal) and
considers only legal authority rational and bureaucracy as the purest and most efficient form
hereof, while also being the prevalent method of organisation in modern societies.
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the “right to decide”, the second refers to the “effective control over decisions”.7
This difference becomes important in Section 3, where organisational structures are
quantified.
3.2.2 Empirics on Organisational Economics: What Has Been
Done so Far?
Empirically testing the predictions of the theories of organisational economics is a
field only partially cultivated and therefore leaving ample space for future research
projects. With rapidly increasing and better data availability, I expect to see a surge
in the number of contributions in this research area. Several important contributions
already exist.
The papers most related to and most influential for this chapter are those
empirically assessing organisational structures of firms on the basis of new panel
data sets. To this category belong, in particular, the joint works of Colombo and
Delmastro (1999) and of Rajan and Wulf (2006). The former analyse hierarchies
based on a large panel data set (438 Italian metalworking plants) and quantify
structures in terms of span of control and the allocation of decision-making powers.
The source of their data are questionnaires answered by plant managers. They find
that the choice of an organisational configuration can be well explained by the “loss of
control phenomenon”, that organisations change only little and slowly and that firm
size plays a crucial role for organisational change (see Colombo and Delmastro, 1999,
p. 272). Rajan and Wulf (2006) also examine hierarchies and analyse more than
300 US firms during the period 1987-1998. They find an increased span of control
of CEOs (breadth) and a reduced number of positions between CEOs and division
heads (height) and as an overall result a flattening of organisational hierarchies
within firms. Their paper relies on data from “a confidential compensation survey”
comprising job descriptions and reporting levels and relationships of management
positions (see Rajan and Wulf, 2006, p. 761). In this chapter, I apply some measures
similar to those of these two papers but rely on a very different data source.
7The important theoretical contribution of Williamson (1975) will be mentioned at this place,
although more distant. Williamson illustrates why not all transactions are conducted through
markets but also within organisations such as firms. Decisive is the relative size of the informa-
tion cost of the respective transactions. When regarding markets and hierarchies as alternatives
and a market transaction is subject to higher information costs, the hierarchical solution be-
comes more attractive. Finally, there seems to be a limit to growth in hierarchies explained by
changes in internal structures within growing organisations that then result in increased costs
of the hierarchical transaction.
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Other studies are less concerned with hierarchies but rather focus on cent-
ralisation within firms. For instance, Bloom et al. (2012) measure the degree of
decentralisation within firms by surveying plant managers. By taking z-scores of
the answers and aggregating these, they obtain country-specific indices of decentral-
isation. They find rule of law, trust, non-hierarchical religions, and product market
competition to be associated with more decentralisation. Acemoglu et al. (2007)
measure decentralisation according to whether a firm’s units are organised as profit
or cost or production centres, where the existence of profit centres corresponds to
more decentralisation. Their analysis of French and British firm panel data shows
that “firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous envir-
onments and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization” (see their
abstract). Also, Marin and Verdier (2008) use survey data from 660 Austrian and
German firms where the level of decentralisation is ranked from 1 to 5. They find
that Germany as the larger country has larger companies which are less centralised
than Austrian firms and link their observations to the trade environment, i.e. inter-
national competitions inducing firms to flatten and decentralise their organisational
structures.
An important characteristic common to all of these largely descriptive papers
is that they are all based on survey data.
3.2.3 Flat or Tall Hierarchies: An Applied Perspective
The concept of flat structures is regularly contrasted with the concept of hierarchical
structures, for example in the business press. While the former refers to an organ-
isation with few or no layers between management and staff, the second concept is
characterised by subordination among several levels and is often illustrated by the
image of a pyramid (see for instance BBC, 2016). Many business consultants, such
as those from the Boston Consulting Group (2006), openly advocate flatter struc-
tures for companies on a local as well as on a global scale, with the prospective of
cost savings, faster decision-making, and increased morale and accountability, and
more efficiency in general.8 For the employees, an advantage is seen in what is called
“empowerment”.
In the case of the public sector, which in general is considered highly hierarch-
ical, the question of flat or tall hierarchies has not been raised to the same extent as
8Wulf (2012, p. 2) emphasises this point and adds that the Boston Consulting Group even
“applied for a trademark in 2005 for the term delayering to designate its distinctive approach
to flattening the corporate pyramid”.
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in the firm case. Nevertheless, in the last years there have been indications of the
public sector’s growing awareness that a changing environment might necessitate
incisive organisational changes. For instance, a handbook published by the German
Federal Ministry of the Interior (2016), which is “from and for practitioners” in
public administrations can in some parts be interpreted in this sense. Designed for
the review of organisational issues and the assessment of staffing needs9, it reveals
many important insights into the German administration, which might be more uni-
versal than country-specific. One is that advantages of flat and tall hierarchies are
discussed openly also in the public sector. Table 3.1 is based on the Ministry’s hand-
book and summarises the arguments for both types or organisational configurations.
Table 3.1: Advantages and disadvantages of flat and tall hierarchies
Advantages Disadvantages
Flat Lower personnel costs due to fewer
management positions.
Enhanced communication.
Increased autonomy, creativity, and
responsibility of employees.
Better decision-making.
Danger of overstrain of managers affecting
quality, efficiency, and employee satisfaction.
Stunted development of human resources due
to a lack of prospects of promotion.
Development of informal hierarchies.
Tall Better exertion of influence by
management.
More time for executive duties.
Easier coordination and control.
Slower flow of information and
communication.
Missing flexibility.
Tendency towards dependent employees.
Higher personnel costs due to more
management positions.
Source: German Federal Ministry of the Interior (2016).
Another important insight from the handbook is that the public sector acknow-
ledges the changing environment it has to face. Concretely, the handbook identifies a
necessary budget consolidation and a need for more customer orientation as driving
forces that require adaption of the public sector.10
In my opinion, it makes sense to assume a similar consciousness of public au-
9“Handbuch für Organisationsuntersuchungen und Personalbedarfsermittlung”.
10Exact wording in German: “Die öffentliche Verwaltung sieht sich seit einigen Jahren einem
starken Druck zu Veränderungen ausgesetzt. Dieser wurde einerseits durch die notwendige
Haushaltskonsolidierung ausgelöst, die zu mehr Wirtschaftlichkeit und Sparsamkeit zwingt.
Andererseits verstehen die Empfänger der Leistungen des Verwaltungshandelns sich inzwischen
nicht mehr als Antrags- oder Bittsteller, sondern als Kunden. Die Verwaltung wird somit zum
Dienstleister, von dem die Erstellung eines qualitativ hochwertigen Produktes oder einer Di-
enstleistung in angemessener Zeit zu angemessenen Kosten erwartet wird.” (see German Federal
Ministry of the Interior, 2016, p. 13).
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thorities in general and of central banks of what is expected of them. To give a
supportive example, a survey among 40 central banks conducted by the Bank for
International Settlements identifies a reduction in hierarchies as well as in the num-
ber of divisions and departments as the main areas of major organisational change
in central banks – apart from changes in communication and human resource man-
agement (see Ortiz, 2009, p. 165 or Figure 6.1 in the Appendix).
3.3 Central Bank Structures over Time: Data and
Measurement
The organisational structure of an organisation is the totality of its rules of distribu-
tion of authority, tasks, control, and coordination (see Robbins and Coulter, 2014,
p. 24). While, to the best of my knowledge, most empirical examinations of organ-
isational structures are based on survey data, I choose a very different approach and
make use of organisational charts.11 This type of graphical representation of formal
structures is documented as being in use in the United States of America (USA)
from the 1850s onwards and is very common today.12 As far as I know, this study
is the first academic contribution to make use of central bank organisational charts
for the sake of generating additional data that can be analysed quantitatively. The
good availability of central bank organisational charts allowed me to compile a new
data set capturing the formal organisational structures of central banks over time.
In some ambiguous cases, verbal descriptions were useful to complete the picture.
A first step was the collection of historical organisational charts (see Section 3.3.1),
a second and more demanding step then consisted of quantifying these charts (see
Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Data
To analyse formal organisational structures, I restricted myself almost exclusively to
the structures depicted by organisational charts. These charts can often - but not
always - be found in historical central bank annual reports. As most central banks
11Organisational charts are also referred to as organisation charts, organigrams, or organograms.
12Chandler (1973, pp. 21-22), among others, credits Daniel McCallum, then the general manager
of the New York and Erie Railroad Company, as the first, at least in the US, to make use of
an organisational chart. It was lost and found again in 2005. The impressive illustration can
be found in the Appendix (Figure 6.2). Organisational charts became more prominent in the
20th century. Some central banks have been publishing them since as far back as the 1920s,
most only much later.
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usually only make available online a small number of annual reports, the library
of the Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt, Germany, turned out to be a very rich
source of information in this context. In addition, some central banks answered to
my inquiries and agreed to send historical organisational charts. Some anthologies
of central banks also contained historical organisational charts. Furthermore, a visit
to the archive of the Bundesbank yielded organisational charts for Germany dating
back to 1960 and a contact to the Bank of the Republic (Colombia) even back to
1927. In total, I capture the information of nearly 1,200 organisational charts of 98
central banks worldwide, the oldest from the late 19th/early 20th century, and by far
most of them dating from the last two and a half decades. The following two graphs
provide an example of organisational charts of the Bank of Italy (see Figure 3.1) and
the Central Bank of Russia (see Figure 3.2) and give an idea of what the original
information underlying my dataset typically looks like, i.e. the raw data. A selection
of other interesting central bank organisational charts can be found in the Appendix
(i.e. Italy 1894 (see Figure 6.3), Canada 1936 (see Figure 6.4), Austria 1946 (see
Figure 6.5), Norway 1985 (see Figure 6.6), UK 2000 (see Figure 6.7), and France
2015 (see Figure 6.8)).
Figure 3.1: Organisational chart Bank of Italy 2015
6 July 2015 
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Source: Bank of Italy (2015).
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Figure 3.2: Organisational chart Central Bank of Russia 2015
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3.3.2 Features and Limitations of Organisational Charts
I am well aware that the organisational chart cannot fully describe the organisational
structure regardless of the nature of the organisation of interest (neither for a firm
nor a public institution nor a central bank, in particular) and that the organigram
only is a partial picture of what is happening inside an organisation. This is obvious,
as many relationships are informal and not represented in these charts. Nevertheless,
I am convinced - even more after my analyses - that these charts carry a lot of
information and that they are in fact strongly correlated with real organisational
developments.13 Reflecting upon the features and limitations of these charts reveals
what they show and what they do not show.
The main feature in support of the use of organisational charts is that they
precisely capture formal structures. Firstly, they show which positions exist within
an organisation, thus disclosing the range of activities of the organisation. Secondly,
13The point that the organisational chart is indeed relevant finds expression in the reference to
the organisational chart as an organisation’s “skeletal configuration” (see for instance Van de
Ven, 1976, p. 70).
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they show how these positions are grouped. Thirdly, they contain the information on
how labour is formally divided. Fourthly, they tell us how authority, communication,
and responsibility flow between elements of the organisational charts. Fifthly, they
show vertical and horizontal relationships, thereby revealing the breadth and the
height of an organisation (i.e. the number of management levels) (see Mintzberg
1979, pp. 36-27 and Business Dictionary, 2017).14
The feature of precisely describing formal structures is at the same time the
main limitation of my approach. An organisational chart always remains a reduced
depiction of the complete and real organisational structure. This means that it has
nothing to say about the informal structure and thus neither says how labour is
actually divided nor how real authority, real communication, and real responsibility
flow (see Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 36-37). The level and position of an element in
the organisation chart does not have to correspond to its real rank and importance
within the firm or public institution (see Aghion and Tirole, 1997). There might
even be important elements which are not shown in the organisational chart. Even
more difficult to discern than real vertical relationships are often real horizontal
relationships as these are usually not marked by lines. Finally, an organisational
chart does not say anything about the managerial style. For example, despite a
flat structure an organisation could be managed in an authoritarian manner (see for
instance Mazal, 2014).
In total, having the limitations of such a simplified graphical representation of
an institutional structure in mind, the analysis of accurate formal structures appears
absolutely suitable for the purpose of quantifying organisational structures of central
banks. Mintzberg (1979, p. 37) fittingly sums up features and limitations, when
writing that “the organigram should [. . . ] be [. . . ] placed in context” as “it tells us
some useful things, even though it hides others”. Finally, while formal structures can
be quantified and thus operationalised, this is not be possible for informal structures,
thereby speaking for an analysis of formal structures.
3.3.3 Measures of Hierarchies and Relations
In order to quantify and operationalise organisational structures of central banks,
I experimented with several measures of hierarchies and relations, some of which I
14Furthermore, organisational charts can mirror past developments as well as plans for the future
(see for instance Alexander Hamilton Institute, 1923, p. 7).
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dismissed as inappropriate for this project.15 As a result, I retained five measures
which coherently and quantitatively describe major differences between organisa-
tional charts and structures over countries and time. These measures are partially
correlated, but altogether they allow for an extensive coverage of central bank struc-
tures.16 In the following, these five measure are described.
Number of elements: The first measure is a straightforward count of all elements
shown in the (core) organisational chart. It serves to capture the size and complexity
of a central bank. Beyond that, it is an indication of the range of activities in which
a central bank is involved. From the private sector it is widely accepted that larger
enterprises are usually more complex, mostly having more organisational units on a
greater number of management levels than start-ups or small firms (as for instance
family businesses).
Height: The second measure is the height of an organisation. It corresponds to
the number of management levels. In terms of its construction and interpretation,
it captures the vertical dimension of an organisation. The elimination of a layer in
the organisation thus manifests itself in a lower number. Generally speaking, a high
number of management levels corresponds to more hierarchical structures.
Span of control governor: The span of control reflects the breadth of an or-
ganisation, i.e. the horizontal dimension. It corresponds to the number of elements
reporting to the superordinate hierarchy element and is defined for each element
of the organisation. Both measures, i.e. height and span of control, are used for
instance by Colombo and Delmastro (1999) or Rajan and Wulf (2006), who find
that in the case of firms the number of management levels has decreased, whereas
spans of control at the highest management level have increased over time. I am
particularly interested in the span of control of the central bank governor as the
usually most important position in a central bank.
Centralisation: The fourth measure contains the (formal) degree of centralisa-
tion within a central bank. Understanding centralisation as a high concentration
15A characteristic with which I experimented but which I finally dismissed was inter alia the dis-
tinction between functional, divisional, and process-oriented structures. This measure requires
an individual assessment of each organisational chart. A functional structure is characterised
by positions executing related tasks being grouped together; a divisional structure is desig-
nated by its grouping of positions associated by a common responsibility for a specific service
or product; a process-oriented structure is characterised by its attention to processes rather
than to rigid structures. This measure appeared to yield only little additional insight. Another
measure which I dismissed was, for instance, the horizontal differentiation of an organisation
measured by the number of elements on each management level.
16Certain software applications for the creation of organisational charts were used for some back-
testing of my set of measures, i.e. I could rebuild organisational charts true to the original for
a specific central bank and year on the basis of these five measures only.
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of power, this concept can be applied to spans of control.17 I therefore construct a
normalised Herfindahl index H* describing the distribution of the span of control
according to each organisational chart. A value of 0 would represent a structure in
which the span of control is evenly distributed and a value of 1 would correspond
to a structure where all elements would have to report to one sole position in the
organisational chart.18
Staff: Finally, the fifth measure captures the size of each central bank in a year
in terms of the number of its employees. That it is named last is based on the
fact that this piece of information is not directly part of the organisational chart.
The number of employees usually can be found in central bank annual reports or is
taken from past editions of the Central Bank Directory. The staff size is of major
importance as it has strong implications for other organisational aspects and is
directly related - to different degrees - to the four other measures of hierarchies and
relations. Staff size is usually indispensable when trying to discuss the organisation
of any firm from the private economy.
Together, these measures provide a detailed picture of the formal organisational
structure of central banks. The following example shall illustrate how the informa-
tion contained in the organisational chart is quantified for our purposes: While the
first graph contains a total of 16 elements, which are distributed along four manage-
ment levels (see Figure 3.3), the second organisational chart contains a total of 10
elements distributed along three management levels (see Figure 3.4). The span of
control of the governor (as an example) doubles in this example from 4 to 8, whereas
the level where most elements of the organisational chart are situated remains the
lowest level in the hierarchy, i.e. level 4 and level 3 respectively. Finally, a normal-
ised Herfindahl index of 0.14 and 0.78 indicates a more evenly distributed span of
control in the first organisational chart and thus a lower concentration of power. In
this logic, I quantify the information content of all organisations charts available.
17If decentralisation is considered the opposite of centralisation, a possible definition might explain
decentralisation as “the process of distributing power away from the centre of an organisation”
(see The Economist, 2009).




a2i with ai =
xi∑N
j=1 xj
and xi denoting the span of control of element i. Normalising the index to H∗ = H−1/N1−1/N
then results in values ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a higher degree of
centralisation of the span of control within a central bank.
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3.4 Descriptive Analysis
In the following subsections, I begin with some general remarks on the entire sample
(Section 3.4.1). As the main part of this section, I then present descriptive find-
ings for a balanced sample for the period 2004-2015 and 50 central banks (Section
3.4.2). Looking for possible driving forces of organisational change, I finally regress
a selection of country-specific factors on the observations for the five measures of
hierarchies and relations (Section 3.4.3). The short last section, in particular, is mo-
tivated by anecdotal evidence suggesting IT progress and budgetary pressure among
others as possible drivers of organisational change in the private sector.
3.4.1 Remarks on the Entire Sample
Disposing of the quantified information of over 1,200 organisational charts for differ-
ing spans of time, this subsection briefly provides a number of observations before
turning to a statistically more convincing balanced sample for the period 2004-2015
in the next section.
For the very long-run, I obtained organisational charts for the central banks of
Italy from 1894 on, of Colombia from 1927 on, of Canada from 1936 on, of Austria
from 1946 on, and of Germany from 1960 with more or less difficulty.19 Obtaining
organisational charts for other countries for similar periods of time appeared to be
very complicated. This is more likely to be a result of a lack of data availability
and accessibility of most central banks rather than of them not using organisational
charts. The very long-run would have been particularly interesting to answer ques-
tions such as whether extreme events (e.g. the two World Wars) caused important
ruptures in formal relations and hierarchies. For the very small sample (n=5), the
above introduced measures show that changes in organisational charts before the
turn of the millennium are in general not particularly striking. Overall, the small
number of observations for very long periods made me abandon the idea of further
statistical analyses.
When conspicuous organisational changes occurred, they often were preceded
by important political changes. An example is a central bank’s loss of its monetary
19Historical organisational charts for the Bank of Italy are from an anthology about the history of
the Italian central bank (see Contessa and De Mattia, 1993). Organigrams for the Bank of the
Republic (Colombia) were received in scanned form via e-mail. Organisational charts for the
Canadian and German central banks were provided by courtesy of their archives. Organisational
charts for the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) also are part of an anthology, not yet
entirely published (see Weber, 2017).
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policy monopoly following the introduction of a common currency. It is therefore
crucial to be familiar with a central bank’s history and the country-specific historical
context to understand causes of institutional change.20
There are two groups of central banks that stick out of the complete sample.
There are, on the one side, central banks that have barely modified the formal in-
ternal organisation represented by their organisational charts over the years, such as
the central banks of Taiwan and Japan. On the other side, there are several Scand-
inavian and Baltic central banks that have actively promoted organisational change,
having documented and expressed this in their annual reports. An interesting case
among others is the central bank of Lithuania. In its annual report for the year 2012,
the Bank of Lithuania explains the replacement of its former organisational chart
stating that “the new organisational structure enabled creation of a new, substan-
tially flatter management structure based on the principle of subordination” and
further elaborates that “this structure permitted to reduce the number of managing
positions by 42 per cent” (see Bank of Lithuania, 2013, p. 84). The “old” and “new”
structure are presented below (see Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6).
















73 Source: Bank of Lithuania (2012, p. 73)
20Taking the example of Germany for the period since the establishment of a common monetary
union, the set of five measures presents a picture of a more compact Bundesbank, which might
be explained by the institution’s loss of its monetary policy monopoly.
42
Evolving Hierarchies in Central Banks






























Source: (Bank of Lithuania, 2013, p. 83)
That these verbally announced changes in the organisational structure indeed
correspond to changes in the organisational chart highlights the usefulness of these
charts. In my system of five measures of hierarchies and relations, these changes find
expression in three dimensions: In 2011, there were 66 elements in the organisational
chart of the Bank of Lithuania and the normalised Herfindahl index of centralisation
took a value of 0.08. In that year, the Bank of Lithuania had 728 employees. In 2012,
the organisational chart of the Bank of Lithuania comprised 27 elements, while it
had become more centralised with a normalised Herfindahl index of 0.22. The staff
number had been reduced to 586 employees (-19.5%). This example illustrates that
organisational charts and staff numbers unquestionably carry an important amount
of information.
3.4.2 The Balanced Sample: Descriptive Statistics
A balanced sample 2004-2015 for 50 countries appeared preferable to a larger un-
balanced sample as it allows us to comprehensively follow organisational changes
over time. In sum, this results in 600 observations per measure. With a number
of five measures this makes a total of 3,000 data points. Concerning the sample’s
representativeness, European central banks are overrepresented: 24 central banks
from the sample are located in Europe, 13 in Asia, 7 in the Americas, and 3 in
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Africa and Australia and Oceania each. Half of the European central banks from
the sample (i.e. 12) are part of the Eurosystem.21 At the same time, when distin-
guishing between central banks of advanced economies and those of emerging and
developing economies,22 the sample is divided equally, with 25 central banks from
each group (see Table 3.2). The only partial representativeness is to be explained
simply by the data availability. However, a high match with the unbalanced sample
for the same period suggests that the overrepresentation of European central banks
is unproblematic for this project.
Table 3.2: Countries in sample (industrial and emerging markets)





















































Table 3.3 shows the pairwise correlation between the five variables. Different
21See Table 6.6 of the Appendix for the geographic composition of the balanced sample.
22The country classifications of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook are applied here (see IMF,
2016c).
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signs and sizes of the coefficients indicate that the five measures of interest com-
plement each other and represent different organisational aspects. The strongest
positive correlations are those between the organisation’s number of elements and
the organisation’s height (number of management levels) (+0.56) and between the
number of employees (staff) and the number of elements (+0.31). This is not surpris-
ing insofar as larger institutions in terms of more organisational units are regularly
organised along more management levels, and the notion that more employees are
associated with more organisational units is rather common. The strongest negative
correlations, in contrast, are those between the organisation’s number of elements
and the organisation’s degree of centralisation (normalised Herfindahl) (-0.57) and
between the organisation’s height and the governor’s span of control (-0.50). This
implies that larger central banks are rather decentralised and that within taller cent-
ral banks (i.e. with more management levels) fewer elements report directly to the
governor. Furthermore, more organisational units are correlated with less central-
isation; so too is a larger central bank staff (-0.13).
Table 3.3: Correlation matrix organisational measures
Number of
elements












Centralisation -0.57 -0.49 0.26 1.00
Staff 0.31 -0.03 0.26 -0.13 1.00
The following tables and figures describe my findings in the five categories.
First of all, the total number of elements within the organisational charts has in-
creased from a mean (median) of 37.96 (31.00) in 2004 to 42.17 (33.50) in 2015 (see
Figure 3.7). This corresponds to an average increase of more than four additional
organisational units over the 12-year period suggesting that central banks have be-
come on average more complex. In relative terms, the number of elements increased
by 11.09% between 2004 and 2015.
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Figure 3.7: Number of elements
Year Mean Median Standard
deviation
2004 37.96 31.00 24.44
2005 36.53 26.00 23.18
2006 38.17 29.50 24.41
2007 39.87 34.00 24.60
2008 39.88 34.50 24.59
2009 41.58 34.00 26.43
2010 41.31 34.00 25.92
2011 42.50 34.50 27.64
2012 43.16 35.00 27.71
2013 44.96 37.00 30.10
2014 45.38 37.00 31.41
2015 42.17 33.50 31.47
Average 41.12 33.33 26.83












Secondly, the height of the central banks of the sample did not follow any clear
trend. The number of management levels has not altered significantly over time.
Mean and median numbers are identical for 2004 and 2015 (4.14 and 4.00 respect-
ively) (see Figure 3.8). Changes between these years appear small and practically
insignificant. Precisely, the average central bank increased the number of manage-
ment levels by +0.16% only.
Figure 3.8: Height
Year Mean Median Standard
deviation
2004 4.14 4.00 1.07
2005 4.38 4.00 1.30
2006 4.21 4.00 0.97
2007 4.17 4.00 0.93
2008 4.23 4.00 1.13
2009 4.26 4.00 1.12
2010 4.24 4.00 1.07
2011 4.17 4.00 1.02
2012 4.27 4.00 1.06
2013 4.31 4.00 1.16
2014 4.26 4.00 1.12
2015 4.14 4.00 1.16
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Thirdly, the span of control of the central bank governor was stable when com-
paring 2015 to 2004. In between, the number of elements directly reporting to the
governor fluctuated. A decrease from 7.98 (6.50) in 2004 to 6.96 elements in 2008
(-12.77%) was followed by an increase to 7.98 (7.00) elements in 2015 (see Figure 3.9).
The evolution of this measure thus followed a U-shape pattern.
Figure 3.9: Span of control governor
Year Mean Median Standard
deviation
2004 7.98 6.50 5.53
2005 7.48 6.00 5.51
2006 7.38 6.00 5.12
2007 7.48 6.50 4.98
2008 6.96 6.00 4.65
2009 7.30 6.50 4.97
2010 7.10 6.00 4.81
2011 7.46 6.50 4.75
2012 7.47 6.00 5.13
2013 7.49 6.00 5.10
2014 7.70 6.50 5.28
2015 7.98 7.00 4.91
Average 7.48 6.29 5.06












Fourthly, the degree of centralisation of the average central bank has decreased
very slowly but sustainably for all years after 2005. Compared to 2004, central
banks have on average become less centralised (see Figure 3.10). In percentage
terms, the average measure of centralisation decreased by 4.16% between 2004 and
2015, between 2005 and 2015 the change is even more pronounced (-7.77%).
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Figure 3.10: Centralisation
Year Mean Median Standard
deviation
2004 0.24 0.14 0.24
2005 0.25 0.14 0.25
2006 0.24 0.13 0.25
2007 0.23 0.13 0.24
2008 0.22 0.12 0.24
2009 0.23 0.12 0.25
2010 0.23 0.14 0.25
2011 0.23 0.13 0.25
2012 0.23 0.12 0.25
2013 0.23 0.13 0.25
2014 0.24 0.15 0.25
2015 0.23 0.16 0.22
Average 0.24 0.13 0.25









Fifthly, central bank staff has on average been visibly reduced, from a total of
2,064 employees in 2004 to 1,936 employees in 2015 (-6.23%) (see Figure 3.11). A
minimum of on average 1,830 employees was reached in 2010 and corresponds to a
decrease by -11.33% to 2004. For the average staff number the U-shape pattern is
striking. It signals that, after years of staff reductions, the trend has been reversed
during the last years. Median values present a similar picture as arithmetic averages
but the numerically large difference between both measures points to the fact that
average staff numbers are particularly driven by large central banks.
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Figure 3.11: Staff
Year Mean Median Standard
deviation
2004 2064.10 886.00 3210.46
2005 1978.75 851.00 3063.46
2006 1886.54 818.50 2895.81
2007 1886.45 842.00 2856.55
2008 1871.94 846.00 2812.32
2009 1866.47 805.00 2793.65
2010 1830.24 795.00 2691.14
2011 1858.02 874.50 2695.32
2012 1896.83 949.00 2724.55
2013 1919.89 1012.00 2701.33
2014 1919.13 1014.00 2661.49
2015 1935.55 1037.00 2600.13
Average 1909.49 894.17 2808.85







Taking these observations together illustrates that organisational change cap-
tured by the five measures is diverse. As shown by the graphs above, each year is
characterised by organisational change but in different dimensions and magnitude.
In 2015, the average central bank is constituted of more organisational units, while
it employs fewer people and is less centralised. The measure of the average gov-
ernor’s span of control is unchanged from 2004 but is - as the average number of
employees - marked by a turning point in 2011. Graphically, the evolution is rep-
resented by a typical U-shape pattern. In contrast, the development in the number
of management levels does not show any clear trend.23
Overall, the data suggests that central banks actively and constantly modify
their internal structures, but that they have remained hierarchical institutions. Es-
pecially if compared to findings for the private sector, these observed changes might
appear less drastic. This would speak for the reputation of central banks as overall
stable institutions, not prone to too much experimentation, when it comes to hier-
archies and relations. For instance, Rajan and Wulf (2006), who apply the measures
“span of control” and “depth” (corresponding to height in this chapter) to US firms,
find for the 13-year period from 1986 to 1998 an increase in the average number
of positions reporting to the CEO from 4.46 to 6.79 (+56.28%) and a decrease in
23The analysis of an unbalanced sample for a longer period delivers a different picture. From
1990 to present, organisational change is more pronounced. Compared to 1990, organisational
structures of central banks have on average become distinctly more compact and dense in terms
of a higher degree of centralisation and a reduction of staff levels.
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the average number of elements between CEO and division manager from 1.58 to
1.18 (-25.32%). Both measures of interest, even though the second is conceptually
slightly different, have changed much more in terms of the percentage in the firm
sample for a nearly equivalent duration of time. Similarly, in the paper by Colombo
and Delmastro (1999), the average number of subordinated employees under one
manager (in an Italian metalworking plant) has decreased from 10.23 in 1989 to
8.72 in 1997 (-14.76%), which is the opposite direction documented by Rajan and
Wulf (2006). While the studies aim at different objects of investigation at different
points of time, large two-digit percentage changes in the empirical literature on firm
hierarchies seem to lie well above my findings.
However, the picture changes significantly when a distinction is made between
small and large central banks. Dividing the sample into two groups, one com-
posed of small central banks with up to 1,000 employees (20 central banks), and
one composed of central banks with more than 1,000 employees (30 central banks)
furthermore discloses the importance of staff size for organisational structures.24 T-
statistics confirm significant differences between the two groups especially for the
measures number of elements, span of control governor, and centralisation as is
shown by Figure 3.12. In these categories, the two groups have followed opposite
trends during the period 2004-2015. The number of elements has decreased for
small central banks (-19.87%) and has increased for large central banks (+22.13%).
During the same time, the span of control has increased within small central banks
(+11.27) and has decreased within large central banks (-9.93%). Similarly, small
central banks have become more centralised (+12.27%) and large central banks a
little bit less centralised (-1.97). Table 6.7 to Table 6.11 in the Appendix show the
relevant descriptive statistics for the two groups. These results are, in terms of their
magnitude, much closer to the above-mentioned findings.
24The European Commission defines medium enterprises inter alia as firms with up to 249 em-
ployees. The more generous definition of a central bank, with up to 1.000 employees, thus
corresponds to over four times the Commission’s definition for medium enterprises. The EU
definition is available online (see European Commission, 2017).
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3.4.3 Regression Results
In a next step, I link the set of five measures to different country-specific factors
in order to further examine possible drivers of organisational change. In a first
exercise, I examine in how far a country’s attitude towards centralisation (in other
institutional and organisational affairs) is related to the organisation of its central
bank. As these explanatory variables are mainly cross-sectional data, I confine my
analysis to the latest observations of my measures as dependent variables (i.e. the
year 2015). In a second exercise, I link my measures of hierarchies and relations in
central banks for the years 2004 to 2015 to a more extensive selection of political,
technological, financial, and economic factors and make use of the panel structure
of my data.
In the first exercise, I experiment with Bloom et al. (2012)’s index of firm
decentralisation, with Hofstede et al. (2010)’s power distance ranking, and with
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)’s measure of fiscal centralisation. First, the index of
firm decentralisation is based on plant managers’ answers to a set of four questions
concerning their autonomy and the degree of centralisation in their company and
covers 12 countries, of which five are part of this dataset. High average z-scores
for a country correspond to a high degree of firm decentralisation. Second, the
power distance index shall capture the degree to which an unequal distribution of
power within a society is accepted. In this sample, figures are available for 40
countries. High index values correspond to a high power distance. Third, a measure
of fiscal decentralisation is borrowed from the literature and is updated for a total
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of 34 countries. In particular, I use the share of the central government in general
government tax revenues, where a high share signals a high degree of centralisation
in fiscal affairs.25 Especially, I am interested in the relation to my measure of central
bank decentralisation, which is shown by the following scatter plots (see Figure 3.13).
The third illustration in the box appears to be the only one providing at least weak
evidence of a possible (inverse) relationship between fiscal centralisation in a country
and the degree of organisational centralisation in a central bank (concentration of
data points in the south-east corner of the plot). This could be a hint that more
fiscal centralisation - in terms of tax revenues - is somehow associated with less
centralisation in the organisational structure of a central bank, which may not be
an intuitive idea.
25Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) propose three distinct measures of fiscal centralisation which are
based on IMF data from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS). In different (bookkeeping)
compositions, they set the share of central government expenditures in relation to total govern-
ment expenditures, including national, state, and local government expenditures. They mainly
rely on their second measure, which is calculated as me2 = C2G2 with
C2=Central Government Consolidated Expenditures and G2= Central Government Consol-
idated Expenditures + State Government Consolidated Expenditures + Local Government
Consolidated Expenditures (see Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005, pp. 1186-1187). I update this
measure and transfer it to tax revenues, allowing for cross-checks with the OECD fiscal decent-
ralisation database (see OECD, 2017).
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Hofstede et al. (2010) power distance index






































Bloom et al. (2012) firm decentralisation


































































Fiscal centralisation and central bank centralisation
Corr(x,y)=-0.29
Sources: Hofstede et al. (2010), Bloom et al. (2012), Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), own calcu-
lations. Notes: The power distance index values are for 2010, the firm decentralisation measure
is for 2006, and the fiscal centralisation measure is for 2015 (all on x-axis), the y-axis values for
central bank centralisation are for 2015.
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However, when running very basic cross-sectional regressions, neither Hofstede’s
power distance ranking nor measures of fiscal centralisation can well explain organ-
isational features as signalled by the five measures of hierarchies and relations (see
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). At best, more fiscal centralisation might be associated
with a higher span of control by the central bank governor. This is suggested by
significant coefficients in Table 3.5 after having included additional controls. Never-
theless, results are to be interpreted with caution due to the obviously questionable
sample size.














without additional controls (n=40)
power distance index 0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.448
(0.24) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (16.62)
with macroeconomic controls (n=40)
power distance index 0.24 0.01 0.01 -0.09 19.69
(0.30) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (17.74)
with institutional controls (n=24)
power distance index 0.17 -0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.99
(0.60) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12) (17.64)
with macroeconomic and institutional controls (n=24)
power distance index 0.58 0.01 -0.06 -0.25 13.84
(0.53) (0.02) (0.07) (0.18) (8.82)
R2 0.20 0.11 0.42 0.22 0.72
Prob>F 0.34 0.36 0.01 0.17 0.00
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. Macroeconomic controls comprise the logs of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and of population. Institutional controls are government
effectiveness and central bank independence. More details on the macroeconomic and institutional
controls used are given in the next paragraph and in Table 3.6. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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without additional controls (n=34)
fiscal centralisation 10.79 0.39 7.85 -0.39 -6944.24
(42.00) (1.57) (4.80) (0.28) (4287.46)
with macroeconomic controls (n=34)
fiscal centralisation 36.80 0.12 3.42 -0.53 -1654.95
(51.66) (1.97) (6.16) (54.30) (3582.64)
with institutional controls (n=21)
fiscal centralisation 48.89 -1.89 14.75** -0.60 1421.46
(53.20) (2.45) (4.29) (24.44) (1880.33)
with macroeconomic and institutional controls (n=21)
fiscal centralisation 72.28 -1.50 14.38** -0.678 1905.57
(64.34) (2.95) (4.848) (19.53) (1566.58)
R2 0.20 0.22 0.33 0.46 0.74
Prob>F 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.00
Notes: OLS estimation. Macroeconomic controls comprise the logs of GDP per capita and of
population. Institutional controls are government effectiveness and central bank independence.
More details on the macroeconomic and institutional controls used are given in the next paragraph
and in Table 3.6. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
In the second exercise, I aim to shed light on anecdotal evidence suggesting
mainly technological progress and budgetary pressure, but also financial devel-
opment, and government effectiveness as possible driving forces of organisational
change. In addition, I include central bank independence in my analysis as a crucial
characteristic of central banks. Data for the independent variables is taken from
a variety of publicly accessible sources. Macroeconomic control variables are GDP
per capita and population size, both available in the World Bank’s online database.
The spread of the internet has the same origin. Country-specific public debt data
is taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database (see IMF, 2016c). As
an index of government effectiveness, I use an index of the same name built by the
World Bank (see World Bank, 2016b). The World Bank’s Global Financial Devel-
opment database contributes a measure of financial development, i.e. stock market
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (see World Bank, 2016a). Finally, a measure
of central bank independence from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) completes the set
of independent variables (see Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: Explanatory variables
Variable Description Scale Source
GDP/capita Gross domestic product per
capita.
Current USD. World Bank
Population Total population. In million. World Bank




net lending/borrowing to GDP.
Percentage of GDP. IMF
Government
debt
General government debt to
GDP (in %).
Percentage of GDP. IMF
Government
Effectiveness
Perceived quality of the
government, the public sector
and services and its
independence from political
pressure.









Value of all listed shares in a
stock market to GDP.








Independence index. Ranges from 0 (least





In the baseline approach, I estimate linear regressions of the following form:
Hierarchiesit = α + βDevelopmentit + γZit + it
where Hierarchiesit corresponds to the five measures of hierarchies and relations,
Developmentit denotes selected variables of budgetary, technological, and finan-
cial development, while Zit is a vector a additional control variables such as GDP
and population size and it is the error term.26 I am particularly interested in the
coefficient β which provides information on the relationship between the variables
Hierarchiesit and Developmentit. To this end, I run separate regressions for each
of the five categories. Table 3.7 provides indications for possible relations between
26Frequency distributions of dependent and independent variables are shown in Figure 6.9 and
Figure 6.10 of the Appendix.
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a set of explanatory variables and the five measures of hierarchies and relations.27












ln Population 6.40 1.15 6.86 0.25 1672.09**
(24.06) (0.85) (5.68) (0.30) (512.58)
ln GDP/capita 8.15 0.02 -0.43 -0.07 -17.73
(6.59) (0.30) (0.79) (0.05) (95.82)
Internet users (per 100 people) 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.91
(0.16) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (2.69)
General government debt to GDP 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.64
(0.10) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (2.56)
General government primary net
lending/borrowing to GDP
0.18 0.02 -0.02 0.00 7.82
(0.34) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00) (5.67)
Government effectiveness -13.33 0.05 -2.08 0.01 -232.49
(6.76) (0.10) (1.20) (0.03) (167.80)
Stock market capitalisation to GDP 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.60
(0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.76)
Central Bank independence 1.01 -0.13 -5.35 0.10 -2285.92
(23.97) (0.90) (5.07) (0.17) (1503.10)
Constant -49.04 1.48 -6.80 0.15 -1226.85
(59.72) (3.91) (17.47) (0.54) (1815.46)
Observations 224 224 224 224 224
Adj. R2 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.23
Prob>F 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.15 0.01
Notes: OLS estimation with fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Column 1 shows a positive coefficient between population size, GDP and the
total number of elements and a negative coefficient between government effectiveness
and the total number of elements. Column 2 shows a positive association between
population size and the number of management levels. Column 3 reveals a positive
sign of the estimated coefficient between population size and the number of elements
subordinate to the central bank governor, while government effectiveness and central
27A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that the random effects model’s assumption of unobserved
individual heterogeneity being independent of other explanatory variables is not the best choice
for my data. The baseline model therefore consists in OLS estimations with (country-) fixed
effects.
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bank independence are negatively related to the governor’s span of control. The
measure of centralisation in column 4 does not appear to be meaningful, whereas
the fifth measure, which is the central bank staff, in column 5 is most straightforward
in terms of the estimated coefficients’ size, their signs, and their interpretation. In
particular, a country’s population not surprisingly shows significance at a 5% level
here and is the only robust and significant finding in the baseline model. However,
different regression configurations do not reveal any significant relations between
the majority of explanatory variables and at least four out of my five measures of
hierarchies and relations.28 To be more concrete, it appears that neither internet
usage, nor public debt levels or deficits, nor the state of financial development are
able to explain the number of organisational units, the number of management levels,
the span of control of the governor, or the degree of centralisation as indicated by a
complete absence of significant coefficients at commonly used levels. When adding
further variables, several coefficients turn insignificant.
A modified model also suggests that for the number of central bank employees
internet use, government effectiveness, and central bank independence could play a
role. Yet, this statement again is based on the coefficients’ signs and not on statist-
ical significance. It indeed appears plausible that especially the factors population,
information technology use, and government effectiveness determine the number of
employees and can importantly reduce staff requirements. In all regressions, vari-
ables of financial development seemingly are of secondary or no importance for
central bank structures.29
Summing these findings up, it appears that staff size is of the five measures
the one most closely related to the country-specific factors under consideration. In
turn, for the other four measures, the empirical analysis conducted cannot confirm
anecdotal explanations for organisational change in the case of central banks. To-
gether with the findings from the first exercise (i.e. the examination of a possible
link between measures of firm, fiscal, and social centralisation, and central bank
hierarchies and relations) it appears that organisational structures of central banks
28In particular, both OLS estimations with fixed as well as with random effects do not yield
significantly different coefficients. For the category centralisation, where the dependent variable
is limited to the interval [0, 1], deviating from OLS, given the different categorical structure
findings with a Tobit model were not significantly different. Furthermore, the use of lagged
values (by one period) for the independent variables for reasons of endogeneity and of logs for
the dependent variables did not affect regression results. Table 6.12 of the Appendix presents
estimation results for a random effects model.
29Here, I also experimented with the number of listed companies (per 100,000 adults), the ratio
of financial system deposits to GDP, the number of bank branches and Automated Teller Ma-
chines (ATMs) (both per 100,000 adults) from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development
Database.
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as presented by organisational charts cannot be explained satisfactorily neither by
“soft” factors such as a country’s general manner of organising relations nor by
“hard” factors such as, for instance, budgetary pressure. However, more and differ-
ent data - especially on public sector management - might help solve this puzzle and
explain differences between national banks as a result of country-specific factors.
3.5 Discussion and Policy Conclusions
The most important conclusion of this chapter is that, in the last 12 years, central
banks have in fact modified their internal structures. This finding comes from ana-
lysing a unique data set. Most evidently, central banks have on average increased
the number of organisational elements, have become slightly less centralised and
employ fewer people. If a distinction is made between small and large central banks
in terms of staff numbers, changes are even more pronounced and point to opposite
directions for the three main areas of change. Then, on average, the number of
organisational units has decreased (increased) for small (large) central banks; the
span of control of the governor has increased (decreased) for small (large) central
banks; and the degree of centralisation has increased (decreased) for small (large)
central banks for the period 2004-2015.
However, why these changes have occurred remains a puzzle. Several possible
explanations were tested but no clear-cut results were found. The second conclusion
is that organisation structures of central banks seem to depend only to a minor
degree on the general management of relations and the prevailing attitude towards
those in a country. This is examined with the help of a set of indicators, namely
by Bloom et al. (2012)’s index of decentralisation, Hofstede et al. (2010)’s Power
Distance Ranking and Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)’s measure of fiscal decent-
ralisation. Data availability imposes an important restriction on this finding that
cannot be denied. Furthermore, an econometric analysis aimed at finding links
between “hard” country-specific factors such as budgetary pressure or internet use
reveals very few significant results, apart from the not surprising finding that having
a larger population significantly increases the staff size, other things held constant.
For future research, it is important to address this puzzle of driving forces
behind these changes. Not only because central banks remain public institutions
of primary importance but also because of a lack of robust results in the field of
(public) organisational empirics. One contribution of this chapter shall be to present
a possible way to obtain and quantify additional data which is based on an analysis
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of organisational charts.
As to the policy conclusions, it is well-known that the effect of hierarchies and
relations within central banks can only partially be related to outcomes. While
there is some consensus for private companies that certain organisational structures
can have direct effects on revenues, costs, and profits, the case of central banks
is different due to very different objectives. For instance, for a desired outcome,
such as monetary stability, central bank independence appears to play a greater
role than characteristics such as staff size or the position of the governor. However,
a possible policy implication would be to absolutely consider the importance of
the proper design when establishing a public institution such as a central bank.
Despite the evolving nature even of central banks, my analysis has in parts revealed
very long-lasting path dependencies, which could have both positive and negative
consequences. Therefore, from the perspective of a government, paying attention
to organisational issues can pay off for many years and decades. Simultaneously,
the possibility of modifying structures does exist and organisational structures and
relations are not invariable, even for central banks often considered as guarantors of
stability in different contexts. However, once set up, changes to the organisational
structure are undoubtedly more difficult to impose.
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Currency Compositions of International Reserves and the Euro Crisis
4.1 Motivation
During the last years, absolute holdings of international reserves have grown at an
extremely fast pace, as shown by Figure 4.1. According to the IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS) international reserves have seen a more than eightfold
increase over the last decade: They have grown from a sheer 1.3tn USD in 2005 to
10.7tn USD in 2015. Only in the last two years, the size of international reserves
has slightly shrunk.1


















growth year-over-year (right axis) volume in tn. USD
Source: IMF (2016b).
This development has largely been driven by a small group of countries, as the
ten biggest holders of reserves account for 72% of worldwide international reserves
(see Table 4.1). China and Japan alone manage around 42% of worldwide interna-
tional reserves, while China’s international reserves surpass the cumulated reserves
1In its Balance of Payments Manuel, the IMF defines international reserves as “those external
assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of
payments financing needs, for intervention in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange
rate, and for other related purposes (such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the
economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing)” (see IMF, 2007a, paragraph 6.64).
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of the six following countries in the list.2














1 China 3,330.4 31.3% 17.0% 306.7%
2 Japan 1,179.5 42.3% 13.8% 42.3%
3 Saudi Arabia 604.0 48.0% 39.8% 295.9%
4 Switzerland 560.6 53.3% 157.9% 1,428.8%
5 Hong Kong 358.7 56.6% 33.5% 188.7%
6 Korea 358.5 60.0% 24.9% 70.7%
7 Brazil 348.9 63.3% 24.3% 555.6%
8 India 327.8 66.3% 22.4% 150.2%
9 Russia 309.4 69.2% -28.5% 76.1%
10 Singapore 245.7 71.5% 9.9% 112.7%
Source: IMF (2016b).
There are two main research questions when analysing international reserves.
The first deals with the appropriate size of these reserves, the second concerns their
appropriate composition. In this chapter, we focus on the second issue. However,
empirical examinations of currency compositions are hampered by a lack of data
as access to comprehensive datasets on this issue is highly restricted for reasons of
confidentialiality. While only very few academics were granted access to relevant
IMF data, we compile a new dataset based on those central banks that publicly dis-
close their data. Making use of individual country data, we want to identify factors
explaining currency compositions of international reserves. Unlike other papers, we
put more weight on the specific role of the EUR, which since its introduction has
been considered a serious competitor to the USD (see Bergsten, 1997 and Chinn
and Frankel, 2008).3 In particular, we want to disentangle the impact of the euro
crisis on the euro’s role as an international currency. In a final exercise, we use our
estimates to derive predictions of currency compositions of the three most important
2Note that of the ten biggest holders of international reserves seven are located in Asia. Saudi Ar-
abia and Russia belong to the group of oil exporters, whereas Brazil is the only Latin American
country among the ten biggest reserve holders. The strongest increase in the period 2005-2015
records Switzerland as the only European industrial country of the list (+1,429%). In 2015,
international reserves of the UK were worth 101.6bn USD. Reserves of the USA amounted to
39.2bn USD, of France and Germany to 36.4bn USD each.
3Bergsten (1997) sees the EUR as the new rival to the USD and expects the establishment of a
“bipolar currency regime”. Chinn and Frankel (2008) consider the EUR a serious rival but also
describe scenarios, in which the USD remains the prevailing international currency.
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non-disclosing holders of international reserves, which are China, Japan, and Saudi
Arabia.
Our main findings suggest that currency compositions of international reserves
under central bank management are to a major part determined by currency pegs
and trade patterns. Thus, the findings of this chapter are in line with some promin-
ent academic contributions. Furthermore, we identify an actual and negative impact
of the euro crisis on EUR holdings, as the crisis has apparently been a throwback
for the EUR as an international currency. However, the crisis, at best, had an only
partial effect on the determinants of currency compositions.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we address the related
literature and distinguish between contributions explaining levels of international
reserves and contributions explaining compositions. In Section 3, we present our
data and descriptive findings. Sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to determinants of
country-specific reserve compositions and the role of the euro crisis. In Section 6,
we summarise and discuss our findings.
4.2 Literature
The literature dealing with international reserves can basically be split up into two
parts according to the question of interest. The first question is why countries
accumulate increased levels of foreign reserves. The second question is how they
determine the currency composition of these reserves.
4.2.1 Motives for International Reserve Holdings
The literature addressing the question of why countries hold increased levels of
international reserves identifies three main motives: A precautionary motive, a mer-
cantilist motive, and an investment motive. As the relevance of these motives is
subject to a rather broad body of literature, we limit ourselves in the following to
the most closely related contributions from this field.
Probably the most prominent paper when discussing international reserves is
Heller (1966). In this seminal piece of work, Heller distinguishes between a precau-
tionary, a speculative, and an investment motive for holding international reserves
and regards the first as the most relevant. For him, the main rationale for holding
reserves is to finance imbalances in a country’s international accounts. Heller com-
putes optimal reserve levels for 60 countries by minimising the costs of adjustment
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to an external imbalance and the costs of holding international reserves, while con-
sidering the probability of having to adjust. Another paper with a precautionary
motive stance comes from Calvo et al. (2012) and addresses the question of the
optimal reserve level in the face of a sudden stop. Their statistical model assumes
that central bankers choose the desired reserve level by weighting the expected costs
of a sudden stop against the opportunity costs of holding international reserves.
They find that de-facto reserve levels were close to optimal on the eve of the Global
Financial Crisis and do not find evidence for the mercantilist motive.
Dooley et al. (2003) belong to the proponents of a mercantilist motive view and
explain the accumulation of international reserves in Asia with export-led growth
strategies. To them, the motive for holding international reserves is to influence the
exchange rate to foster competitiveness (through undervaluation). Aizenman and
Lee (2008) assess the importance of the mercantilist motive empirically and focus
on developing countries from 1980 to 2000. They find that the precautionary motive
better explains the accumulation of international reserves. Theoretically, they point
out to the high potential costs caused by a sudden stop.
Rodrik (2006), among others, views the high and increasing levels of interna-
tional reserves as a protection against financial crises but raises the questions of
the related costs of these holdings, which puts his paper close to the investment
motive category. Due to the low level of interest earned on international reserves
and the cost of foreign borrowing, Rodrik estimates a concrete income loss of close
to 1 percentage point of GDP for developing countries.
Goldberg et al. (2013) offer a helpful overview of and introduction to the in-
ternational reserve subject, focusing on industrialized countries from a central bank
perspective. In their descriptive and anecdotal paper, they inter alia touch the ques-
tions of why industrialized countries hold high levels of international reserves and
what is an adequate level of reserves.
4.2.2 Determinants of Currency Compositions
The previously discussed issue of why countries amass foreign exchange reserves
is linked to the question of how central banks choose the currency composition of
their foreign exchange reserves. On this subject, the literature mainly distinguishes
between transaction and classical portfolio investment considerations. Transaction
motives with respect to the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserve
portfolio arise from the central bank’s potential need to conduct foreign exchange
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interventions, current account interventions, or temporary import financing. The
portfolio investment motive is characterised by a yield/risk trade-off. However, it is
generally agreed upon that central banks exhibit a lower risk tolerance than private
investors.
Empirical attempts in this field, however, are often hampered by poor data
availability. One important source is the IMF’s COFER database (see IMF, 2017,
a). On very rare occasions, the IMF grants access to its confidential country-specific
data. Three important contributions based on these data are closely related to our
chapter. Heller and Knight (1978) stress the importance of transaction motives. Us-
ing a panel of 76 countries for the period 1970-76, they find a relation between trade
patterns and the exchange rate regime of a country with the currency composition of
its foreign exchange reserves. Analysing an updated version of the dataset, Dooley
et al. (1989) confirm this finding for the years 1976-86. Additionally, they find that
the denomination of a country’s debt is related to the currency composition of this
country’s international reserves. Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000), assessing a
panel of 84 countries over the period 1979-96, find further evidence that trade flows,
financial flows, and currency pegs are the principal determinants of a country’s cur-
rency composition. Other contributions are based on publicly accessible data. For
instance, Wong (2007) extracts information from central bank annual reports on
international reserves of 23 countries to analyse diversification. For the years 2000-
2005, she finds evidence for net stabilizing interventions. This implies that central
banks increase their foreign currency shares as a response to devaluation and vice
versa. In another study, Chinn and Frankel (2008) rely on aggregated COFER data
for the years 1973-2007 and estimate a model using characteristics of the currency
issuing country to explain shares of major currencies. They identify the relative size
of the home country, a proxy for the relative size of the domestic trading place, and
the exchange rate volatility of the respective currency as significant determinants.
In two out of several possible scenarios the EUR is expected to surpass the USD (by
2015 and by 2022 respectively). Eichengreen et al. (2014) use data on aggregated
currency compositions from 1947 to 2013 to investigate whether the break down of
the Bretton Woods system had an impact on the above mentioned determinants.
Including a measure of persistence, they find support for strong inertia in currency
compositions and their determinants. Additionally, they suggest a smaller effect of
the relative size of the home country’s economy post-Bretton Woods and weaker
network effects.
On the theoretical side, one strand of the literature is concerned with modelling
optimal currency composition according to a Markowitz-type portfolio problem, i.e.
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trading off expected return versus risk. In this sense, Ben-Bassat (1980) formulates
the problem as minimizing the variance at a given return for a basket of import
currencies. Using data from 1976 to 1980 and comparing optimal and de facto
currency compositions, he finds evidence for different roles of portfolio objectives
across groups of countries. These are more relevant for developing countries and
semi–industrial countries than for industrial countries. Papaioannou et al. (2006)
develop a mean-variance optimization framework including portfolio rebalancing
costs and constraints mirroring a central bank’s desire to hold some amount of
currency reserves in the currency of its peg, of its main trading partners, and of
its outstanding debt. They find that, once the dollar is assigned the status of
the reference (risk-free) currency, de facto and optimal share as suggested by the
model match well. Observed EUR shares on the other hand exceed optimal shares.
The authors explain this finding with the euro’s partial use as an international
reserve currency. Beck and Rahbari (2011) build a model which embeds transaction
motives to mitigate the effect of sudden stops into the minimum variance framework.
They identify two separate rationales for currency compositions: Classical portfolio
objectives and hedging demands to counter effects of sudden stops. They argue
that the importance of hedging demands decreases with declining debt to reserve
ratios. Furthermore, they suggest that the USD is relatively more in demand than
the EUR as a hedge against sudden stops in Latin America and Asia. Contrarily, in
Emerging Europe the EUR appears to be the more relevant hedge currency. Beck
and Weber (2011) do not consider the questions of the optimal international reserve
level and composition independent from each other and combine them in one model.
Their paper contradicts the common belief that higher levels of international reserves
necessarily come along with more diversification. For them, a positive correlation
between the level of reserves and reserve diversification exist more in the case where
precautionary motives do not play a role.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.3.1 Data
Empirical work on the composition of international reserves has remained some-
what limited because of the discretion authorities in charge of reserve management
exercise on this subject. There are three main sources which provide insight into
the composition of international reserves. The most general source consists of the
above-mentioned IMF’s IFS, comprising the overall reserve holdings of most coun-
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tries around the world (see IMF, 2016b). The IMF’s COFER database as another
potential data source contains aggregated reserve holdings broken down by major
international currencies (see IMF, 2017). It does not show individual reserve hold-
ings and reporting is on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, of 146 reporting countries
only 97 are listed by name on the IMF webpage (see Table 6.13 in the Appendix
(IMF, 2017)). A third source consists of national data and is the foundation of this
chapter. A total of 37 countries individually disclose the currency composition of
their international reserves in diverse publication formats (mostly central bank an-
nual reports). The advantage of this source is that it allows conclusions to be drawn
both about the currency composition of worldwide total international reserves as
well as about country-specific foreign reserve compositions. The total international
reserves volume of our dataset accounts for one fifth of the total COFER reserves
(20.2%) and for more than one fourth of the allocated COFER reserves (29.3%).
Table 4.2 compares the three data sources.4












Countries, of which: 179 145 (97 names disclosed) 37
Industrial countries 40 39 22
Developing countries 139 58 15
Total international
reserves (2015)
10.6tn USD 10.9tn USD 2.2tn USD
Percentage of
international reserves
as of the COFER
total (2015)
97.2% 100% 20.2%






Frequency of data monthly/quarterly quarterly annual
Sources: IMF (2016b), IMF (2017), Wooldridge (2006, p. 26).
4Furthermore, in 2015, the IMF conducted an ad-hoc survey on its member states’ foreign curren-
cies holdings for 2013 and 2014 and published (aggregated) summary results. For a total of 130
responding monetary authorities it reveals, among other things, which foreign currency assets
were held by how many countries and at which size. For details, please refer to Table 6.14 and
Table 6.15 in the Appendix.
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Table 4.3 provides the exact coverage of our data and respective sources. By
far most data originates from central bank annual reports (usually from balance
sheets).
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Report on the Management of Canada’s Official International Reserves
Annual Report





























UK International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Template
U.S. International Reserve Position (Treasury)
IMF SDSS Reserve Template
Notes: *Gap in 2010, 2012, 2014. **Gap in 2007.
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4.3.2 Descriptives
Figure 4.2 illustrates the strong and parallel increase in international reserves over
the last decade according to different sources, while Figure 4.3. is based on our data
and shows that the USD was able to successfully defend its positions as the world’s
main international currency.5 An above-average share of the EUR as well as the
below-average share of the USD in our dataset can be explained by an overrepres-
entation of European states having closer ties to the euro area.










IMF COFER IMF COFER allocated reserves
Sources: IMF IFS, IMF COFER, Laser/Weidner.
In total, our panel dataset contains the individual international reserve com-
positions of 36 disclosing countries (plus the euro area) and includes the eight ma-
jor reserve currencies for different spans of time between 1996 and 2015.6 These
currencies are the USD, the EUR, the JPY, the CAD, the RMB, the GBP, the
Deutsche mark (DEM), the CHF, and the AUD. The entire (unbalanced) panel con-
tains roughly 4,300 observations. To illustrate the data structure, Figure 4.3 shows
5This USD domination is apparent both in the COFER data as in our own data.
6In the EA, not only the national central banks manage foreign reserves, but also the ECB. In
2015, the ECB’s international reserves were composed of around 84% USD-denominated and
16% JPY-denominated assets (the ECB reports net foreign currency holdings in its annual
reports).
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country-specific reserve compositions for - to our knowledge - all disclosing states.
In our statistical analyses, we are particularly interested in the four most important
international reserve currencies, which are the USD, the EUR, the JPY, and the
GBP.







USD EUR JPY GBP AUD Total
For the period 2005-2015, our data shows unambiguously for a total of 30 central
banks in which direction the percentage shares of the eight major reserve currencies
have evolved.7 For instance, 16 central banks increased the proportion of USD in
their international assets, while 12 central banks reduced their USD exposure. Only
seven countries increased their EUR share and a total of 17 countries decreased
their EUR share. Here it should be mentioned that this is partly due to the EUR
accession, making the EUR the new domestic currency. As a consequence, EUR-
denominated assets are no longer considered part of the international reserves for
these countries. For the period under review, the biggest gains were made by the
AUD and the CAD, where hardly any country reduced its reserve assets (0 and 2
respectively) but many countries increased their reserve share (11 and 8 respect-
ively).8
7Data gaps prevent doing so for the other central banks of the sample.
8Table 4.4 provides percentage shares for the four major reserve currencies only. AUD, CAD, and
RMB shares are listed together with other smaller international currencies under the category
“others”.
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Table 4.4: Individual international reserve composition (%)
USD EUR JPY GBP others
Country 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
Australia 45.0 55.0 45.0 25.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 10
Bosnia 0.0 0.0 99.9 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0
Bulgaria 3.8 0.8 95.2 99.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0
Canada 60.5 67.6 38.0 23.0 1.5 1.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 0
Chile 67.8 66.1 27.5 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 18.9
Colombia* 85.0 90.3 12.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 8.7
Croatia 14.9 17.3 85.1 79.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
Czech Rep. 47.9 14.8 52.1 57.1 0.0 3.8 0.0 1.4 0.0 22.8
Denmark* 15.2 35.0 71.8 60.2 0.0 0.0 7.1 4.1 6.0 0.7
Euro Area* 83.0 83.7 0.0 0.0 17 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finland 30.0 77.2 0.0 0.0 5.0 7.7 25.0 15.1 40.0 0.0
Georgia 67.3 81.7 32.3 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 12.3
Germany 98.3 92.2 0.0 0.0 1.7 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
Hong Kong 86.8 86.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.2 13.5
Iceland* 20.9 48.1 67.5 40.7 1.3 1.6 7.0 8.8 3.3 0.8
Israel / 67.6 / 29.4 / 0.0 / 3.0 / 0.0
Italy 63.5 67.5 0.0 0.0 9.6 13.7 24.9 10.9 2.3 8.0
Latvia 40.0 45.0 50.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0
Lithuania 0.0 / 100.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 /
Macedonia / 32.3 / 57.9 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 9.8
Moldova / 62.0 / 20.6 / 0.0 / 16.5 / 1.0
Mozambique 65.8 55.3 15.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.2 12.1 40.7
Netherlands 100.0 87.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2
New Zealand / 24.3 / 24.9 / 5.4 / 14.7 / 30.6
Norway 36.6 51.8 39.8 28.3 6.6 8.6 9.7 7.4 7.3 3.8
Peru 81.3 91.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 3.8 18.7 4.1
Philippines / 78.8 / 5.0 / 10.0 / 0.0 / 6.2
Poland 50.0 39.0 50.0 29.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 12.0 0.0 20.0
Romania 28.5 16.6 66.6 79.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.3
Russia 47.0 43.1 42.4 40.1 0.8 1.0 9.8 10.7 0.0 5.1
Slovak Rep. 22.2 / 77.8 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 /
Slovenia 14.3 99.2 74.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.8 0.8
Sweden 37.0 53.6 37.0 34.1 8.0 0.0 11.0 4.5 7.0 7.8
Switzerland 35.0 32.6 46.3 42.9 1.9 7.8 10.3 7.3 6.5 9.5
UK 19.4 9.2 72.3 83.0 4.4 4.7 0.0 0.0 3.9 3.2
USA 0.0 0.0 57.6 60.4 42.4 39.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 80.7 97.6 14.5 0.8 2.5 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.6
Notes: *If currency shares are unavailable for a specific year, nearest data available is reported
(max. ±2 years).
In terms of the percentage of the aggregated reserves of our sample, the USD share
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very slightly decreased from 52.8% to 52.7%, whereas the EUR share decreased
from 33% to 29.3%. The AUD share rose from 0.1% to 1.6% and the CAD share
from 0.4% to 2.1%. The RMB, often regarded as the rising international currency,
was certainly no international reserve currency by 2005, by 2015 it had become
part of the official international reserves of Australia, Italy, and New Zealand even
though its share of the total international reserves has so far remained negligible
(0.1%). The JPY and the GBP have remained rivals for the position of the world’s
third international reserve currency with shares fluctuating between 4% and 5%.
Furthermore, it seems that countries increasingly turn towards more diversification
of their foreign reserve assets. Indications hereof are a higher number of reserve
currencies over time in our panel and also in the IMF COFER database, where in
the last years the AUD, the CAD (both 2013), and the RMB were included (2016).
Table 4.5 presents currency shares for industrial and emerging economies and shows
that the EUR and the GBP have gained shares, especially in emerging economies.9
Table 4.5: Share of currencies in total reserve holdings (%)
Currency 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015
All economies
US dollar 80.5 58.5 52.8 48.6 52.7
Euro 0.0 27.2 33.0 36.4 29.3
Japanese yen 3.5 11.0 5.0 5.3 4.2
British pound 0.1 2.1 3.8 4.5 5.3
others 15.9 1.1 5.4 5.2 8.5
Industrial economies
US dollar 80.5 58.0 54.0 51.2 54.5
Euro 0.0 27.3 30.4 32.0 27.0
Japanese yen 3.5 11.3 6.0 8.0 5.4
British pound 0.1 2.2 3.9 2.3 4.3
others 15.9 1.2 5.7 6.5 8.8
Developing economies
US dollar n/a 72.6 47.5 44.8 47.5
Euro n/a 24.8 44.7 43.1 35.6
Japanese yen n/a 1.2 0.1 1.1 0.7
British pound n/a 0.7 3.7 7.7 8.1
others n/a 0.7 4.0 3.3 8.1
9Table 6.16 and Table 6.17 in the Appendix show the country composition of the sample.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Determinants of the International Reserve Composition
In this section, we wish to update the two in our eyes most relevant empirical contri-
butions dealing with the the composition of international reserves and making use
of individual country data: Dooley et al. (1989) and Eichengreen and Mathieson
































where t=1,...,T is the number of periods, i=1,..., n denotes the countries for
which we observe currency holdings, k=1,...,4 is the number of reserve-currency
countries (USA, EA, Japan, and UK) and s=1, 2 denotes the considered exchange
rate arrangements (pegs to the USD or the EUR respectively). Ai,k,t denotes the
end-of-period reserves of country i in the reserve currency of country k at time t,
A¯i,t is the total end-of-period amount of foreign exchange reserves for country i at
time t. Ei,s,t represents a dummy variable which is equal to one if country i follows
a peg to the USD or the EUR (for s=1 or s=2 respectively) in period t and which
is zero otherwise. IMi,k,t denotes the imports to country i from reserve currency
country k at time t and IM i,t is the sum of all imports to country i. Di,k,t stands
for the amount of external debt of country i in period t in the currency of reserve
currency country k and D¯i,t is for the total amount of external debt of country i
in period t. BCi,k,t denotes foreign currency claims of banks from country i in the
currency of country k in period t and BCi,t are total bank foreign currency claims
of banks from country i in period t. Finally µi,t denotes a country- and time-specific
error term. Table 4.6 reports the sources for our set of explanatory variables.
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Table 4.6: Explanatory variables
Variable Description Scale Source
Peg Hard or soft peg to reserve currency










Imports Ratio of imports from currency issuing
country to total imports.





Ratio of external long-term public and
publicly guaranteed debt in specific
currency to total external long-term
public and publicly guaranteed debt.






Ratio of foreign currency bank claims
denominated in particular currency to
total foreign currency bank claims.




In Table 4.7, we provide an overview of our three models used, which are es-
timated separately for four reserve currencies as dependent variables. As some
covariates are not available for the entire set of countries in our sample, the number
of observations strongly depends on the model which is chosen.
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Table 4.7: Models estimated
Model Explanatory variables Countries included Obser-
vations
A pegUSD, pegEur, importsfromUSA,
importsfromEA, importsfromJapan,
importsfromUK
Australia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Georgia, Germany, Hong Kong,
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Mozambique, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines,









Bosnia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Georgia,
Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia
105




Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Hong Kong, Norway, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland
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As altering the model also alters the composition of the countries in the sample,
models cannot be directly compared with each other. Instead, results have to be
interpreted within the given models. In the following sections, we start with some
preliminary results obtained from pooled regressions, thus ignoring the panel struc-
ture of our data, and then gradually modify our estimation strategy.
In this sense, Table 4.8 presents the results from pooled OLS estimations. The
coefficients of the pegs for the USD and for the EUR are both large and highly
significant, expressing the importance of both currencies. In particular, the pegs
are positively associated with the holdings of the respective currency and negatively
associated for the alternative, which suggests that the choice basically is one between
USD and EUR holdings. We also obtain some significantly negative coefficients
for both the USD and the EUR peg on the relative holdings of JPY and GBP. In
addition, the pooled OLS regressions yield significantly positive coefficient estimates
for imports from the respective emitting countries on the relative holdings of the
EUR, the JPY, and the GBP.
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Table 4.8: Pooled regression results: Model A, OLS
Dependent variables
Independent variables USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.301*** -0.238*** -0.065*** -0.041*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
pegEur -0.396*** 0.383*** -0.004 -0.056***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
importsfromUSA 0.135 0.090 -0.045 -0.153***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03)
importsfromEA -0.490*** 0.727*** 0.012 -0.021
(0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
importsfromJapan -1.461** 0.122 0.821*** -0.214
(0.53) (0.43) (0.11) (0.15)
importsfromUK 1.032* -1.407*** 0.283** 0.617***
(0.45) (0.38) (0.09) (0.13)
_cons 0.674*** 0.232*** 0.003 0.058***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 425 358 424 407
adj. R2 0.422 0.629 0.165 0.189
Notes: OLS estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table 4.9 provides the results from pooled Tobit regressions. The censored
nature of the data (values for the dependent variable lie within the range of 0 and
1) makes the use of a Tobit estimation technique preferable (see Beck and Weber,
2011). For non-linear models the interpretation of the coefficients is somewhat less
intuitive than for linear models. The coefficients describe the predicted effects on
a latent variable y*, which only partly coincides with actual dependent variable.
Nevertheless, significance and signs of the obtained estimates can be interpreted.
Results are quite similar to those discussed for the pooled OLS regressions above.
Again, we find that pegs to the USD and to the EUR are associated with an increase
in the relative holdings of the USD and the EUR, but with a decrease of the re-
spective other currency. In the pooled Tobit regression model these effects are even
stronger. Similar results as before are obtained with regards to imports. On the one
hand, except for imports from the USA, imports from the currency emitting coun-
tries are positively associated with the relative holdings of the respective currency.
On the other hand, imports from a country other than the emitting country or the
euro area are sometimes negatively associated with the relative holdings of a cur-
rency. For instance, higher imports from the USA are associated with lower relative
holdings of GBP and higher imports from the euro area are associated with lower
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relative USD holdings. Although the structure of our data obviously demands panel
regressions, these pooled regressions confirm some initial expectations and alleviate
concerns about our rather small number of observations.
Table 4.9: Pooled regression results: Model A, Tobit
Dependent variables
Independent variables USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.303*** -0.349*** -0.102*** -0.115**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
pegEur -0.419*** 0.388*** -0.030* -0.147***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
importsfromUSA 0.153 0.089 0.018 -0.329***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
importsfromEA -0.467*** 0.732*** 0.034 -0.033
(0.09) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
importsfromJapan -1.404* -0.051 1.176*** -0.853*
(0.55) (0.46) (0.19) (0.33)
importsfromUK 1.212** -1.370*** 0.515** 1.329***
(0.47) (0.39) (0.17) (0.25)
_cons 0.660*** 0.233*** -0.054*** 0.030
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 425 358 424 407
LRχ2 233.97 365.16 80.03 122.24
Prob > LRχ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Tobit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
In a next step, we want to exploit the panel structure of the data. We retain a
Tobit approach but make use of panel regressions without fixed effects as suggested
by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Table 4.10, Table 4.11, and Table 4.12 present
the results of our three models altering the set of explanatory variables.
Model A (Table 4.10), which includes pegs and import variables as depend-
ent variables, reveals some intuitive patterns. The coefficient of the USD peg is
significantly positive in the regression for the USD and negatively significant in the
regression for the EUR. Contrariwise, the coefficient for the EUR peg is significantly
negative in the USD regression and significantly positive in the EUR regressions.
Note that in the EUR regression the effect of the EUR peg is economically much
smaller if compared to the effect of the USD peg on USD holdings. Countries that
peg to a given currency might want to hold larger relative amounts of that currency
in order to back the stipulated exchange rate. At the same time, relative holdings
of the other main currencies are reduced. Concerning trade, we find significantly
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negative coefficients for imports from the euro area and from the USA in the USD
and EUR regressions. Central banks might be to some degree obliged to finance
foreign trade with accumulated reserves (see Soesmanto et al., 2015). With this
logic, increased imports from the USA should reduce a central bank’s propensity
to hold EUR relative to other currencies. In sum, much speaks for the transaction
motive.
Table 4.10: Panel regression results: Model A, Tobit
Dependent variables
Independent variables USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.489*** -0.599*** 0.017 0.001
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
pegEur -0.244*** 0.074* -0.007 -0.057***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
importsfromUSA 0.218 -0.592* 0.341** -0.163
(0.28) (0.27) (0.13) (0.14)
importsfromEA -0.283** -0.037 -0.006 -0.024
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
importsfromJapan -0.665 -0.155 0.969*** 0.519
(0.61) (0.56) (0.27) (0.34)
importsfromUK -0.385 0.089 0.472** 0.487**
(0.44) (0.37) (0.18) (0.18)
_cons 0.594*** 0.526*** -0.095*** -0.009
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 425 358 424 407
Wald χ2 156.87 166.65 50.65 19.91
Prob > Wald χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Tobit estimation with random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Our second model (Model B, Table 4.11) also incorporates variables for pub-
lic foreign currency debt in the four main currencies. Here, it is noteworthy that
including foreign currency debt substantially reduces the sample size as most coun-
tries in our sample are not indebted in foreign currencies or do not report so. From
a theoretical perspective, large foreign debt in a certain currency should increase a
country’s relative holdings of that currency and reduce the relative holdings of altern-
ative currencies. One reason is that central banks should have some responsibility
for the processing of foreign currency debt repayments. Our regression results are
not very indicative. For USD holdings, we obtain significantly negative coefficients
for EUR- and JPY-denominated debt but also for USD-denominated debt, which
would contradict theoretical considerations. Most of the other estimates are not
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significant. Including foreign currency debt measures leaves some central findings
mostly unaffected. For instance, the coefficient of the EUR peg remains significantly
negative for USD holdings and significantly positive for EUR holdings and some of
the quantitative findings for imports are maintained.
Table 4.11: Panel regression results: Model B, Tobit
Dependent variables
Independent variables USD EUR JPY
pegUSD -0.043 0.014 0.082
(0.08) (0.08) (19.68)
pegEur -0.405*** 0.467*** -0.091
(0.10) (0.10) (28.98)
importsfromUSA 1.696*** -0.877 0.247
(0.44) (0.47) (0.22)
importsfromEA 0.086 0.110 0.167
(0.18) (0.19) (0.23)
importsfromJapan 2.970** -3.439*** 1.020
(1.00) (1.01) (0.66)
importsfromUK -0.569 0.571 -0.581
(0.55) (0.58) (1.19)
debt_USD -0.772** 0.118 1.327*
(0.24) (0.23) (0.58)
debt_EUR -0.640** 0.146 0.990
(0.23) (0.22) (0.78)
debt_JPY -0.785* 0.619 1.649*
(0.38) (0.39) (0.69)
_cons 1.029*** 0.295 -1.396*
(0.23) (0.21) (0.64)
Observations 106 105 105
Wald χ2 86.50 86.99 76.13
Prob > Wald χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Tobit estimation with random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%. Regression estimates for GBP
are excluded from this table due to non-convergence of the estimation routine.
The third model (Model C, Table 4.12) expands our baseline regression model
by foreign currency claims on domestic banks. We would expect a positive effect
of claims in a certain currency on the relative holdings of that currency and a
negative effect on other currencies. Again, the intuition supports a transaction
motive as central banks are strongly involved in international payments and financial
transactions. And again, our sample is substantially reduced compared to Model A.
The obtained results are mixed. We do not find indicative results for an effect of USD
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claims on USD holdings. Claims in EUR have a significantly negative coefficient for
USD and JPY holdings and a significantly positive coefficient for EUR holdings.
Overall, including variables on bank claims yields similar quantitative results for
pegs and imports, although the sample is markedly smaller.
Table 4.12: Panel regression results: Model C, Tobit
Dependent variables
Independent variables USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.175* -0.685 -0.286 -0.149
(0.07) (18.82) (15.50) (7.09)
pegEur -0.171*** 0.252*** -0.041 -0.057***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
importsfromUSA -0.041 0.376*** 0.063 -0.065
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
importsfromEA -0.368*** 0.115 0.200*** 0.137**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05)
importsfromJapan -1.951*** 1.591* 0.977* -0.879*
(0.57) (0.67) (0.39) (0.41)
importsfromUK -0.066 -1.113** 1.156*** 0.545**
(0.32) (0.37) (0.22) (0.17)
USDclaims -0.196 0.200 -0.265* -0.041
(0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.09)
EURclaims -0.590* 0.907*** -0.536** -0.033
(0.23) (0.27) (0.17) (0.14)
JPYclaims 0.700 0.893 -0.432 -0.215
(0.41) (0.48) (0.28) (0.26)
GBPclaims -0.587* 0.412 -0.089 -0.140
(0.26) (0.31) (0.18) (0.17)
_cons 0.898*** -0.068 0.157 0.051
(0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 93 93 93 93
Wald χ2 326.40 180.01 149.69 113.40
Prob > Wald χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Tobit estimation with random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes
significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
Having analysed a set of regression specifications, we alter estimation methodolo-
gies for additional sensitivity analyses in this section. Results of the Tobit approach
are confronted with results of OLS regressions with random effects and Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR). SUR appear to be a plausible choice as there is likely
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some dependence between the respective currency shares. To be more concrete,
SUR allows the estimation of a system of equations where error terms are correl-
ated. Taking into account such a correlation can increase efficiency compared to
the estimation of separate equations using OLS.10 For instance, Soesmanto et al.
(2015) advocate the use of the SUR technique for a closely related examination.11
For our three models, we estimate the shares of USD, EUR, JPY, and GBP as a
system of equations. Table 4.13, Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 exemplarily confront
the findings for USD shares from three different estimation methodologies, which
are Tobit, OLS, and SUR. As the tables largely speak for themselves, results shall
be discussed briefly.
For USD shares in Model A (Table 4.13), OLS and SUR estimates mostly con-
firm our findings from Tobit estimations. In all three methodologies, coefficients are
economically relevant and highly significant for three explanatory variables. Intu-
itively, USD pegs are associated with higher USD shares, EUR pegs and imports
from the euro area are associated with reduced USD shares. The SUR model further
suggests a significantly negative effect of UK imports on USD holdings.
10The use of SUR was promoted by Arnold Zellner(see Zellner, 1962). It refers to a system of
linear equations, where the use of correlated error terms across equations can increase effi-
ciency, while OLS regressions would only yield consistent estimators. SUR is conducted using
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and is based on two steps: First, residuals from
OLS regression are used to estimate the matrix variance-covariance matrix of the residuals Σ.
Second, generalised least squares are estimated to obtain the unbiased and more efficient GLS





with V ar(βˆ) = {X ′(Σ−1⊗ IN )X}−1. The two steps are formally described as follows: 1.
Estimate Σ using uˆj = yi − Xiβˆjand σˆ′ij = uˆ
′
iuˆj
N . 2. Substitute Σ in GLS estimator:





11Soesmanto et al. (2015) examine determinants of international reserve holdings of the Reserve
Bank of Australia (RBA). Asking for a possible shift away from USD-denominated assets, the
authors tend to expect an enduring dominance of this currency for Australian foreign reserve
management.
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Table 4.13: Comparison of regression results: Model A (USD)
Dependent variables = USD shares
Independent variables Tobit OLS SUR
pegUSD 0.489*** 0.450*** 0.456***
(0.07) (6.92) (14.61)
pegEur -0.244*** -0.239*** -0.123***
(0.03) (-7.75) (-9.32)
importsfromUSA 0.218 0.161 0.118
(0.28) (0.60) (1.03)
importsfromEA -0.283** -0.298*** -0.482***
(0.09) (-3.47) (-10.87)
importsfromJapan -0.665 -0.693 0.084
(0.61) (-1.18) (0.25)




Observations 425 425 341
R2(overall) 0.3653
Wald χ2 156.87
Prob > Wald χ2 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%
and * significance at 10%.
Model B (Table 4.14), which contains foreign debt variables and which is based
on a smaller number of observations, confirms a negative effect of being pegged
to the EUR and suggests a positive relation between imports from the US and
USD holdings. Surprisingly, coefficients of the foreign debt variables now appear
more significant but indecisively point in opposite directions and thus do not yield
additional insights.
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Table 4.14: Comparison of regression results: Model B (USD)
Dependent variables = USD shares
Independent variables Tobit OLS SUR
pegUSD -0.043 0.143 0.049
(0.08) (1.31) (1.07)
pegEur -0.405*** -0.342*** -0.384***
(0.10) (-11.31) (-9.05)
importsfromUSA 1.696*** 1.320*** 0.475***
(0.44) (5.67) (3.73)
importsfromEA 0.086 -0.628*** 0.002
(0.18) (-3.63) (0.01)
importsfromJapan 2.970** 0.305 0.422
(1.00) (0.35) (0.51)
importsfromUK -0.569 1.027* -0.520
(0.55) (1.99) (-1.86)
debt_USD -0.772** 0.0943 0.433***
(0.24) (0.57) (6.35)
debt_EUR -0.640** -0.0325 0.285***
(0.23) (-0.18) (3.78)




Observations 106 106 105
R2(overall) 0.8998
Wald χ2 86.50
Prob > Wald χ2 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%
and * significance at 10%.
Model C (Table 4.15), which comprises foreign currency denominated bank
claims, further confirms the importance of pegs and trade as determinants of the
composition of international reserves. Especially, being pegged to the USD is asso-
ciated with higher USD shares, whereas being pegged to the EUR and importing
from the euro area is associated with lower USD shares. Imports from the UK are
seemingly related to lower USD holdings, but the coefficient is only significant in
the SUR configuration.
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Table 4.15: Comparison of regression results: Model C (USD)
Dependent variables = USD shares
Independent variables Tobit OLS SUR
pegUSD 0.175* 0.175* 0.303***
(0.07) (0.07) (6.91)
pegEur -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.227***
(0.03) (0.03) (-4.58)
importsfromUSA -0.041 -0.041 0.131**
(0.07) (0.08) (3.04)
importsfromEA -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.034
(0.08) (0.09) (-0.40)
importsfromJapan -1.951*** -1.951** 1.076*
(0.57) (0.61) (2.39)
importsfromUK -0.066 -0.066 -1.844***
(0.32) (0.34) (-3.88)
USDclaims -0.196 -0.196 0.418***
(0.14) (0.15) (4.28)
EURclaims -0.590* -0.590* 0.555***
(0.23) (0.25) (3.53)
JPYclaims 0.700 0.700 0.521
(0.41) (0.43) (1.67)




Observations 93 93 93
R2(overall) 0.7783
Wald χ2 326.40
Prob > Wald χ2 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%
and * significance at 10%.
In sum, results are most robust for peg and trade variables and can explain
international reserve compositions reasonably well. Models B and C acknowledge
the importance of international debt and international bank claims but present
mixed results. In the following sections, we therefore rely on our baseline Model A
as a workhorse model.
4.4.3 Effect of the Euro Crisis on Euro Holdings
In the first decade after the introduction of the common European currency, the
EUR share experienced a steady increase in international reserve holdings. The
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outbreak of the euro crisis in 2010 marked a turning point, as since then the EUR
share has constantly lost ground. IMF COFER data document a peak in 2009 with
a share of 28% of total allocated foreign reserves. Our more eurocentric data suggest
the year 2008 as a break date already and, for that year, documents a EUR share
in total foreign reserves of nearly 38%. In both data sets, the EUR shares have
decreased by 9 and 8 percentage points (pp), respectively, since their peak years.
Not surprisingly, scenarios of the EUR surpassing the USD as the worldwide most
important reserve currency usually date from the years prior to the euro crisis (see
Chinn and Frankel, 2008, for instance). Figure 4.4 illustrates the increasing and then
decreasing importance of the EUR as an international reserve currency with 2007
as a base year (2007=100). In terms of the euro’s share in international reserves,
2015 was the currency’s temporary nadir.








EUR (LW) EUR (IMF)
Source: IMF (2017).
We use Chow tests to verify a structural break for EUR shares triggered by
the euro crisis.12 To do so, we create a non-crisis and a crisis subsample, where we
consider all years prior to 2010 as pre-crisis years. For our country-specific data, the
hypothesis of estimated coefficients being equal between non-crisis and crisis years
12The Chow test is given by (RSSC−(RSS1+RSS2))/k(RSS1+RSS2)/(N1+N2−2k) , where RSSC is the residual sum of squares
of the combined regression, RSS1 is the residual sum of squares of the regression for group 1,
and RSS1 is the residual sum of squares of the regression for group 2. k corresponds to the
total number of estimated parameters and N1 and N2 are the numbers of observations of both
groups. The test statistic then is given by F (k, N1 +N2 − 2k). Also see Chow (1960).
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can be comfortably rejected for most variables. In our baseline model (Model A),
this is particularly true for USD pegs, imports from the euro area, and imports from
Japan as explanatory variables. The euro crisis alters the impact of these regressors
distinctly as shown by Table 4.16. In particular, signs and significance of these coef-
ficients are different between both groups. Being pegged to the USD no more has
a significantly negative effect since the spread of the euro crisis, whereas the effects
of imports from the euro area on EUR holdings has turned significant and negative
after 2010. The coefficient for imports from Japan, on the other hand, has been
significantly negative before the crisis and has turned insignificant since 2010.
Table 4.16: Crisis impact on EUR shares
Dependent variables = EUR shares




pegUSD -0.599*** -0.817*** 0.013
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
pegEur 0.074* 0.053 0.018
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
importsfromUSA -0.592* -0.402 -1.715***
(0.27) (0.29) (0.44)
importsfromEA -0.037 -0.065 -0.368*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.18)
importsfromJapan -0.155 -2.226** -0.052
(0.56) (0.76) (1.01)
importsfromUK 0.089 0.789 -0.574
(0.37) (0.58) (0.36)
_cons 0.526*** 0.632*** 0.662***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
Observations 358 201 157
Notes: Tobit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
To further examine effects of the euro crisis, we add a crisis dummy to capture
a direct effect and interaction terms to capture an indirect effect to the baseline
regression, as we suspect some interdependence between the crisis dummy variable
and the other covariates (see Table 4.17). Crisis years are marked by a dummy vari-
able (1 if crisis, 0 otherwise) according to the system described above. Interaction
terms are constructed as products of the dummy variable and the six independent
variables of the baseline regression. On the one hand, a significant and negative crisis
dummy in columns 2 and 3 supports a reduction in EUR holdings post-2010, as ex-
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pected. The coefficient confirms that, in comparison to the pre-crisis period, central
banks have reduced their EUR shares by more than 6 percentage points (column
2). On the other hand, coefficients of the interaction terms in column 3 and 4 are
mostly not significant at commonly used levels. In column 4, the interaction terms
Crisis*importsfromEA and Crisis*importsfromUK provide two exceptions. How-
ever, pegs in particular did not have an additional and more pronounced impact
during crisis years.
Table 4.17: Regression results with interaction terms
Dependent variables = EUR shares
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
pegUSD -0.599*** -0.558*** -0.599*** -0.613***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
pegEur 0.074* 0.093** 0.075* 0.070*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
importsfromUSA -0.592* -0.635* -0.670** -0.818***
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
importsfromEA -0.037 -0.073 -0.088 -0.224**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
importsfromJapan -0.155 -1.258* -1.104 -1.140*
(0.56) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55)
importsfromUK 0.089 -0.039 -0.053 1.647***
(0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.46)














_cons 0.526*** 0.600*** 0.609*** 0.618***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 358 358 358 358
Notes: Tobit estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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We also aim to glance at a possibly different behaviour in the reserve man-
agement of non-euro currency holdings between crisis and non-crisis countries as a
response to the outbreak of the euro crisis. We do not differentiate as to the severity
of the crisis but regard all countries of the euro area as crisis countries and all other
countries as non-crisis countries. Focusing on USD and JPY holdings, our hypothesis
is that euro area central banks adapted their investment strategies as a response to
the crisis differently than other central banks. The treatment group consists of all
countries that were exposed to the euro crisis in the second period. The control group
is composed of all countries not exposed to the euro crisis neither in the first nor
in the second period. Table 4.18 presents the results of a Difference-in-Differences
(DID) analysis for USD holdings. Whereas the p-value for the treatment effect in the
USD shows no significance, the treatment effect is significant at a 10% level for JPY
holdings and at a 1% level for GBP holdings (see Table 4.19 and Table 4.20). These
findings reflect a parallel increase in USD holdings of both groups but contrary ac-
tions in the management of JPY and GBP reserves. While euro area central banks
have increased the volume of their JPY holdings and have decreased the volume of
their GBP holdings after 2010, the opposite applies to JPY and GBP holdings of
non-euro area central banks. It is therefore right that changes in JPY and GBP
holdings are systematically different between the control and the treatment group.
The interpretation of the results is, as in many DID applications, disputable. Sys-
tematic differences might well be due to other factors and euro area central banks in
general face a fundamentally different investment decision in comparison to non-euro
area central banks. In particular, the euro crisis does not require from them some
type of portfolio rebalancing away from EUR holdings and possible currency reserve
compositions are automatically more limited. Nevertheless, systematic differences
between both groups can be confirmed.
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Table 4.18: Difference-in-Differences estimation results: USD share








Diff (A-B) 0.055 0.06 0.91 0.362
Diff-in-Diff 0.014 0.066 0.21 0.831
R2 0.24
Notes: Means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression. Inference: *** p<0.01; **
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
Table 4.19: Difference-in-Differences estimation results: JPY share








Diff (A-B) 0.029 0.021 1.34 0.182
Diff-in-Diff 0.043 0.023 1.83 0.068*
R2 0.02
Notes: Means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression. Inference: *** p<0.01; **
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 4.20: Difference-in-Differences estimation results: GBP share








Diff (A-B) -0.051 0.014 3.69 0.000***
Diff-in-Diff -0.059 0.015 3.87 0.000***
R2 0.11
Notes: Means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression. Inference: *** p<0.01; **
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
4.4.4 Actual and Model Predicted Currency Compositions
In another exercise, we confront model predicted and actual currency shares. We re-
strict ourselves to the three main international currencies (i.e. USD, EUR, JPY) and
make use of our parsimonious but sound baseline model, i.e. Tobit-type panel regres-
sions with currency pegs and import shares. Benchmarking actual against predicted
currency shares reveals in how far a country’s reserve composition follows common
patterns or is different from that of its peers. For all three currencies, the actual
shares exceed the predicted shares of a relevant number of countries. In particular,
for most countries the model predicts a USD share in the range between 40-60% of
total international reserves, whereas an important number of Latin American and
industrial European countries seemingly have a strong preference for holding USD-
denominated assets. EUR shares are regularly larger than predicted in neighbouring
states of the euro area but also in the US. In contrast, a large number of central
banks in our sample does not hold JPY denominated assets despite important trade
links. This is partially offset by JPY holdings of the Bank of Italy, the ECB, and the
Fed markedly larger than predicted. This indicates that additional factors might
play a role for the composition of international reserves. However, Figure 4.5 in-
dicates that a model with few explanatory variables can reasonably well explain an
important share of the variation between countries and that outliers are often an
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expression of only partial reserve diversification.13
13The UK insofar is a special case as it disposes of foreign reserves managed by the Bank of
England as well as of foreign reserves managed by the British Treasury. In our analysis, we
limit ourselves to central bank foreign reserves. For the UK, this results in too large (actual)
EUR and too small (actual) USD shares in our data.
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Actual and predicted JPY shares
Corr(x,y)= 0.21
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In a final exercise, we aim to make some predictions about the currency com-
positions of the three largest - non-disclosing - reserve holders. These are China,
Japan, and Saudi Arabia, which together dispose of nearly 50% of worldwide inter-
national reserves. Substituting respective import shares and pegs into our baseline
estimation equation (Model A) for USD, EUR, and JPY shares can reveal something
about these countries’ reserve composition.14
For China, our model predicts a composition of its international reserves of 52%
USD, 45% EUR, and 2% JPY assets. The model further suggests that Japanese
international reserves are invested to 59% in USD and to 31% in EUR. For Saudi
Arabia, the US peg translates itself via an economically significant coefficient into
a highly USD dominated predicted reserve composition, despite vivid trade with
the EA. The predicted foreign reserves portfolio consists of 92% USD and 3% JPY
denominated assets.15
For the three countries of interest, these estimation results are difficult to com-
pare to actual compositions as too little is known about these. Nevertheless, possible
bands within which currency shares may fluctuate might be derived from statements
from economists and analysts. For China, older estimates assume a USD share
between 60% and 70% of its international reserves, a EUR share between 20% and
30%, and JYP and GBP shares together between 5% and 10% (see Hu 2010, pp.
8-9, Morrison and Labonte, 2013, p. 5, Wildau, 2014, Neely, 2016, p. 1, and Neely,
2017, p. 1).16 For Japan, a high USD share in the country’s international reserves
14In this section as well as in the initial estimates of Section 4, we also experimented with the
locations of central bank foreign representatives, but results were only partially useful. While
most central banks which maintain foreign branches indeed hold reserves in the currency of the
guest country, the overlap of countries that in some form disclose international reserves and
countries that maintain foreign branches was negligible. In 2015, a total of 27 central banks
worldwide had foreign offices to our knowledge, but only five of them also reported the currency
composition of their international reserves. Those are the central banks of Australia, Canada,
Hong Kong, Norway, and Switzerland. For instance, Switzerland runs a branch in Singapore
to avowedly better manage its reserves denominated in the currencies of the region (see Swiss
National Bank, 2012). Among other Asian currencies, the Swiss National Bank holds assets
denominated in SGD. To estimate currency compositions of international reserves, we restricted
ourselves to our baseline model due to its favourable properties and the stable results it yields
in our previous sections.
15In 2015, the composition of Chinese imports was as follows: USA: 9%, EA: 10%, Japan: 9%,
UK: 1%. For the same year, the composition of Japanese imports was the following: USA:
10%, EA: 9%, UK: 1%. For Saudi Arabia respective shares were: USA: 13%, EA: 20%, Japan:
6%, and UK: 3% (own calculations). Data is from the China Statistical Yearbook, the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO), and the Saudi Arabian General Authority for Statistics.
Peg data is from the IMF’s AREAER database and only the Saudi riyal is characterised by a
currency peg (i.e. to the USD).
16Concerning the impact of the euro crisis on Chinese EUR holdings, Wang and Freeman (2013,
p. 7) write that “the European sovereign debt crisis has not produced a significant reduction
in the share of China’s holding of euro assets, but it may have discouraged any increase”.
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appears realistic. For instance, Wong (2007) is among the few committing herself
to an, in our opinion, plausible USD share between 83% and 89%. For Saudi Ara-
bia, which is regularly among the largest holders of foreign reserves, some market
watchers assume central bank foreign reserves to be denominated nearly exclusively
in USD (see Reuters, 2015, for instance).
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examine determinants of the composition of international reserves
and aim to disentangle the impact of the euro crisis. As comprehensive datasets on
the composition of international reserves are highly confidential, we compile a new
dataset based on those central banks which make their data publicly available. To
a large extent these pieces of information can be found in central bank annual re-
ports. Relating these data to a selection of country-specific factors reveals that trade
patterns and currency pegs are primary determinants of foreign currency holdings.
Thus, we can confirm findings from papers based on access to confidential IMF data
(i.e. Heller and Knight, 1978, Dooley et al., 1989, and Eichengreen and Mathieson,
2000). Other possible determinants are examined. Foreign debt and international
bank claims appear to play a role in the composition of foreign currency holdings,
but results are mixed.
We further show that the spread of the euro crisis caused a break in the de-
velopment of EUR holdings. In pre-crisis years and since the EUR introduction in
1999, the EUR could sustainably improve its position as the world’s second currency
after the USD. Since 2010, EUR shares have been declining by trend. However, the
euro crisis only partially affected determinants of the composition of international
reserves. A DID analysis furthermore reveals systematic variation in the evolution
of JPY and GBP reserve shares between euro area and non-euro area countries.
Additionally, the chapter argues that a simple model can explain currency com-
positions reasonably well but in some cases important deviations from predicted
shares suggest that additional factors might play a role. However, the stability of
findings from Heller and Knight (1978), Dooley et al. (1989), and Eichengreen and
Mathieson (2000) is impressive and indicates strong inertia in international reserve
compositions. Political considerations should be worth further attention in future
work. Returning to the initially mentioned motives for foreign currency holdings,
our present point of view is that transaction and mercantilist motives are still highly
relevant. In our approach we have not investigated whether investment motives can
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explain the composition of currency reserves. We, however, expect that those are
a driving force for wealthy states with large excess reserves that actively search for
investment opportunities.17 In a final exercise, we showed exemplarily for China, Ja-
pan, and Saudi Arabia that reserve compositions of non-disclosing countries can be
estimated approximately. More transparency on the part of these countries nonethe-
less remains desirable in our eyes as these three states own nearly 50% of worldwide
international reserves. Economic analyses in this field hence should put more weight
on the important players as those can heavily impact currency markets, exchange
rates and entire economies.
17Nugee (2000, p. 66) suggests that the size of a central bank’s reserves has an impact on the
central bank’s reserve management style. Higher reserves by trend require less attention for
liquidity issues, whereas for instance wealth management and strategic asset allocation con-
siderations become more relevant. Such considerations bring central banks closer to wealthy
private investors, who face yield/risk trade-offs. A prominent example is Norway, where Norges
Bank Investment Management is a separate part of the central bank, managing the Government
Pension Fund Global.
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5.1 Motivation
In general, structures of financial supervision are very heterogeneous1; from time
to time they undergo important changes and often they are very complex (e.g. in
the USA or in Europe). Historically, supervision of banks has mostly been a task
assigned to central banks, whereas other specialised institutions were in charge of
supervising securities markets and insurance actors. With a closer integration of
financial markets, decreasing boundaries between bank business, securities markets,
and insurance business, and an overall growing importance of Non-Bank Financial
Intermediaries, the model of an integrated supervisor emerged in the 1980s. The
financial crisis has also called into question this design and some countries such as
the United Kingdom and Hungary have since then dissolved their FSAs and have
redistributed responsibilities again. Due to the multitude of different supervisory
designs, quantifying these structures is a demanding project.
In this chapter, I distinguish three types of supervisory systems (“no integra-
tion”, “partial integration” and “total integration”) and examine empirically factors
determining a country’s supervisory structure. To this end, I use a new dataset
which covers the changing supervisory structure of 170 countries from 1990 to 2015.
Unlike other studies, I focus on political factors as determinants of national arrange-
ments. These factors include, for instance, a country’s political system as well as its
regime type. One important finding is that federalism seemingly plays an important
role for the way financial supervision is organised.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the rel-
evant literature in the field of financial supervision. Section 3 portrays how financial
supervision structures developed historically. Section 4 assesses empirically political
determinants of supervisory designs. Section 5 draws this chapter’s conclusions and
makes some final remarks.
5.2 Literature
In the scientific debate on the issue of financial financial supervision, three ap-
proaches are usually distinguished according to the degree of integration: Total in-
1A country’s financial supervision architecture is usually composed of micro-prudential financial
supervision, macro-prudential financial supervision and consumer financial protection. To-
gether they aim at ensuring the stability and the well-functioning of financial markets. Each of
these three pillars being an important issue by itself, this chapter is limited to micro-prudential
financial supervision. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to it as financial supervision in the
following.
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tegration, where one distinct authority supervises at least banks, securities markets,
and insurers; partial integration, where one authority supervises two of the three
above-mentioned sectors; and no integration at all, where one authority supervises
one single sector each (see Arnone and Gambini, 2006; Masciandaro, 2007; Melecky
and Podpiera, 2013, for instance). Two frequently asked questions are whether fin-
ancial supervision should be integrated or decentralised and whether and how the
central bank should be involved in supervision (see Podpiera and Čihák, 2007, p.
313). While, in theory, there are numerous arguments for and against consolidation
of supervision, a tendency towards more integration of financial supervision can be
observed.
The related literature on the topic of financial supervision consists of exclusively
descriptive contributions2 as well as of empirical assessments that aim either at
exploring the outcome of financial supervision or at exploring the determinants of
a country’s supervisory architecture. This chapter follows the latter path, i.e. it
looks at financial supervision as the dependent variable. Given the breadth of the
subject, I only briefly reproduce the main points of relevant and related studies in
chronological order in the following.
Schoenmaker and Goodhart (1992) were among the first to explore the impact
of supervisory integration and the role for central banks. They do not find clear
evidence for an advantage of separating supervision and monetary policy.
Lannoo (2003) focuses on supervision in Europe and categorises financial su-
pervision by assigning letters according to the involvement of different authorities.
I borrow from this author and make use of a similar classification in my dataset.
Martinez and Rose (2003) canvass 15 countries that have integrated supervi-
sion in their about reasons for and experiences with integrated supervision. Effective
supervision and economies of scale are commonly named as rationales for consolid-
ation.
Shen (2006) tries to spot which states integrate their supervision and finds
a “reverse central bank effect” and good governance being associated with more
integration.
2For example, the Group of Thirty (2008) reviews 17 national supervisory systems and distin-
guishes four approaches to financial supervision (institutional, functional, integrated, and twin
peaks approach). The Group of Thirty is a Washington D.C.-based private, non profit or-
ganisation which, according to its homepage, “aims to deepen understanding of international
economic and financial issues, and to explore the international repercussions of decisions taken
in the public and private sectors.” (www.group30.org/about). Members are mainly policy-
makers such as active or former central bank governors as well as academics.
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Arnone and Gambini (2006) find a statistically significant advantage of integ-
rated supervision outside the central bank over a decentralised system, where the
central bank plays a pivotal role. They measure quality of financial supervision
in terms of compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for effective banking
supervision.
Podpiera and Čihák (2007) go a step further by additionally regarding the qual-
ity of securities markets and insurance supervision. To do so, they expand the BCP
for effective banking supervision by the Objectives and Principles of Securities Reg-
ulation of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and
the Insurance Core Principles (ICP) of the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS). They find that integration is accompanied by a higher quality of
supervision in terms of compliance with these principles and explain this result with
a generally higher level of development of the countries that dispose of an integrated
supervisory authority. They do not find a significant relation between the quality of
supervision and whether supervision is located inside or outside the central bank.
Masciandaro (2007) coins the term “central bank fragmentation effect”, which
describes a trade-off between integration and central bank involvement, i.e. the more
important a central bank is as a supervisory authority, the less likely supervision is
to be integrated. In other papers, he introduces new indices to measure the degree
of financial supervision integration mainly by examining how many authorities are
involved in monitoring each financial segment (see Quintyn et al., 2011). Another
finding is that smaller economies tend to integrate their authorities. Masciandaro
and Quintyn (2011b) recognise that the decision for a specific supervisory structure
is based less on economic than on political premises. As the public sector obviously
is influenced by political tendencies, this chapter seizes on this idea and focuses on
political factors as determinants of supervisory structures.
Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) observe that financial markets are more conser-
vatively regulated in states where the central bank or another independent agency
is in charge of supervision. They see a trade-off between financial stability and a
generous provision of capital to the economy.
The paper closest to my analysis is that of Melecky and Podpiera (2013). The
authors additionally include consumer financial supervision and exploit a dataset of
98 countries from 1999 to 2010. Following similar approaches, certain findings of
their paper are in line with those of this chapter. While they identify the level of
economic development, the size of an economy and the experience of past financial
crises as drivers of supervisory integration, I use a larger database and focus more on
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political determinants such as a country’s federal character, as I suspect the political
system and the general way in which public affairs are handled to be decisive. While
I confirm the majority of their findings, I cannot confirm their result of a negative
effect of central bank independence on integration.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
5.3.1 Data
Sources for data on supervisory structures between 1990 and 2015 are the national
supervisory authorities’ homepages, the central banks’ annual reports, to a large
extent volumes of “How countries supervise their banking, insurers and securities
markets”, which was relabelled in 2014 as the “Directory of Financial Regulators”,
and volumes of the annual “Central Bank Directory”. Especially for information
not available online, the library of the German Bundesbank turned out to be a rich
treasury of data.
The briefly above-mentioned notion of Lannoo (2003) suggests itself as a prac-
tical way to capture worldwide financial supervision architectures for the endeavour
of this chapter. Basically, Lannoo’s notion records all supervisors in charge of banks,
securities markets, and insurances and further categorises them along two lines, these
being the type of the respective authority and the concentration of supervision. His
paper therefore distinguishes between central banks, specialised supervisors, integ-
rated financial supervisory authorities, and government departments, for instance
within Ministries of Finance (MoF). In order to quantify supervisory designs around
the world, this chapter follows Lannoo’s categorisation which reads as follows (see
Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Classification of supervisors of banks, securities, and insurance markets
CB central bank
B specialised banking supervisory authority
S specialised securities markets supervisory authority
I specialised insurance supervisory authority
BS specialised banking and securities markets supervisory authority
BI specialised banking and insurance supervisory authority
SI specialised securities markets and insurance supervisory authority
G government department (for instance within Ministry of Finance)
FSA integrated Financial Services Authority
Source: Lannoo (2003).
To illustrate how this notion is employed in this chapter, Table 5.2 shows ex-
emplarily the development in the German case from 1990 to 2015 and thus the
structure of my data.
In Germany, the Bundesbank shared the responsibility for banking supervision
with the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kredit-
wesen, BAKred) until 2001 and then with the Federal Financial Supervisory Author-
ity (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin). A federal authority
for the supervision of securities markets only existed from 1994 onwards with the es-
tablishment of the Federal Supervisory Office for the Securities Trading (Bundesauf-
sichtsamt für denWertpapierhandel, BAWe). This authority was merged in 2002 into
the then newly established integrated financial services authority BaFin. Similarly,
the Federal Insurance Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherung-
swesen (BAV) was in charge of insurance supervision until 2001 and then was also
merged into the newly established BaFin – which has been the German integrated
supervisor for all three financial market segments, whilst sharing responsibility in
the banking sector. As supervisory responsibility remains shared, I consider the
German structure in the year 2015 an example of partial integration despite the
FSA’s involvement in the supervision of all three segments of the financial market .
The last column in Table 5.2 then summarises the overall supervisory structure
according to the degree of supervisory integration. In my dataset, for each country
and each year a distinct supervisory design is assigned verbally and quantitatively,
where the numbers 1 to 3 are to be read as follows:
1. no integration (sectoral supervision, traditional model)
2. partial integration (hybrid model)
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3. total integration (within FSA or central bank, integrated model)

























1990 CB/B / I BuBa, BAKred State level BAV No integration (1)
1991 CB/B / I BuBa, BAKred State level BAV No integration (1)
1992 CB/B / I BuBa, BAKred State level BAV No integration (1)
1993 CB/B / I BuBa, BAKred State level BAV No integration (1)
1994 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
1995 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
1996 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
1997 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
1998 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
1999 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
2000 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
2001 CB/B S I BuBa, BAKred BAWe BAV No integration (1)
2002 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2003 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2004 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2005 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2006 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2007 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2008 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2009 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2010 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2011 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2012 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2013 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2014 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
2015 CB/FSA FSA FSA BuBa, BaFin BaFin BaFin Partial integration (2)
Attributing these numbers (i.e. 1 to 3) to supervisory designs yields ordinal
variables, where a higher value corresponds to a higher degree of supervisory integ-
ration. Following this approach, I classify the annual financial supervisory archi-
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tecture for 170 countries from 1990 to 2015 as completely as possible.3 I use the
obtained ordinal variables as regressands of ordered logit regressions in Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Historical Development and Descriptive Analysis
To better understand the current financial supervision architecture, it is worth taking
a look at the historical development of financial supervision. In short, the creation of
supervisory authorities and their later evolution have largely been driven by financial
market turbulences and the USA has in many aspects been a forerunner.
Evidence for the latter is the worldwide establishment of agencies entrusted
with the task of supervising financial market players shortly after the disastrous
stock market crash of 1929 spreading from the US.4 Historically, responsibility for
banking supervision was assumed by central banks, while other institutions have
been in charge of the securities and insurance sectors – given those sectors existed.
This model corresponds to the classical tripartition, where one specialised authority
supervises a sole financial segment, i.e. one authority supervises banks only, a second
securities business, and a third insurers. This traditional model is sometimes also
referred to as the silo model (see Podpiera and Čihák, 2007).
Subsequently, in the course of a continuing integration of financial markets and a
growing importance of Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries, the integrated approach
of financial supervision progressively gained popularity (“all-finance supervision”)
from the 1980s on (Podpiera and Cihak, 2006, pp. 4-5). In particular, the Mon-
etary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has been in charge of the banking, securities,
and insurance industries since 1984, while the Kredittilsynet of Norway, established
two years later, identifies itself as “the first integrated supervisory authority for the
3The state at the end of each year is decisive for the respective annual classifications. Data gaps
exist, for instance, for the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia for obvious reasons.
Table 6.19 in the Appendix provides a list of all countries of the sample.
4The institutionalisation of financial supervision began in the USA, where the Great Depres-
sion originated in 1929 and then spread over the world (see for instance Bundesanstalt fuer
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 2014). The American design of financial supervision was and is
characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and decentralisation, which can be explained
by the country’s federal traditions and its system of checks and balances. To date, there exist
several authorities in all financial market segments. For instance, powers in the field of bank-
ing supervision are divided among the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and authorities from the states. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, established in 1934) is the leading actor in stock
exchange supervision. In insurance supervision, this principal role is exercised by the Federal
Insurance Office (FIO), with numerous further authorities being involved (see Horakova and
Glass, 2016).
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financial market in the western world”.5 The Danish Finanstilsynet (established
1988) and the Swedish Finansinspektionen (established 1991) were soon to follow
the model of Norway.6 With the establishment of the British Financial Services
Authority in 1997, for the first time a large economy transferred the task of super-
vising the entire financial system to a sole authority. This event might therefore
be interpreted as the breakthrough of the integrated design (see Masciandaro and
Quintyn, 2011a, p. 10). Among others, Korea (1999), Japan and Hungary (2000),
Germany and Austria (2002), Poland (2008), and Finland and Switzerland (2009)
were to follow the British model in the next years, to name but a few.7
In 2013, the UK and Hungary again dissolved their FSAs and transferred re-
sponsibilities to their central banks. In Hungary, the national bank is now the single
supervisory authority; in the UK the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) is part
of the Bank of England.89 While there were only four integrated supervisors world-
wide in 1990, there were 41 in 2015. At the same time, the number of countries
with partially integrated authorities has increased, whereas the traditional model
has lost ground. Simultaneously, exclusive central bank responsibility for banking
supervision has strongly decreased. Figure 5.1 illustrates the rise in the number of
single consolidated supervisors over time.
5See homepage of authority under heading About Finanstilsynet / History. The supervisor re-
named itself in 2009 to Finanstilsynet.
6In all cases described (Singapore, Norway, Denmark, Sweden), the establishment of integrated
authorities was the result of mergers of existing supervisory authorities.
7As already indicated in the example of Germany, several other supervisory authorities regularly
remained involved in financial supervision despite the establishment of an integrated supervisor.
Hence, the existence of an integrated supervisor does not automatically imply being classified
as “totally integrated” in my categorisation.
8The case of the European Union presents itself as a special case. Despite a common monetary
policy within the euro area, the EU is far from having a coherent supranational supervisory
structure. Integrated supervisory authorities regularly exist ithin the member states of the
currency union. At a supranational European level exists a three-membered system composed
of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in London, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) in Paris, and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(EIOPA) in Frankfurt, which are mainly entrusted with the elaboration of common standards.
Coordination between these three agencies takes places within the Joint Committee of the
European Supervisory Authorities. With the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechan-
ism (SSM) in autumn 2014, which is to supervise the most important banks of the euro zone,
there is, for the first time, a real European supervisory authority (see European Parliament,
2016). Compared to other currency unions (particularly the West African Economic and Mon-
etary Union and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) that have already
had a common banking supervision for many years this is a late occurence. This fact is all
the more interesting as the idea of a common banking supervision situated within the ECB
was already discussed at the planning stage for the new central bank in the 1980s (see Ignazio
Angeloni, 2017).
9The discrediting of the British FSA for its role in the financial crisis is particularly well docu-
mented. See for instance The Telegraph (2010).
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Sources: Central bank annual reports, How countries supervise their banking, insurers and secur-
ities markets, Directory of Financial Regulators.
Figure 5.2 depicts the development of the respective shares of the three mod-
els of financial supervision from 1990 to 2015, a phase characterised by important
changes. In 1990, the traditional fragmented model was the most common design,
followed by partial integration and quasi non-existent total integration. Since then,
supervision has powerfully become more and more integrated and the model of total
integration has caught up but still remains behind the two other designs. In 2015,
partial integration was the most common design, followed very closely by absence
of integration.
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Sources: Central bank annual reports, How countries supervise their banking, insurers and secur-
ities markets, Directory of Financial Regulators.
On the one hand, the rationale for a more integrated supervisory architecture
is that it should better match the financial market structure which is increasingly
characterised by a high degree of integration. On the other hand, separated super-
visors could theoretically be more specialised and therefore achieve more stability in
financial markets. However, the question of which supervisory design better attains
financial stability is not part of this paper. In Table 5.3, I only briefly present main
arguments, which are obviously very country-specific and subjective.
Table 5.3: Rationales for integrated and non-integrated supervision
Integrated Non-integrated
Cross-border supervision ensures that every
market player is supervised.
Distinct and specialised supervisor for each
type of business.
Higher degree of accountability. Clear objectives for supervisors.
Economies of scale. Better to have multiple but smaller
institutions than one large institution (less
bureaucratic, more flexible). Economies of
scales as well.
Neutrality between different financial
institutions.
Moral hazard problems.
Attracting highly professional staff and
sharing of knowledge.
Establishment of FSA complicated process
by itself.
Sources: Abrams and Taylor (2000), Podpiera and Čihák (2007).
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Last, the issue of central bank involvement in supervision is currently an im-
portant topic especially in Europe, where national banks are looking for new tasks
after the loss of their monetary capacities to the ECB. The data shows that three
out of four central banks worldwide are involved in financial supervision (mostly in
banking supervision, followed by banking and insurance supervision and integrated
supervision). The latest central bank in the European Union (EU) to have received
new supervisory responsibilities is that of Lithuania, having assumed the tasks of the
former Insurance Supervisory Commission and the Securities Commission in 2012.
The Bank of Lithuania is thus now - according to this chapter’s logic - Lithuania’s
single integrated supervisor (see How Countries Supervise their Banks, Insurers and
Securities Markets 2012). In Europe, but outside the EU, Russia transferred the task
of financial supervision entirely to its central bank in 2013. Other central banks in
Europe might also reach for new supervisory responsibilities in the following years.
This fits in with the observation that the evolution of central bank involvement in
financial supervision follows a U-shape pattern (see Nitsch, 2015, p. 55). Table 5.4
describes central bank involvement in banking supervision in 2015.
Table 5.4: Central bank involvement in supervision
Number Percentage
Banking 84 63%
Banking and insurance 23 17%
Banking and securities 4 3%
Integrated 23 17%
Total 134 100%
Source: Horakova and Glass (2016).
This far the framework has been depicted, the following sections will deal empir-
ically with the causes of these organisational changes, focusing on political drivers.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
The underlying assumption of this chapter and this section is that political factors
might be more suitable to explain the design of public institutions than other
country-specific factors such as size or wealth, for which I nevertheless control. Such
a relation is only partially established (see for instance Masciandaro and Quintyn
(2011b) or Nitsch (2015)). This section aims to take a closer look at several political
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factors and in how far they could shape a country’s supervisory structure. I suggest
that political decisions play a role for the decision to integrate financial supervision.
When taking a first look at potential political indicators, the sheer multitude
of existing political variables is impressive and in parts seems a little neglected
by economists, who normally have a big interest in extensive panel data. In a
first step, I want to gain an overview of possibly exploitable data and to identify
potential drivers. In a second step, I run ordered logit-type (maximum likelihood)
regressions using promising explanatory variables. Table 5.5 below shows an excerpt
of governance and political indicators for extended periods of time and a coverage
greater than 100 countries. For a wider range of related panel data, please see the
appendix (see Table 6.20, Table 6.21, and Table 6.22).
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Table 5.5: Selected political and governance variables: Panel data
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From these potential data sources shown in Table 5.5, I make a selection of
explanatory variables based on plausibility and data availability. In order to explore
the determinants of supervisory structures, I regress the degrees of supervisory in-
tegration on a set of nine explanatory variables. As the ordinal dependent variable
is the supervisory structure - ordered by the degree of integration (1: no integration,
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2: partial integration, 3: total integration) - an ordered logit estimator10 is applied.
I concretely estimate equations of the following form in different configurations:
FinancialSupervisionIntegrationit = β0 + β1GDPcapitait
+β2Populationit + β3GovernmentEffectivenessit + β4Democracyit
+β5PoliticalSystemit + β6GovernmentMajorityit + β7Federalismi
+β8CentralBankIndependenceit + β9StockMarketCapitalisationit + it
where FinancialSupervisionIntegrationit as dependent variable denotes the
supervisory structure of country i at time t. t concretely refers to the years 1990,
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 as five-year intervals were chosen due to the only
little variation of the dependent variables between two consecutive years. The vari-
ables GDPcapitait (IMF, 2016c) and Populationit (World Bank, 2017b) capture the
macroeconomic environment. Most other variables describe major political charac-
teristics. The variable
GovernmentEffectivenessit from the World Bank (2016b) captures the perceived
quality of the public sector.11 The variable Democracyit consists of the combined
Polity score and ranges from -10 for strongly autocratic countries to +10 for strongly
democratic countries (see Center for Systemic Peace, 2015). PoliticalSystemit then
describes whether a country is presidential (0), governed by a strong president elec-
ted by a parliament (1), or parliamentary (2), where a higher value hence corresponds
to more parliamentary political systems. GovernmentMajorityit refers to a govern-
ment’s margin of majority in the parliament, i.e. the fraction of seats held by the
government (see Cruz et al., 2015). Federalismi takes the value of 1 if a country be-
longs to the group of countries widely classified as federal (as for instance Germany,
Switzerland, or the USA) and is constant. CentralBankIndependenceit describes
the autonomy of a national central bank and is based on Dincer and Eichengreen
(2014). The variable
StockMarketCapitalisationit covers the level of financial development and the po-
sition of the central bank respectively (see World Bank, 2016a). Finally, it denotes
10Ordered logit and ordered probit usually lead to similar results. The difference lies in the question
of the more appropriate distribution for εi (ordered logit: standard logistic distribution, ordered
probit: standard normal distribution). In this case, I tried both variants without significant
deviations. Therefore, only the results of the ordered logit-type regressions are presented in the
following.
11The World Bank Government Effectiveness indicator is a composite indicator in units of a
standard normal distribution (mean=0, standard deviation=1) which runs approximately from
-2.5 to +2.5.
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the country- and time-specific error term. Table 5.6 further describes the set of
explanatory variables.
113
Political Determinants of the Financial Supervision Architecture
Table 5.6: Explanatory variables
Variable Description Scale Source
GDP per
capita
Gross Domestic Product. International USD. IMF World
Economic
Outlook





Perceived quality of the government,
the public sector and services and its
independence from political pressure.

































Federalism Federalist tradition of country. 24
states: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil,
Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India,
Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, South
Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland,
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The choice of these regressors is motivated by theoretical considerations about
possible effects on the regressand. In particular, I expect a positive sign of the
coefficient of GDP per capita and a negative sign of the coefficient of Population.
The idea is that richer and smaller countries might have a preference for supposedly
more efficient forms of supervisory structures. Also, one could expect that more
Government effectiveness, as a proxy of more modern practices in public sector
management, is associated with more integration. Concerning the coefficient of the
Political system variable, a presidential system might have a preference for integ-
rating supervision. Similarly for the variable Government majority, high shares of
parliamentary seats held by government parties might be conducive to integration
by empowering a government to initiate major institutional changes. Federalism is
expectedly associated with lower levels of integration. In addition, I expect more
Central bank independence to be associated with less integration, as central banks
might want to defend responsibilities. This is suggested by Masciandaro (2007) and
Melecky and Podpiera (2013). Finally, I use Stock market capitalisation as a meas-
ure of financial development and expect ratios of listed shares in a stock market to
GDP to be positively correlated with degrees of integration.
Table 5.7 presents regression results for five possible combinations of my set of
explanatory variables. Model 1 (column 1) comprises logs of GDP per capita and
population only. Model 2 comprises the five political covariates. Model 3 contains
the macroeconomic covariates plus the political covariates. While Model 4 consists of
the political plus the financial development variables, Model 5 represents the fullest
estimation specification. Confronting regression results of the different models, I
can find some evidence for my initial suspicion that political factors play a role for
the way financial supervision is organised. Note that of all models the Models 2 and
3 are most comparable in particular in terms of a similar number of observations.
Although the ordered logit approach has some conceptual particularities, coef-
ficients can be interpreted meaningfully. In my models, the coefficients refer to
a higher logarithmised probability for integration. For instance, in Model 2 the
logarithmised probability of integration decreases by 3.14 if the dummy variable for
federalism increases from 0 to 1. Or in other words: Federal countries have an expec-
ted logarithmised probability for integration which is 3.14 below that of non-federal
states in this model. Furthermore, Model 2 suggests that Government effectiveness
and Democracy are significant determinants of a country’s supervisory structure.
The signs of the coefficients remain unchanged in Model 3, but only the coefficient
of the Democracy variable remains significant at the 10% level, when controlling
for population size and wealth. In Model 4, the coefficient of Democracy again is
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significant and positive. When adding macroeconomic controls to the estimation
equation, this coefficient turns insignificant at commonly used levels but remains
positive. Remarkably, the level of economic development measured in terms of per
capita GDP appears to be strongly linked to the degree of integration. A high per
capita GDP is associated with a high degree of integration. At the same time, the
negative but mostly not significant coefficient of the population size might suggest
that smaller countries are more prone to integrate supervision above-average and
should be best and carefully interpreted as simple correlation. Central bank inde-
pendence, Stock market capitalisation and the degree of integration seem correlated,
but again the respective coefficients are not significant at commonly used levels in
none of the models. Finally, the coefficients of the variables Political system and
Government majority also do not show clear patterns. In order not to ignore symp-
toms of endogeneity, lagged values of the explanatory variables are also used, but
estimation results remain stable.
The findings can be summarised and interpreted as follows: Firstly, countries
with more positively perceived governance tend to integrate their supervisory struc-
tures. Assuming that the perceived quality of governance represents the de facto
quality of governance, the interpretation is then that good governance should be
conducive to supervisory integration. Secondly, other results suggest that being
classified as more democratic corresponds to a higher degree of integration, although
this effect is not clear for all estimation configurations. This is insofar plausible as
more democratic countries could be more prone to institutional change and effi-
ciency gains. Thirdly, negative coefficients of the variable for Federalism suggest a
negative association with the degree of supervision. Imaginably, federal states have
a preference for a generally greater separation of powers. Finally, a positive relation
between wealth and integration might be founded on initial costs associated with
the establishment of a new institution, while the observation that smaller coun-
tries might rather integrate supervision could be based on important economies of
scale.12 A little surprisingly, the Political system (presidential, strong president elec-
ted by assembly, parliamentary) shows no clear effect, opposed to my expectation
that presidential systems could have a preference for an integration of supervisory
powers.
12The example of central banks shows that public institutions in small countries are often over-
staffed, when relating the staff numbers to the overall population.
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Table 5.7: Regression results 1: Coefficients and standard errors
Ordinal dependent variable = Degree of integration
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Population -0.783* -0.894 -1.166
(0.31) (0.47) (0.69)
ln GDP/capita 2.346*** 2.930*** 5.377**
(0.44) (0.78) (1.94)
Gov. effectiveness 2.038*** 0.518 2.375* 0.161
(0.50) (0.69) (0.99) (1.37)
Democracy 0.159* 0.225* 0.102 -0.121
(0.07) (0.09) (0.21) (0.30)
System -0.546 -0.789 0.105 -0.682
(0.44) (0.59) (0.67) (0.82)
Gov. majority -0.095 -0.298 5.421 5.733
(1.23) (1.44) (3.25) (3.89)
Federalism -3.144** -3.605 -2.918 -1.131
(1.15) (1.85) (2.00) (2.61)
CB independence 4.041 1.614
(3.04) (3.91)
Stock Market Cap to GDP 0.016 0.006
(0.01) (0.02)
Observations 573 440 435 110 110
Wald χ2 31.24 26.86 22.95 12.90 12.74
Prob> Wald χ2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.075 0.175
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.269 0.318 0.812 0.830
Notes: Ordered logit estimation with random effects. Standard errors are in parentheses ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
In comparison to logarithmised probabilities, which are difficult to interpret
and which do not allow us to make statements about the exact size of changes
in probabilities, odd ratios constitute a more practical measure. Odd ratios show
lengthening or shortening odds for a higher degree of integration.13 For instance,
in Model 2 a one unit increase in Government Effectiveness leads to a 7.68-fold
increase in the odds of (more) supervisory integration. The odd ratios for Federalism,
mostly close to 0, indicate lower odds for integration, i.e. states with a federal
constitution are significantly less likely to have a fully integrated supervisory system
(see Table 5.8).
13Odd ratios smaller than 1 signal lower odds of outcome, odd ratios larger than 1 signal higher
odds of outcome, and odd ratios equal to 1 signal no effect.
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Table 5.8: Regression results 2: Odd ratios
Ordinal dependent variable = Degree of integration
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Population 0.457 0.409 0.312
ln GDP/capita 10.442 18.736 216.377
Gov. effectiveness 7.677 1.678 10.748 1.175
Democracy 1.173 1.253 1.107 0.886
System 0.579 0.454 1.111 0.506
Gov. majority 0.910 0.742 226.014 308.776
Federalism 0.043 0.027 0.054 0.323
CB independence 56.885 5.022
Stock Market Cap (to
GDP)
1.016 1.006
Observations 573 440 435 110 110
Lastly, average predictive margins are perhaps the most useful way to see the
role of the categorical independent variables more clearly in set ups like the one
described. In my different regression configurations, this particularly concerns the
two significant explanatory variables Government Effectiveness and Democracy. In
these cases, plotting predictive margins illustrates how probable a certain degree
of integration is, given possible values of Government Effectiveness and Democracy
respectively. Based on Model 3, I exemplarily compute and plot predictive margins,
while distinguishing between federal and non-federal countries (see Figure 5.3) and
according to the political system (see Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.3 shows how the probabilities of a country’s supervisory system being
classified as not integrated (1), partially integrated (2), and totally integrated (3)
change with Government Effectiveness scores. According to the upper left plot of
Figure 5.3, a non-federal country with a low score in this category is most likely to
be classified as not integrated. The likelihood of being classified as not integrated,
then decreases with increasing scores. A country with a high score is most likely to
be classified as totally integrated and least likely to be classified as not integrated.
According to the upper right plot of Figure 5.3, a federal country with a low Gov-
ernment Effectiveness score has a pronouncedly high likelihood of being classified
as not integrated and this likelihood decreases more slowly than in the upper left
plot. Especially, the slope of the green line is smaller, suggesting for federal states a
smaller impact of increases in government effectiveness on the probability of being
classified as totally integrated. The two lower plots of Figure 5.3 illustrate the evol-
ution of the probabilities of the three possible supervisory systems as functions of
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Democracy scores. Both plots suggest that the likelihoods of partial (red line) and
total integration (green line) increase as Democracy scores increase. At the same
time, the probability of being classified as not integrated constantly decreases with
increasing Democracy scores.
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Figure 5.4 again shows predictive margins by Government Effectiveness and by
Democracy scores, but this time not for federal and not federal countries but for
presidential systems (0), systems characterised by a strong assembly-elected pres-
ident (1), and parliamentary systems (2). All six plots reveal similar patterns and
largely confirm observations made for Figure 5.3. Again, countries with low levels
of Government Effectiveness and Democracy are most likely to be classified as not
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integrated. As the values of these two measures increase, the likelihood of being clas-
sified as not integrated decreases and the likelihood of being classified as partially
or totally integrated increases. Yet, the only minor differences between the three
political systems speak for the secondary importance of the political system choice.
For the highest possible Democracy score (i.e. 10 points), the probabilities for the
three types of supervisory regimes either overlap or are very close to each other for
the three political systems. Note the very high probabilities of being classified as
not integrated in all plots for very low levels of government effectiveness.
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To conclude, certain political factors appear to matter for the question of
whether a state integrates financial supervision or not. Especially, more govern-
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ment effectiveness should foster integration. Contrarily, federalism seems to hinder
integration and to be of primary importance, as out of 24 federal states only two had
a totally integrated supervisory architecture in 2015.14 A reason for this underrep-
resentation is likely to lie in a preference of federal states for a stronger limitation
of powers and systems of checks and balances. Further, more independent central
banks, higher per capita GDPs, and smaller populations could be conducive to a
higher degree of integration. Especially, this finding of central bank independence
might surprise at first sight, but is relativised by the fact that it is the central banks
which very often exercise the role as integrated supervisor. This finding stands in
contrast to Melecky and Podpiera (2013, p. 12)’s conclusion on this subject when
claiming that “integration of prudential supervision is a less preferred outcome from
the point of view of an independent central bank”. Furthermore, the adverse effect of
population size on the probability that a state integrates supervision might be best
explained by economies of scale, whereas GDP per capita seems to have a strong
and positive effect on integration and in general is able to explain supervisory integ-
ration reasonably well. Imaginable are two underlying causes: Firstly, initial costs
of adopting a new supervisory architecture might make the creation of an integ-
rated supervisor less attractive for poorer countries and, secondly, poorer countries
are more often - and unfortunately – associated with institutional flaws and less
modern forms of public management, despite their even higher need of “good gov-
ernance”. Plotting predictive margins can help to better understand relations in set
ups such as the (ordered) logit-type one of this chapter.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter studies the distribution of supervisory responsibilities around the world
and tries to find factors explaining different structures. The analysis is based on an
unbalanced sample of 170 countries for 26 years at maximum (1990-2015). It al-
lows us to track the spread of more integrated approaches of financial supervision
during the last two decades. Unlike other papers that identify the size of an eco-
nomy (usually negatively correlated), the experience of past crises (usually positively
correlated), and the economic development (usually positively correlated) as major
factors determining the degree of supervisory integration, I further show that the
choice of a specific supervisory design is also a political issue. Results indicate inter
alia that countries with better governance, more democracy, more wealth, and smal-
ler populations are more prone to integrate supervision, whereas federalism seems
14This corresponds to a current share of only 8% compared to nearly 30% for the full sample.
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to render countries less susceptible to integration. What remains to be answered in
a future effort is whether the main goal of financial supervision, i.e. to guarantee
more financial stability, is indeed achieved. Current research has not yet found a
clear answer. Which kind of supervisory system copes best with financial crises?
Does the occurrence of a financial crisis lead to more integration? Do states exhibit
a better performance after more integration has been imposed? These questions
are all the more important as more integration of supervision is usually justified by
more stability and the changing structure of financial markets, but the theoretical
and empirical foundation until present remains rather unsatisfactory.
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This dissertation deals with selected aspects of central banking and is based on a
new dataset, which was compiled from a variety of sources. The main sources of
information are central bank annual reports, which are available either online or in
the library of the Bundesbank. Other main sources are the homepages of central
banks, issues of the “Central Bank Directory” and issues of “How countries super-
vise their banking, insurers and securities markets” and the “Directory of Financial
Regulators”. Additional related central banking data, which is provided by interna-
tional institutions such as the IMF and the BIS, is used throughout this dissertation.
This work is divided into four main chapters. The first presents a rather general
introduction to the data, while the following chapters each analyse a different aspect
of it.
Chapter 2 introduces the dataset and presents the research areas it covers.
This purely descriptive chapter contains inter alia explanations and illustrations
concerning the distribution of exchange rate regimes, inflation targeting, and forms
of central bank ownership and anticipates some of the findings of the following
chapters. It shows that central banks are indeed subject to constant change in many
fields. While the scientific central banking literature seems to be very much focused
on the monetary policy topic, even more so in the wake of the Global Financial
Crisis, the chapter shall point to some other areas which require further research
and which also offer a variety of possibilities for such.
Chapter 3 explores the evolution of organisational structures within central
banks. It is based on an analysis of close to 1,200 organisational charts. A result
central to my examination of a balanced panel for 50 countries during the period
2004-2015 is that central banks worldwide have adapted their organisational struc-
tures. On average, they employ fewer people, they are composed of more organisa-
tional units, and they have become slightly less centralised. Unlike my statistical-
descriptive findings, results of regression analyses are less clear cut. In particular,
I cannot confirm a stable relation between the development of these organisational
structures and country-specific factors such as budgetary pressure. This result in-
sofar appears unproblematic to me as there are, on the one hand, generally known
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differences between the private and the public sector and as, on the other hand, the
main contribution of this chapter shall lie elsewhere. Firstly, where, in the case of
private firms, output can be observed more easily, it is also easier to identify rela-
tions between institutional characteristics and output. For central banks, analyses
are per se different due to the very special nature of central banks. For instance,
the above-cited budgetary pressure might possibly not concern central banks at all.
Secondly, the main contribution of this chapter is rather that it generates new data
and shows a way of doing so by using organisational charts. For the near future,
I expect to see, with better data availability, an increasing number of papers from
the field of organisational empirics which focus on the public sector. For instance,
it appears conceivable that future analyses combining new data and methods from
the public choice field could contribute to a fundamentally better understanding of
public bureaucracies.
Chapter 4 analyses determinants of the currency composition of international
reserves under central bank management. It is based on panel data covering the
years 1996-2015 for 38 central banks. The chapter shows that first and foremost
currency pegs and trade can explain currency compositions. It further examines a
possible break in the holding of EUR-denominated reserve assets as a consequence
of the euro crisis. It is shown that the spread of the euro crisis has been a throwback
for the EUR as an international currency, but also that it only had a partial impact
on determinants of the currency composition of international reserves. The findings
of this chapter on determinants are mostly in line with those of related influential
papers such as Heller and Knight (1978), Dooley et al. (1989), and Eichengreen and
Mathieson (2000). A time span of between 17 to nearly 40 years between these
papers and my chapter suggests great stability of these determinants of currency
compositions. Yet, more recent papers, which predicted an end of the USD domin-
ation as the world’s number one currency, were in parts overtaken by actual events,
especially by the euro crisis.
Chapter 5 discusses how financial market supervision is organised around the
world. It examines over time how supervisory responsibilities for the three main
financial protagonists, banks, securities markets, and insurance companies, are dis-
tributed. Analysing supervisory structures of 170 states for the period 1999-2015, I
show a trend towards more integrated approaches of supervision. Formal statistical
analyses further suggest a relation between country-specific political factors and the
degree of supervisory integration, e.g. federal systems and more government effect-
iveness are associated with a higher degree of integration. Results of this part of
the dissertation are largely intuitive. During the work on this chapter, the motion
124
Conclusions
in this subject has regularly shown up. Particularly noteworthy in the coming years
should be for instance the approach of the EU towards this matter. One question
concerns inter alia the role of the EBA being located in London after an exit of
the UK from the EU. Another question is concerned with the future importance of
national supervisors since the ECB has been able to strengthen its profile as banking
supervisor for the euro area constantly since the outbreak of the crisis.
Contrary to common perception, central banks have undergone important evol-
utions and have been able to adapt quickly if needed. The chapters of this dis-
sertation illustrate both how diverse these areas of change are and how diverse
the central banking subject itself is. Some main findings and concluding remarks
of the three essays are: Firstly, organisational structures are constantly evolving.
However, the reasons behind these changes merit further investigation. Secondly,
international reserves are still marked by a strong dominance of the USD, despite
different predictions. Here, I expect to see a continuation of this USD dominance
as an international currency for many years to come. Thirdly, financial supervision
might become even more integrated in the next years. The question of which su-
pervisory architecture performs best in terms of achieving more financial stability
remains a highly important topic that also needs further investigation.
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Volumes of Central Bank Annual
Reports
The following tables are part of the bibliography and provide an overview of all
central bank annual reports that are available online or in the Bundesbank library









Country Name of central
bank









Afghanistan Bank of Afghanistan http://dab.gov.af/en/page/media/publications/dab-annual-report 2013-2015 /
Albania Bank of Albania https://www.bankofalbania.org/?crd=0,22,0,0,0&ln=Lng2 1999-2015 1998-2015
Algeria Bank of Algeria http://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/html/rapport.htm 2002-2014 /
Angola National Bank of
Angola
http://www.bna.ao/Conteudos/All/lista.aspx?idc=145&idsc=330&idl=1 2001-2014 /
Argentina Central Bank of
Argentina
http://www.bcra.gob.ar/PublicacionesEstadisticas/Informe_anual_al_congreso.asp 1993-2015 1998-2003
Armenia Central Bank of
Armenia
https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/pperiodicals.aspx?Category=Annual%20report&pDate=0 2005-2015 1994-2012
Aruba Central Bank of
Aruba
http://www.cbaruba.org/cba/getDocumentList.do?firstItem=1 1998-2015 /


















Country Name of central
bank









Bahamas Central Bank of The
Bahamas
http://www.centralbankbahamas.com/publications.php?cat=113&stub=main 2000-2015 2001-2010
Bahrain Central Bank of
Bahrain
http://www.cbb.gov.bh/page-p-reports_and_papers.htm 1999-2015 2001-2004
Bangladesh Bangladesh Bank https://www.bb.org.bd/pub/publictn.php 2001-2016 1973-2000
Barbados Central Bank of
Barbados
http://www.centralbank.org.bb/media/publications/annual-reports 1999-2015 1973-2009
Belarus National Bank of the
Republic of Belarus
http://www.nbrb.by/engl/publications/report/ 1999-2015 1997-2009
Belgium National Bank of
Belgium
https://www.nbb.be/en/publications-and-research/annual-reports 1851-2016 1967-2015
Belize Central Bank of
Belize


















Country Name of central
bank















Botswana Bank of Botswana http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/content/2009110614010-annual-report 2000-2015 1976-2015











http://www.bnb.bg/ResearchAndPublications/PubPeriodical/PubPAnnualReport/index.htm 1980 - 2015 1990-2015
Burundi Bank of the Republic
of Burundi
http://www.brb.bi/fr/content/rapport-annuel 2010-2015 1967-2004
Cambodia National Bank of
Cambodia
https://www.nbc.org.kh/english/publications/annual_reports.php 2002-2015 1957-1967
Canada Bank of Canada http://www.bankofcanada.ca/publications/annual-reports-quarterly-financial-reports/ 1996-2015 1946-2010
Cape Verde Bank of Cape Verde www.bcv.cv/vEN/publicationsandspeeches/Relatorios/Relatorio Anual 1998-2012 1998-2011











Country Name of central
bank









Chile Central Bank of
Chile
http://www.bcentral.cl/en/faces/bcentral/publicaciones 1998-2015 1984-2015
China People’s Bank of
China
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130739/index.html 2007-2014 1999-2015















Cuba Central Bank of
Cuba
/ 1950-1960















Country Name of central
bank









Czech Republic Czech National Bank http://www.cnb.cz/en/about_cnb/performance/annual_reports/index.html 1997-2015 1993-2008









Central Bank of the
Dominican Republic
http://www.bancentral.gov.do/bc/memorias/ 2004-2014 1948-2012
Egypt Central Bank of
Egypt
http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/EconomicResearch/Publications/Pages/AnnualReport.aspx 2002-2014 1975-2011
El Salvador Central Reserve
Bank of El Salvador
http://www.bcr.gob.sv/esp/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=330 2005-2015 1951-2015
Estonia Bank of Estonia http://www.eestipank.ee/en/publications/series/annual-report 1995-2015 1993-2011












Country Name of central
bank









Fiji Reserve Bank of Fiji http://www.rbf.gov.fj/Publications-(1)/Reserve-Bank-Annual-Reports 2003-2015 1984-2015
Finland Bank of Finland https://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/media-and-publications/publications/annual-report/ 1999-2015 1996-2013
France Bank of France https://publications.banque-france.fr/en/liste-chronologique/banque-de-france-annual-report-0 2006-2016 1991-2015
Gambia, The Central Bank of The
Gambia
http://www.cbg.gm/publications/annual_reports.html 2003-2015 1971-2002








Ghana Bank of Ghana https://www.bog.gov.gh/statistics/publication/annual-report 2004-2015 1984-2015
Greece Bank of Greece http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Publications/GovReport.aspx?Filter_By=8 1998-2015 1997-2013
Guatemala Bank of Guatemala http://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/main.asp?id=14756&aud=1&lang=1 2003-2015 1961-2014











Country Name of central
bank









Guyana Bank of Guyana https://www.bankofguyana.org.gy/bog/economic-financial-framework/publications/annual-reports 2001-2015 1965-2015
Haiti Bank of the Republic
of Haiti
1998-2013 1979-1990
Honduras Central Bank of
Honduras
http://www.bch.hn/memoria_anual.php 1998-2015 1957-2006







Iceland Central Bank of
Iceland
http://www.cb.is/publications/publications/publications-all-archive/?all=1& 1997-2015 1955-2015
India Reserve Bank of
India
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualReportMainDisplay.aspx 1998-2015 1990-2015


















Country Name of central
bank









Ireland Central Bank of
Ireland
http://www.centralbank.ie/publications/Pages/corporate-publications.aspx 1998-2015 1951-2013
Israel Bank of Israel http://www.boi.org.il/en/NewsAndPublications/RegularPublications/Pages/Default.aspx 1955-2015 1955-2012
Italy Bank of Italy http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/relazione-annuale/index.html 1997-2015 1984-2015
Jamaica Bank of Jamaica http://www.boj.org.jm/publications/publications_show.php?publication_id=8 2003-2016 1961-2013
Japan Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/activities/act/index.htm/ 2005-2015 1951-2014





Kazakhstan National Bank of
Kazakhstan
http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=28&switch=english 2000-2015 1996-2014
Kenya Central Bank of
Kenya
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/reports/cbk-reports-and-financial-statements/ 2000-2015 1967-2009
Korea, South Bank of Korea http://eng.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=740 1998-2015 1958-2015











Country Name of central
bank









Kuwait Central Bank of
Kuwait
http://www.cbk.gov.kw/en/statistics-and-publication/publications/annual-reports.jsp 2000-2015 1970-2014






Bank of the Lao
PDR
http://www.bol.gov.la/english/annualreports1.html 1993-2015 /
Latvia Bank of Latvia https://www.bank.lv/en/publications-r/annual-report 2000-2015 1993-2013
Lebanon Central Bank of
Lebanon
/ /
Lesotho Central Bank of
Lesotho
http://www.centralbank.org.ls/publications/default.php#Annual%20Reports 2003-2015 1981-2013





Libya Central Bank of
Libya
https://cbl.gov.ly/en/annual-reports/ / /









Country Name of central
bank









Luxembourg Central Bank of
Luxembourg
http://www.bcl.lu/en/publications/Annual-reports/index.html 2000-2015 /










Madagascar Central Bank of
Madagascar
http://www.banque-centrale.mg/index.php?id=m6_4 1998-2015 1993-2010











Malta Central Bank of
Malta
https://www.centralbankmalta.org/annual-reports 1998-2015 1968-2015
Mauritania Central Bank of
Mauritania
http://www.bcm.mr/rapport-annuel-292 2005-2015 /









Country Name of central
bank

















Mongolia Bank of Mongolia https://www.mongolbank.mn/eng/aboutus.aspx 2002-2015 1993-2011










Mozambique Bank of Mozambique http://www.bancomoc.mz/fm_pgTab1.aspx?id=106 2000-2015 /
Myanmar Central Bank of
Myanmar
http://www.cbm.gov.mm/content/annual-report 2006-2011 /
Namibia Bank of Namibia https://www.bon.com.na/Publications/Annual-Reports.aspx 1990-2015 1990-2015
Nepal Central Bank of
Nepal
https://nrb.org.np/red/annualrpt.php?tp=annual_reports&&vw=15 2003-2014 1966-2000









Country Name of central
bank









New Zealand Reserve Bank of New
Zealand
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/about-us/annual-reports 1997-2015 1954-2014
Nicaragua Central Bank of
Nicaragua
http://www.bcn.gob.ni/publicaciones/periodicidad/anual/informe_anual/index.php 1999-2015 /









Oman Central Bank of
Oman
http://www.cbo.gov.om/ 2002-2015 1976-2014








Bank of Papua New
Guinea
https://www.bankpng.gov.pg/about-us/annual-reports/ 2001-2015 1977-2009











Country Name of central
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Poland National Bank of
Poland
http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/publikacje/r_roczny/r_roczny.html 1997-2015 1989-2015
Portugal Bank of Portugal https://www.bportugal.pt/en/publications/banco-de-portugal/all/112 1996-2015 1994-2014





Central Bank of the
Russian Federation
http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/publ/?PrtId=god 1997-2015 1992-2015
Rwanda National Bank of
Rwanda
http://www.bnr.rw/index.php?id=130 2003-2015 /
Samoa Central Bank of
Samoa
http://www.cbs.gov.ws/index.php/media/publications/annual-reports/ 2002-2011 1984-2011












Country Name of central
bank











Central Bank of Sao
Tomé e Príncipe
http://www.bcstp.st/RelatoriosAnuais.aspx 2001-2013 /
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency
http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/Pages/AnnualReport.aspx 1961-2015 /
Serbia National Bank of
Serbia
http://www.nbs.rs/internet/english/90/90_4/index.html 1999-2015 2002-2015
Seychelles Central Bank of
Seychelles
http://www.cbs.sc/Publications/annualreport.jsp 2001-2015 1984-2005




Slovakia National Bank of
Slovakia
http://www.nbs.sk/en/publications-issued-by-the-nbs/annual-report 1993-2015 1993-2014
Slovenia Bank of Slovenia http://www.bsi.si/iskalniki/letna_porocila_en.asp?MapaId=711 1996-2015 1991-2015











Country Name of central
bank









South Africa South African
Reserve Bank
https://www.resbank.co.za/Publications/Reports/Pages/Annual-Reports.aspx 2001-2016 1991-2015
Spain Bank of Spain http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/Publicaciones_an/Informe_anual/ 1998-2015 1991-2010
Sri Lanka Central Bank of Sri
Lanka
http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/htm/english/10_pub/p_1.html 2008-2015 1985-2003
Sudan Bank of Sudan http://www.cbos.gov.sd/en/node/906 2002-2014 1960-1989
Suriname Central Bank of
Suriname
https://www.cbvs.sr/publicaties/cbvs-rapporten/jaarrapporten 1957-2014 /
Swaziland The Central Bank of
Swaziland
http://www.centralbank.org.sz/about/annual/index.php 2008-2015 1979-2015
Sweden Sveriges Riksbank http://www.riksbank.se/en/Press-and-published/Published-from-the-Riksbank/Annual-Report/ 1997-2015 1971-2015
Switzerland Swiss National Bank http://www.snb.ch/de/iabout/pub/annrep/id/pub_annrep 1996-2015 /











Country Name of central
bank
















Bank of Tanzania https://www.bot.go.tz/Publications/publicationsAndStatistics.asp?sec=Financial_Statements 2002-2015 /
Thailand Bank of Thailand https://www.bot.or.th/English/ResearchAndPublications/Report/Pages/default.aspx 1998-2015 1998-2010











Tunisia Central Bank of
Tunisia
https://www.bct.gov.tn/bct/siteprod/page.jsp?id=77 1959-2015 1995-2015
















Country Name of central
bank









Uganda Bank of Uganda https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/publications_research/annual_reports.html 1997-2015 1996-2013











United Kingdom Bank of England http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Pages/digitalcontent/historicpubs/annualreport.aspx 1947-2015 1999-2014
United States Federal Reserve https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/annual-report/default.htm 1995-2015 1935-2015
Vanuatu Reserve Bank of
Vanuatu
http://www.rbv.gov.vu/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=8&Itemid=4&lang=en 2000-2015 1991-2011
Vietnam State Bank of
Vietnam
http://www.sbv.gov.vn/webcenter/portal/en/home/rm/public/nreport 2005-2014 1994-2008
Yemen Central Bank of
Yemen
http://www.centralbank.gov.ye/newslettar.aspx?keyid=47&pid=46&lang=1&cattype=6 2005-2013 /
Zambia Bank of Zambia http://www.boz.zm/annual-reports.htm 2013-2015 2000-2013







































Euro area European Central
Bank (ECB)












Volumes of the “Central Bank
Directory”
The following table is part of the bibliography and provides an overview of all
volumes of the “Central Banking Directory” that were collected and analysed over
the course of writing this dissertation.
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Volumes of the “Central Bank Directory”
Year Name Publisher Editor
1991 The Central Banking Directory Central Banking Publications,
Morgan Stanley
Pringle, R.
1992 The Central Banking Directory Central Banking Publications,
Morgan Stanley
Pringle, R.
1993 The Central Banking Directory Central Banking Publications,
Morgan Stanley
Pringle, R.

























1999 The Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Central Bank Directory
Central Banking Publications,
Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter
Pringle, R.
2000 The Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
central bank directory
Central Banking Publications,
Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter
Pringle, R.
2001 The Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Central Bank Directory
Central Banking Publications,
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Pringle, R.



































2009 The Dexia Central Bank Directory Central Banking Publications, Dexia Pringle, R.
2010 The Central Bank Directory Central Banking Publications, Dexia Pringle, R.
2011 The Central Cank Directory Central Banking Publications, Dexia Pringle, R.

















Volumes of “How Countries
Supervise their Banks, Insurers and
Securities Markets”
The following table is part of the bibliography and provides an overview of all
volumes of the “How countries supervise their banks, insurers and securities mar-
kets” that were collected and analysed over the course of writing this dissertation.
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Volumes of “How Countries Supervise their Banks, Insurers and Securities
Markets”
Year Name Publisher Editor
1999 How countries supervise their banks,




2000 How countries supervise their banks,




2002 How countries supervise their banks,




2003 How countries supervise their banks,




2004 How countries supervise their banks,




2005 How countries supervise their banks,




2006 How countries supervise their banks,




2007 How countries supervise their banks,




2008 How countries supervise their banks,
insurers and securities markets
Central Banking Publications Pringle, R.
2009 How countries supervise their banks,
insurers and securities markets
Central Banking Publications Pringle, R.
2010 How countries supervise their banks,
insurers and securities markets
Central Banking Publications Pringle, R.
2011 How countries supervise their banks,
insurers and securities markets
Central Banking Publications Horáková, M.
2012 How countries supervise their banks,
insurers and securities markets
Central Banking Publications Horáková, M.
2013 How countries supervise their banks,
insurers and securities markets
Central Banking Publications Horáková, M.
and Jordan, A.
2014 Directory of financial regulators Central Banking Publications Horáková, M.
and Jordan, A.






Appendix to Chapter 2 - Organisational Aspects of
Central Banks































































































































































































Table 6.2: Central banks established since 1989
































Sources: Central bank annual reports, Central Bank Directory.
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Australia 1 1 1 3
Austria 1 1 2
Belgium 1 1 2
Canada 1 1
China 1 1 1 1 1 5
Congo 1 1
France 1 1
Germany 1 1 2
Hong Kong 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 4
Israel 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 3




1 1 1 1 1 5
Malaysia 1 1 1 3
Mongolia 1 1
Norway 1 1 1 1 4
Singapore 1 1 1 3
Switzerland 1 1
Taiwan 1 1 2
Tajikistan 1 1
Thailand 1 1 1 3
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
BCEAO 1 1
ECB 1 1 2
BEAC 1 1
Total 4 4 4 13 3 18 3 7 1 1 1 3 7 2 71
Sources: Central bank annual reports. central bank homepages.
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No. Max. 6 per cent













































Sources: central bank homepages, Bloomberg, Bank of Italy (2017b), Central Bank of the Republic

































































































Sources: central bank homepages, Bloomberg, Bank of Italy (2017b), Central Bank of the Republic




Appendix to Chapter 3 - Evolving Hierarchies in
Central Banks
Figure 6.1: Areas of major organisational change in central banks (% of 40 central
banks)
Selected aspects of management and organisational structures 
Issues in the Governance of Central Banks 165 
9 
on the achievement of efficiency that comes with increased accountability. The shift to 
flatter management structures may have helped in empowering staff and boosting their 
motivation by allowing them to interact more directly with senior members of 
policymaking committees. 
Another dimension of organisational 
change has been towards a more 
horizontal man gement of activities. 
Most central banks are today 
organised along functional lines, 
typically with separate divisions for 
monetary and financial system 
policies. Such a structure tends 
also to reflect the different 
professional groupings, with the 
former comprising mainly macro-
economists, and the latter drawing 
relatively more on accounting, 
finance, legal and microeconomic 
skills.139 
But the emphasis on horizontal 
differentiation varies among central 
banks. The Bank of England, for 
example, organises its policy 
activities into two ―wings‖, each with 
its own mix of staff skills and each 
relating to a separate policymaking 
committee. The monetary policy 
wing encompasses monetary policy 
and markets functions and prepares 
analysis and advice for the MPC. 
The financial stability wing 
encompasses the Bank’s respon-
sibilities for financial stability and 
banking services and prepares 
analysis and advice for the Financial Stability Board (to be replaced by a Financial 
Stability Committee under new legislation). A rationale for the functional organisation of 
multidisciplinary teams is that staff are better motivated when they can identify their 
work with a clear, relatively undistracted, functional purpose.  
The Federal Reserve System provides some elements of contrast to the arrangement 
at the Bank of England. Although the Board of Governors also has separate divisions 
overseen by staff directors, there are, at least at the highest level, functional 
crossovers. The Federal Reserve System as a whole has perhaps more of an ―activity‖ 
structure than a ―functional‖ structure; it does not have, for instance, a separate 
financial stability function, division, or committee but rather weaves financial stability 
considerations into the work of system-wide committees (including the Federal Open 
Market Committee and the Payments System Policy Advisory Committee) and the 
139
 Most central banks’ organisational charts additionally show the various internal support functions (eg IT, 
human resources management, finance, premises) in another ―cluster‖.  
Figure 50 
Areas of major organisational change 
in central banks 
Per cent of 40 central banks 
0% 20% 40% 60%
Major change in the way 
senior management is 
organised or carries out work
Change in vertical structure -
more hierarchies
Change in vertical structure -
fewer hierarchies
Change in horizontal structure 
- more divisions/departments
Change in horizontal structure
- fewer divisions/departments
Change in overall decision-
making and management 
processes
Change in internal 
communication and 
information sharing
Change in human resources 
management
Other major changes
Carried out in past five 
years
Underway now or 
planned for near future
Source: BIS (2008b). 
Source: Ortiz (2009, p. 165).
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Figure 6.2: Early organisational chart of Erie Railroad
Source: McCallum (1855). 167
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Figure 6.3: Organisational chart Bank of Italy (1894)
Source: Contessa and De Mattia (1993, p. 209).
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Figure 6.4: Organisational chart Bank of Canada (1936)
Source: Bank of Canada Archives. Secretary’s Department fonds (2016)
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Source: Weber (2017, p. 538).
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Figure 6.6: Organisational chart Norges Bank (1985)
Source: Norges Bank (1985)
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Secretary of the Bank
13Bank of England Annual Report 2000
Management Structure
As at 1 March 2000
Source: Bank of England (2000, p. 13)
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128 BANQUE DE FRANCE – RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉ 2015
Première direction du Contrôle des assurances
Paul COULOMB, directeur
Claire BOURDON, adjoint
Seconde direction du Contrôle des assurances
Bertrand PEYRET, directeur
Évelyne MASSE, adjoint




Première direction du Contrôle des banques
Violaine CLERC, directeur
Ludovic LEBRUN, adjoint
Seconde direction du Contrôle des banques
mutualistes et entreprises d’investissement
Philippe BERTHO, directeur
Sébastien CLANET, adjoint
Délégation au contrôle sur place 
des établissements de crédit 
et des entreprises d’investissement
Thierry MERGEN, délégué
Matthieu LECLERCQ, adjoint
Direction des Agréments, 
des Autorisations et de la Réglementation
Jean-Claude HUYSSEN, directeur
Nathalie BEAUDEMOULIN, adjoint 
Direction des Affaires juridiques
Henry de GANAY, directeur
Anne-Marie MOULIN, adjoint
Barbara SOUVERAIN-DEZ, adjoint









Olivier de BANDT, directeur
Dominique DURANT, adjoint
Anne-Sophie BORIE-TESSIER, adjoint
Direction de la Qualité et de la Gestion
Michel BORD, directeur
Martine BODILIS, adjoint
Direction des Ressources humaines, 
Méthodes et Système d’information
François BARNIER, directeur
Jean-Marc SERROT, adjoint







Michel CARDONA, chargé de la Stratégie
Michel SPIRI, pour l’Organisation et Information















et du Contrôle de gestion
David ADAM, directeur
Jean-Luc DURAS, adjoint







et des Services généraux
Marc MORAU, directeur
Patrick LAFOREST, adjoint
Direction de la Sécurité
Denis LAURETOU, directeur
Jean-Charles LARROQUE, adjoint
Direction des Centres administratifs 
et du Développement durable
Philippe JEANNEL, directeur







































Direction des Risques 
et de la Conformité des opérations





Direction de la Mise en œuvre 
de la politique monétaire
Olivier COUSSERAN, directeur
N..., adjoint





Direction des Systèmes de paiement 
et des Infrastructures de marché
Frédéric HERVO, directeur
Emmanuelle ASSOUAN, adjoint
Direction des Services bancaires
Christine SAMPIC, directeur
Stéphane KUNESCH, adjoint











Michel FELCE, conseiller général 
représentant le personnel
Corso BAVAGNOLI, censeur
Antoine SAINTOYANT, censeur suppléant 






Comité de la médiation bancaire 1
Observatoire de la sécurité des cartes de paiement 1
Observatoire de l’épargne réglementée 1
Observatoire de l’inclusion bancaire 1
Secrétariat général du Comité consultatif 
du secteur financier
Président : Emmanuel CONSTANS
Secrétariat général du Comité consultatif 
de la législation et de la réglementation financières  
Secrétaire général : Frédéric VISNOVSKY
1
 Le gouverneur préside le Comité de la médiation bancaire, l’Observatoire de la sécurité des cartes de paiement, l’Observatoire de l’épargne réglementée 
 et l’Observatoire de l’inclusion bancaire.
2 Le directeur des Risques des opérations est rattaché à la fois au président du Comité des risques et au directeur général de la Stabilité %nancière et des Opérations.
96 directions départementales dont 13 directions régionales 




Premier secrétaire général adjoint : Sandrine LEMERY
Secrétaires généraux adjoints : 
Patrick MONTAGNER
Frédéric VISNOVSKY
Président : François VILLEROY de GALHAU

























Direction de la Balance des paiements
François MOURIAUX, directeur
Bertrand PLUYAUD, adjoint
Direction de l’Ingénierie 










Direction des Études 




Direction de la Conjoncture 
et des Prévisions macroéconomiques
Pierre SICSIC, directeur
Guy LÉVY-RUEFF, adjoint
Direction des Études monétaires 
et financières 
Benoît MOJON, directeur
Hervé LE BIHAN, adjoint




Direction de projet Cité de l’économie 















Direction des Relations sociales
Pascal CESCON, directeur
Laura DUFAY-KRULIK, adjoint









Direction de la Formation 
et du Développement 
des compétences
Patrick HAAS, directeur
Marie-Agnès de CHERADE 
de MONTBRON, adjoint
Cabinet du Gouverneur
Directeur de Cabinet, Emmanuel ROCHER
Conseiller parlementaire, Véronique BENSAÏD-COHEN
Conseiller pour la Sûreté, Thierry COUTURE
Conseiller pour la Communication, Corinne DROMER
Conseiller Patrimoine, Histoire et Mécénat, François de COUSTIN
Conseiller technique, Marine DUJARDIN
Responsable du Protocole, Emmanuelle PAOLINI
Inspection générale
Audit des services centraux 
Hervé LECLERC, directeur
Anne JUNIEL, adjoint
Audit du réseau, inspecteurs chargés de secteur 
Thierry BANGRATZ, Michel DABADIE, Didier DEBALS, 
Jean-Christophe KREBS, Didier REGNARD
Délégation au contrôle sur place des établissements de crédit et des entreprises 
d’investissement auprès de l’Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution
Thierry MERGEN, délégué
Matthieu LECLERCQ, adjoint
Inspecteurs chefs de mission à l’Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution
Direction de la Prévention des risques
Ivy-Stevan GUIHO, directeur
Loeiz RAPINEL, adjoint
Conseiller pour la sûreté
Thierry COUTURE
Direction des Services juridiques
Directeur : Jacques MILLERET
Adjoint : Christophe ARNAUD
Contrôle général
Contrôleur général : Didier ELBAUM
Adjoint : Christian DURAND
Représentant en chef aux Amériques (à New York) : Pierre JAILLET




Comité des risques 2
Anne LE LORIER, président
Comité actif-passif
François VILLEROY de GALHAU, président
21 antennes économiques, 6 centres de traitement du surendettement et 3 centres de traitement de la monnaie %duciaire




Direction de la Qualité 
et des Affaires européennes
Freddy BEDNAREK, directeur
Direction de l’Industrialisation, 
de la Recherche 
et des Affaires scientifiques
Étienne GRIENENBERGER, directeur
Direction des Finances 
et du Contrôle de gestion
Patrick CHABRIAL, directeur




Source: Banque de France (2016, pp. 128-129)
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Table 6.6: Countries in sample (continents)
























































Table 6.7: Total number of elements; small and large central banks
Small central banks Large central banks






2004 34.58 24.00 26.63 42.58 39.00 20.88
2005 36.25 26.00 26.10 36.90 33.00 19.20
2006 34.64 25.00 25.93 43.10 37.50 21.79
2007 37.88 33.50 26.35 42.33 34.00 22.64
2008 38.21 33.00 26.60 42.20 34.50 21.93
2009 38.39 33.00 26.29 45.64 34.00 26.67
2010 34.88 30.00 22.73 48.57 35.00 27.84
2011 34.93 33.00 22.23 52.24 47.00 31.25
2012 35.96 30.00 22.81 50.08 37.00 30.58
2013 36.19 27.00 24.30 51.54 41.00 32.69
2014 33.78 24.00 23.98 55.26 47.00 33.94
2015 27.71 21.00 17.13 52.00 38.00 35.31
Average 35.55 27.00 24.32 47.37 38.00 28.10
Table 6.8: Height; small and large central banks
Small central banks Large central banks






2004 4.08 4.00 1.22 4.21 4.00 0.85
2005 4.30 4.00 1.14 4.48 4.00 1.50
2006 4.21 4.00 1.10 4.20 4.00 0.77
2007 4.15 4.00 1.03 4.19 4.00 0.81
2008 4.18 4.00 1.33 4.30 4.00 0.80
2009 4.18 4.00 1.33 4.36 4.00 0.79
2010 4.04 4.00 1.04 4.48 4.00 1.08
2011 4.04 4.00 0.90 4.33 4.00 1.15
2012 4.13 4.00 0.99 4.40 4.00 1.12
2013 4.14 4.00 1.06 4.43 4.00 1.23
2014 4.09 4.00 1.00 4.41 4.00 1.22
2015 3.76 4.00 0.97 4.40 4.00 1.22
Average 4.12 4.00 1.09 4.36 4.00 1.07
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Table 6.9: Span of control governor; small and large central banks
Small central banks Large central banks






2004 7.56 6.00 5.45 8.53 7.00 5.73
2005 7.11 6.00 5.12 7.95 6.00 6.07
2006 7.07 6.00 5.18 7.80 6.50 5.15
2007 7.07 6.00 5.01 8.00 7.00 5.00
2008 7.32 7.00 4.70 6.45 5.50 4.66
2009 7.46 7.00 4.86 7.09 6.00 5.21
2010 7.58 7.00 4.80 6.57 6.00 4.86
2011 7.52 7.00 4.85 7.38 6.00 4.74
2012 7.67 7.00 5.04 7.28 5.00 5.32
2013 7.24 7.00 4.47 7.68 6.00 5.60
2014 6.87 7.00 4.71 8.41 6.00 5.71
2015 8.41 8.00 4.60 7.68 6.00 5.19
Average 7.38 7.00 4.85 7.57 6.00 5.23
Table 6.10: Normalised Herfindahl centralisation; small and large central banks
Small central banks Large central banks






2004 0.30 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.13 0.13
2005 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.25
2006 0.29 0.15 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.17
2007 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.22
2008 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.16 0.11 0.16
2009 0.26 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.22
2010 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.21
2011 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.12 0.22
2012 0.27 0.14 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.20
2013 0.26 0.16 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.25
2014 0.31 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.13 0.22
2015 0.34 0.24 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.16
Average 0.28 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.13 0.20
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Table 6.11: Staff; small and large central banks
Small central banks Large central banks






2004 508.46 538.50 297.35 4242.00 2412.50 4100.19
2005 504.21 530.00 288.24 4043.10 2377.00 3925.17
2006 499.87 515.00 278.37 3966.55 2459.50 3730.66
2007 504.07 507.00 279.24 3890.90 2465.00 3654.24
2008 499.46 486.50 273.94 3701.91 2353.00 3567.53
2009 504.57 481.00 272.52 3682.33 2288.00 3545.64
2010 487.22 441.00 254.03 3478.50 2136.00 3362.83
2011 503.48 485.00 271.43 3599.57 2339.00 3363.75
2012 488.04 447.00 265.80 3497.73 2183.00 3336.45
2013 441.23 404.50 237.09 3221.12 2173.00 3188.90
2014 468.00 430.00 255.95 3370.26 2204.00 3165.52
2015 430.15 370.50 234.31 3304.09 2173.00 3004.88
Average 489.23 468.00 266.01 3648.72 2280.00 3429.84
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Table 6.12: Regression results central bank organisation: Coefficients and standard













ln Population 2.94 0.18 -0.08 -0.01 937.17***
(4.63) (0.14) (0.92) (0.05) (209.60)
ln GDP/capita 6.83 0.03 -0.34 -0.02 26.08
(5.15) (0.31) (0.60) (0.04) (90.19)
Internet users (per 100 people) 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 -4.10
(0.14) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (2.71)
General government debt to
GDP
0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.57
(0.08) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (2.14)
General government primary
net lending/borrowing to GDP
0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.00 6.25
(0.34) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00) (5.47)
Government effectiveness -13.17* -0.05 -1.48 0.03 -243.58
(6.22) (0.10) (1.18) (0.03) (165.08)
Stock market capitalisation (to
GDP)
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.27
(0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.89)
Constant -29.32 4.27* 6.87 0.35 102.71
(37.99) (2.11) (6.79) (0.27) (1578.17)
Observations 224 224 224 224 224
R2 within 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.24
R2 between 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.63
R2 overall 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.64
Wald chi2(8) 18.82 5.67 5.75 28.92 50.81
Prob > chi2 0.02 0.68 0.68 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: OLS estimation with random effects. Robust




Appendix to Chapter 4 - Currency Compositions of
International Reserves and the Euro Crisis




































































































Table 6.14: Number of countries reporting assets by currency
2013 2014
Total Currency Holdings 130 130
US dollar 127 127
Pound sterling 108 109
Euro 109 108
Japanese yen 87 88
Canadian dollar 84 85
Australian dollar 79 78
Swiss franc 73 69
Swedish krona 45 48
Norwegian krone 45 40
Chinese renminbi 27 38
New Zealand dollar 27 29
Singapore dollar 16 18
South African rand 11 12
Russian rouble 5 8
Indian rupee 4 6
Brazilian real 5 5
Other currencies 81 80
Source: IMF (2015, p. 2).
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Table 6.15: Official foreign currency assets by currency (mn USD and %)
2013 2014
Amount % Amount %
Total Currency Holdings 6,779,830.42 100.00 6,738,534.06 100.00
SRD Basket Currencies 6,276,718.91 92.58 6,214,838.24 92.23
US dollar 4,158,921.34 61.34 4,290,575.54 63.67
Euro 1,603,466.98 23.65 1,417,328.09 21.03
Pound sterling 287,966.45 4.25 274,564.80 4.07
Japanese yen 226,364.14 3.34 232,369.81 3.45
Non-SRD Basket Currencies 503,111.51 7.42 523,695.81 7.77
Australian dollar 151,026.62 2.23 142,451.37 2.11
Canadian dollar 133,863.09 1.97 133,869.60 1.99
Chinese renminbi 45,358.87 0.67 74,611.87 1.11
Swiss franc 16,077.82 0.24 15,365.62 0.23
New Zealand dollar 16,805.46 0.25 15,213.97 0.23
Swedish krona 13,819.59 0.20 13,224.57 0.20
Norwegian krone 13,956.93 0.21 12,050.16 0.18
Singapore dollar 4,388.19 0.06 3,912.38 0.06
Brazilian real 3,416.08 0.05 3,335.65 0.05
South African rand 2,687.69 0.04 3,140.54 0.05
Indian rupee 459.23 0.01 1,000.11 0.01
Russian rouble 360.81 0.01 355.97 0.01
Other currencies 100,891.13 1.49 105,164.00 1.56
Source: IMF (2015, p. 3)
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Table 6.16: Countries in sample (continents)










































Table 6.17: Countries in sample (industrial/emerging markets and developing
countries)









































Table 6.18: Different sizes of reserves relative to the central bank’s own
circumstances
Relative size of reserves Implications for Reserves Management
style
Inadequate Liquidity management, rationing of access to
foreign exchange (e. g. via exchange
controls), prioritisation of servicing of foreign
currency debt, establishment of credit lines,
dialogue with official sector finance (IMF
etc.).
Sufficient Liquidity management, hedging of foreign
currency debt, maintenance of
creditworthiness and access to market
finance.
Comfortable Liquidity management, hedging of foreign
currency debt, interest rate risk management,
increased transparency to stakeholders?
Surplus Interest rate risk management, market
selection, asset allocation and diversification,
much increased communication with
stakeholders.
Significant Wealth Wealth management, market selection,
strategic asset allocation, role as
shareholder/owner, implications for public
profile of the central bank, issue of whether
or not to split off assets to a SWF.
Source: Nugee (2000, p. 66).
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Appendix to Chapter 5 - Political Determinants of
the Financial Supervision Architecture




















































































































































































Table 6.20: Overview political data (1)




























































among politicians and civil











Large set of institutional
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Table 6.21: Overview political data (2)









Freedom House Assessment of political
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Kunčič Institutional environment of









































Table 6.22: Overview political data (3)






















































Compilation of data from
more than 100 sources by





















































Appendix Central Bank Handbook
This part of the appendix displays summary information for each central bank
analysed in this dissertation. Apart from basic information such as the respect-
ive central bank’s name, its year of establishment, and its legal basis, the data
shown on the following pages is an extract for 2015, being the latest year to date
where coherent cross-country information was available. Basic information usu-
ally comes from the respective central bank’s homepage. Data on currencies and
exchange rate regimes is from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), while data on ownership in parts
is from Bloomberg. Information about central bank employees, regional and for-
eign branches, inflation targets, and the composition of international central bank
reserves is taken from central bank annual reports. Information about financial
markets supervision largely relies on different issues of “How Countries Supervise
their Banks, Insurers and Securities Markets” (since 2014: “Directory of Financial
Regulators”) and the websites of the respective supervisory authorities. Central
bank laws provide the information displayed in the field “main objectives” and can
usually be found on the central bank homepages. Different issues of the “Central



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Excel VBA Code for Central Bank Handbook
In this appendix, I provide a program which I wrote for the automatic graphical
compilation of the country pages of the central bank handbook above.
Sub Daten_anzeigen()





Set strTbl = ActiveSheet
Zeile = Range(Cells(11, 3), Cells(97, 3)).Find([Year]).Row
’Country
tbl_01.Cells(2, 1) = [Country]
’Name of central bank
tbl_01.Cells(7, 2) = strTbl.Range("C1")
’Year of establishment
tbl_01.Cells(9, 2) = strTbl.Range("C2")
’Central bank law
tbl_01.Cells(11, 2) = strTbl.Range("C3")
’Currency
tbl_01.Cells(13, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 22)
’Exchange rate arrangement
tbl_01.Cells(15, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 23)
’Ownership
tbl_01.Cells(17, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 24)
’Government body
tbl_01.Cells(19, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 4)
’Employees
If strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 8) = "" Then
tbl_01.Cells(21, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 9)
Else
tbl_01.Cells(21, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 8)
End If
’Number of regional representations
tbl_01.Cells(23, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 10)
’Number of foreign representations
279
Appendix
tbl_01.Cells(25, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 12)
’Location of foreign representations
tbl_01.Cells(27, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 13)
’Financial markets supervision
For i = 0 To 2
tbl_01.Cells(30 + i, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 17 + i)
Next i
’Inflation target
If strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 26) = "" Then
tbl_01.Cells(34, 2) = "no"
Else
tbl_01.Cells(34, 2) = strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 26)
End If
’Composition of international reserves
If strTbl.Cells(Zeile, 27) = "" Then
tbl_01.Cells(36, 2) = "not reported"
Else














On Error Resume Next
ActiveSheet.Shapes("Logo").Delete
On Error GoTo Error












I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled The Organisation and Structure
of Central Banks is my own work. I have used only the sources indicated and have
not made unauthorised use of services of a third party. Where the work of others
has been quoted or reproduced, the source is always given. I have not presented this
thesis or parts thereof to a university as part of an examination or degree.
